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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Religious change in Europe continues to be a controversial topic. The main 
disputes regard if and how Europe is experiencing processes of secularization 
and how these processes can be explained. On the one hand, there are basically 
three different theories which strongly compete. Secularization theorists declare 
that religiosity in Europe is declining in all its dimensions. Individualization 
theorists declare that religion is changing instead from institutionalized forms to 
more individualized and intimate ones. Finally, adherents of the economic 
market approach prompt that religiosity is all about the ability of the churches to 
stimulate and attract believers. On the other hand, the link between 
modernization and secularization is often presented as the causal mechanism 
underneath religious change. Among this literature, Norris and Inglehart’s 
insecurity theory poses that processes of modernization and human 
development have increased the human security thus reducing the need for 
religion. This theory is based on the idea that religion can work as reassurance 
for conditions of insecurity or for life-threatening events. The present work tests 
this claim. After giving a comprehensive overview of the three main theoretical 
approaches to religious change (chapter 2), of the use of religion as coping 
strategy (chapter 3) and of the main methodological issues that need to be faced 
(chapter 4), I describe European religiosity and analyze possible processes of 
religious change. To do so, I focus on different dimensions of religiosity and I 
consider cohort replacement as the main mechanism to assess this change 
(chapter 5). It emerges that Practice is declining in all European countries, but 
religious self-definition and especially belief show a U-shaped trend for Orthodox 
countries. Given this peculiarity, I devote an entire chapter (chapter 6) to its 
exploration. After doing that, I explicitly deal with insecurity theory. To do so, I 
propose a multiple response multilevel model (EVS data) on European Christian 
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countries (chapter 7) which tackles the association between individual as well as 
contextual insecurity and individual religiosity. Results show that personal 
religiosity is weakly associated only with widowhood at the individual level but 
more strongly associated with economic inequalities and welfare spending at the 
country level. Chapter 8 goes deeper in the investigation of the relation between 
individual insecurity and religiosity. By mean of two fixed-effect panel models for 
Germany (SOEP data) and UK (BHPS + Understanding society data) I am able to 
explicitly test the hypothesis that a worsening of individual condition can foster 
an increase of religiosity. Results clearly show that such hypothesis applies only 
and little for widowhood. Hence, the case of Europe suggests that individual 
insecurity alone does not suit for a comprehensive sociological theory of religious 
change. It should be better integrated with other theories, e.g. the increase of 
education and the failure of religious transmission, to “place” countries on a 
hypothetical path to modernization.  
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Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
When dealing with the field of religious studies, it appears immediately clear 
how personal features, institutional contexts, historical facts and individual traits 
are interrelated. If compared to other fields in the social sciences, the study of 
religion is further complex also because the supernatural side of religiosity poses 
a daunting challenge to the main methods used by sociologists. This is of course 
puzzling but intriguing at the same time, but I am pretty confident that every 
sociology of religion is more motivated than discouraged by these challenges.       
 
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that religion is studied by sociologist in 
many different ways. We can find at one side a lot of works and approaches 
which focus on specific religious groups or on specific faiths or religious 
phenomena. The main aim of these approaches is to describe and interpret them 
deeply, putting emphasis on the meanings individuals give to their behaviors and 
beliefs. On the other side we can find many large-scale works which aim to 
describe and interpret the religious evolution the world is experiencing. Within 
this last approach it is also possible to distinguish some works which focus more 
on the description of religious change (is the world secularizing? Is religious 
practice declining?) from other which also try to find the causes of such change.  
 
This work is clearly placed in the second category. The main theoretical 
framework is the well-known secularization theory and the ongoing debate 
which oppose it to the individualization thesis. Scholars from the side of 
secularization affirm that religion is declining due to modernization processes 
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whereas individualization theorists assert that religion is rather changing, from a 
strong social and institutionalized phenomenon to a more individualized and 
intimate one. I will extensively describe these two main theoretical approaches 
in the first chapter of this work. In the same chapter I will also present the so 
called “economic-market model” or “religious economy theory” which I didn’t 
mention before because it seems less suitable – and it is less used –  to interpret 
European religiosity.    
 
The first empirical part of this work deals exactly with the debate between 
secularization and individualization theory. Using a multidimensional 
measurement and relying on the idea that religious change is driven by cohort 
replacement, the attempt is to understand whether different dimensions of 
religiosity show common or different patterns moving from the older to the 
youngest cohort. To put it simpler, if the three dimensions (practice, belief and 
self-definition) will show a common pattern, secularization theory comes out to 
be the appropriate framework to interpret European religiosity. On the contrary, 
if some trends differ – and especially if practice decrease and belief increase – 
this should reinforce the individualization thesis. Given the denominational 
heterogeneity within European Christianity, I will also divide the trends among 
the three main Christian doctrines – Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy. 
The idea behind is that different doctrines can shape differently the ways of 
being – or not being – religious.  
 
The literature about European processes of secularization is quite coherent in 
saying that Orthodox countries represent an oddity in the main discourse about 
secularization. Main related question is whether this anomaly is caused by the 
Orthodox theology or by the Communist past of these countries. Given the 
saliency of this debate I will devote an entire chapter to its analysis. 
 
13 
 
Until this point, the current work mainly aims to describe the religious change 
Europe is experiencing. The second part of the work tries instead to explore the 
causes of these changes. Both the secularization theory and the individualization 
one link religious change with modernization. This last is a broad-spectrum 
concept which comprise many different mechanisms ranging from the expanded 
education, passing through the weakening of social ties and to the improvement 
of the life conditions leading to more security for individuals. All these 
mechanisms are supposed to weaken or suppress religiosity. The main focus of 
this work is on the last one which is barely investigated in sociology. This lack of 
theoretical and empirical analysis from sociologists is quite problematic also in 
the light of the extensive interest given by psychologists to the link between 
insecurity and religiosity. In the field of religious studies, the first attempt to 
interpret religious differences in the light of security differences is the one by 
Norris and Inglehart: people who are suffering from situation of insecurity 
(threatening themselves or their community) tend to be more religious if 
compared to people who do not. This approach in undoubtedly interesting but it 
is clear that needs a lot of theoretical improvements. The attempt to expand the 
theoretical strength of this theory is clearly the main aim of this work.  
 
Given that the situations of insecurity can regard both individuals and their 
communities, I will firstly try to study whether individuals who are in situation of 
insecurity or who live in countries with low security are more likely to be 
religious. I do so by looking at European countries and focusing on some 
individual situations of insecurity as well as on country ones. In addition, I will 
not only look at economic insecurities (unemployment, income, economic 
inequalities) but also at existential insecurities like the health status or the loss of 
a partner. If the relation between insecurity and religiosity will be confirmed, the 
insecurity theory is likely to fill a relevant gap in the main secularization theory: 
its unidirectionality. As a matter of fact, secularization theory works well in 
interpreting religious decline but has no theoretical ways to explain eventual 
14 
 
reverse paths. If so intended, the insecurity theory can help in strengthening its 
theoretical base.    
 
Results from this study show quite different associations between individual and 
country insecurity and religiosity. This is quite expected because some country 
features I analyzed (like low average income or economic inequalities) are 
exactly the bases of the Norris and Inglehart’s version of insecurity theory. To 
better expand on the insecurity theory it is however essential a better 
assessment of the individual relation between insecurity and religiosity. In 
addition, a simply association between life-threatening situations and individual 
religiosity could not be enough to support the appropriateness of insecurity 
theory to interpret religious change. To really expand on the mechanism behind, 
the main question should be re-framed in a more longitudinal way: does a 
worsening of individual conditions foster religiosity? In the last analytical part of 
this work I will do exactly this. Starting from some longitudinal dataset about 
Germany and Great Britain, I test whether a worsening of economic conditions 
(loss of the job, income decrease) as well as existential conditions (loss of a 
partner, health deterioration) can foster individual religiosity. 
 
From this brief introduction it should be clear the theoretical relevance of this 
work, but its importance does not end here. In the very first rows, I said that the 
study of religion is methodologically challenging because of the different 
phenomena lying behind the general idea of “religiosity”. These methodological 
issues are even more stimulating given the supernatural aspects of the religion 
itself. It is therefore very important to refine the study of religiosity also from the 
methodological point of view. Along this work I will develop some strategy to 
better cope with the measurement issues. First of all, the attempt is to use a 
strong multidimensional research approach ad design and this is clearly visible in 
all the analytical parts. In addition, to push further this multidimensionality, I will 
use a particular kind of multilevel models which permits to deal simultaneously 
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with various dependent variables which, in our case, correspond to different 
dimensions of religiosity. The multilevel modeling techniques are also used when 
estimating the impact of individual as well as country insecurity on religiosity. For 
the last analytical part, I will perform instead an innovative attempt to study the 
relation between insecurity and religiosity using panel data: in doing so it is 
possible to switch from a research question like “are insecure people more likely 
to be religious?” to a question like “does insecurity foster individual religiosity?” 
with undeniable theoretical and methodological advantages.  
 
Everything considered, the present work will follow this structure. Chapter 2 
(RELIGIOUS DECLINE OR RELIGIOUS CHANGE?) is basically the theoretical chapter 
which tries to summarize the main theories behind religious studies with a 
particular focus on the differences among the various levels of interpretation. 
Chapter 3 (INSECURITY AND RELIGIOSITY - WHEN PSYCHOLOGY HELPS 
SOCIOLOGY) is instead the theoretical exploration of the bases of insecurity 
theory; the innovative approach of this chapter attempts to link sociological and 
psychological notions in an overall theory of insecurity which focus more in the 
individual side. Chapter 4 (ABOUT THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION) tries 
to shed light on the main methodological issues that need to be faced when 
studying religion with quantitative methods. More in detail, along this chapter I 
will deal with the issue of multidimensionality, with the interpretation of the 
different levels of analysis, with the kind of data which can be used for studying 
religion and with the age-period-cohort issue, which is very crucial when 
studying – religious – change. Chapter 5 (EUROPEAN RELIGIOSITY) is the first 
analytical chapter and basically draws a static as well as dynamic picture of 
European religiosity; in doing this I will use both the different dimensions and a 
typology of religiosity. Given some result from this chapter, I will devote Chapter 
6 (EASTERN RELIGIOSITY AFTER THE FALL OF BERLIN WALL) to the inspection of 
religious change in the Former-Communist countries. With Chapter 7  
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INSECURITY AND RELIGIOSITY IN THE CHRISTIAN EUROPE) I will go deeply in the 
insecurity theory by empirically testing the relation between some individual and 
country features related to insecurity and the individual religiosity. Chapter 8 ( 
 
DOES INSECURITY FOSTER RELIGIOSITY?) is the last analytical chapter and 
represents the empirical – longitudinal – test of the individual relation between 
insecurity and religiosity. At the end of these chapters I will try to draw some 
conclusions (Chapter 9 - CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION) both from a 
methodological and a theoretical point of view. Is individualization theory 
gaining theoretical ground or secularization theory is still the appropriate 
framework? Is insecurity theory useful to explain religious change in Europe? 
Does it represent an improvement of secularization theory? These are some 
questions I will seek to answer with this work.      
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Chapter 2  
 
RELIGIOUS DECLINE OR RELIGIOUS CHANGE? 
An ongoing debate about the past, the present and the future of European 
religiosity 
 
 
 
 
The debate concerning religiosity in general and European religiosity in particular 
is a complex one. As a matter of fact, a plenty of points of view, interpretations, 
theoretical and empirical issues are in the running. There is quite clear consensus 
that the best way to present and summarize this theoretical mare magnum 
entails the focus on three different theories: the secularization theory, the 
individualization theory and the economic market theory. Along this chapter I 
will follow this distinction with a paragraph for each of them. In addition, I will 
also present a short paragraph about the insecurity theory. This theory 
undoubtedly belongs to the broad secularization theory but, given its relevance 
for this entire work, I have deemed appropriate to devote it an entire paragraph.  
2.1 Secularization theory 
The secularization theory has a long intellectual tradition and is definitely the 
most prominent sociological approach in studying religion. “Secularization” is in 
fact a broad and umbrella term under which many possible processes are 
present. The core thesis of this theory states that processes of modernization will 
have a negative effect on stability and vitality of religious communities, practice, 
and convictions (Pollack 2008b). Secularization can also be viewed as the decline 
of the degree by which people involved in religious practice express their beliefs 
and behave in various aspects of life as influenced by such beliefs (Bruce 2002). A 
third view instead focuses on secularization as the “decline in religious 
authority”, intended as the decrease in the influence of religious institutions and 
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leaders over individual behaviour, social institutions, public discourse and value 
systems (Chaves 1994). 
 
Already from these definitions, it appears clear how can be complex to define 
such broad concept. As we can see from them, secularization can refer at the 
same time to individuals, communities and religious institutions, can affect both 
individual behaviours and belief and invade also the public debate.  
 
As with most concepts in the social sciences, there is no a universally accepted 
definition of secularization. Some definitions emphasize individual beliefs and 
practices, others the influence of religious norms and elites, and others the 
differentiation of religious and nonreligious spheres or institutions (Gorski and 
Altınordu 2008). Despite the complexity of this operation, it is worth to try to 
“narrow the field” of the potential definitions of secularization or at least to 
highlight the main theoretical knots that will be better analysed in the next 
paragraphs. In a hypothetical continuum of definitions, we can see the positions 
of Stark and Gauchet as its boundaries: on the one side Stark (Stark 1999b; Stark 
and Iannaccone 1994) oversimplifies the notion of secularization to the decline 
of individual practice and uses this evidence to raise its “economic market 
theory” (see next paragraph). On the other hand, the extreme formulation by the 
French philosopher Gauchet (Ferry and Gauchet 2004; Gauchet 1997, 1998) 
defines secularization as the loss of world-forming power that religion once had, 
a process directly resulting from the Enlightenment. If we follow this perspective, 
we must accept the fact that indicators of individual religiosity do not tell us 
anything about the degree of secularization (Gorski and Altınordu 2008).  
 
In the space between these extreme views, it is possible to find more complete 
frameworks which recognize the complexity of the secularization concept and 
which treat it as a multidimensional and multimechanism process. One of the 
first to introduce this complexity was the Belgian sociologist Dobbelaere (1999). 
19 
 
He proposed to distinguish among macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis and 
also between three major processes: the functional differentiation of societal 
subsystems, the emergence of competitive religious markets, and the 
individualization and privatization of religious practice and belief. Also Casanova 
(1994) follows this multi-processes approach and, in its well-known book on 
Public Religions in the Modern World, identifies three different mechanisms – 
differentiation, privatization, and decline – that can be defined in terms of 
different and partially unrelated hypotheses.  
 
These brief preliminary considerations suggest three main theoretical issues that 
need to be discussed in order to achieve a better comprehension of the 
phenomena. The analysis of these three points, the multidimensionality of the 
concept, its multi-level nature and its multi-mechanism character is the core of 
this paragraph. To better put them into context, it will be preceded by an 
attempt to summarize some relevant contributions to the topic. 
2.1.1 Secularization in the history: what can we learn looking backward? 
The use of the term “secularization” dates back ages and its etymology (as well 
as the related terms secular, secularism, secularist etc.) directly comes from the 
Latin “Saeculum”, meaning a century or an age (Gorski and Altınordu 2008). 
During the Middle Ages, the term was used to refer to the monks’ renunciation 
to the order’s rules and to their exit from the monastery and their return to the 
world. A third meaning of the word can be found in the period of the 
Reformation, when Protestant rulers confiscated the Church’s properties with 
the argument that worldly rulers could use them more efficiently. Based on this, 
the concept of secularization gained two – somehow opposed – different 
meanings; on one side, it suggests unjust and illegitimate expropriation whereas 
in the opposite it suggests increased rationality and efficiency. The fourth layer 
of meaning, which was outlined during the nineteenth century, directly arose 
with the spread of free thought and the rise of secular societies in the Western 
Europe (Gorski and Altınordu 2008). The main idea behind these societies was 
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the emancipation of various institutions from clerical and ecclesiastical influence 
and control. It follows a positive vision of secularism which idea was to enable 
individuals to shape their own worldviews. The contemporary definition of 
secularization bears the stamp of all these historical definitions.  
2.1.2 Modernization and Secularization: a sociological overview 
The differences between the historical and sociological uses of the term 
secularization are useful to highlight some issues related to the definition of 
secularization processes. As we can see from the previous paragraph, 
secularization comprises a variety of meaning and mechanisms ranging from the 
individual exit from the Church, passing through the expropriation of religious 
benefits by the worldly rulers and finishing with the separation between the 
religious sphere and the political and cultural one. This last meaning can also be 
analysed referring to secularization as the political project of a secularist 
movement. However it is defined, some sociologists describe secularization as an 
outcome or an effect whereas others prefer to consider it as a cause or a 
process. “Should we think of secularization as a working out of the internal logic 
of religious values or ethics, e.g., as a process of purification? Or should we think 
of it as the consequence of external forces that undermine religion?” (Gorski and 
Altınordu 2008:61). 
 
Since the beginning of sociology, some of the “founding fathers” like Max Weber 
and Emile Durkheim argued that religion had lost its central position in modern 
societies. Religion was no longer able, like in pre-modern societies, to provide a 
universally acknowledged worldview. According to Weber, the conflict among 
different value spheres is intrinsic characteristic of modern societies while 
Durkheim observed tendencies towards differentiation (Durkheim 1912). In both 
analyses, religious worldviews and practices were pushed towards the margins of 
society because they were no longer capable of determining the universal rules 
of what is socially acceptable. Given that, neither Weber nor Durkheim assumed 
that religion was heading towards oblivion under the conditions of modernity to 
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be replaced by a scientific worldview. What they argued is that process of 
modernization, transforming the entire social structure, cannot remain without 
consequences for religious traditions and institutions (Pollack 2008a). 
 
Brian Wilson (1982) identifies three different processes which are decisive for 
the decline of religion’s role in the society. He speaks of i) social differentiation 
referring to the diminishing influence of religion over the other spheres such the 
economy, the sciences, politics, arts, medicine and so on which became 
functionally autonomous. When he speaks about ii) societalization, he instead 
refers to the diminishing strength of the form of communities from which 
religion drew strength in the past. These very cohesive communities are now 
replaced by larger and more impersonal ones and this can only decrease the 
religious relevance. The third dynamic, the iii) rationalization, entails that social, 
political, scientific, economic, medical and educational aims can be accomplished 
by continually improving means, leaving transcendent sphere outside and 
detracting religious importance (Pollack 2008a). In addition, there is another 
process that would decrease the saliency of religion. Its analysis relies on the 
effect of increasing religious pluralism and elitarianism and basically states that 
in the face of this growing pluralism, “states that recognize the legal equality of 
individuals are forced to withdraw their support for specific religious 
organizations and to secularize their central institutions” (Bruce 2002; Pollack 
2008a:3). Under this condition of pluralism, religious societies are deprived of 
the regular confirmation they receive in culturally homogenous societies. 
Another way to interpret the link between modernization and secularization in 
the one by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Their central idea, which will be discussed 
extensively throughout this work, is that the meaning – and the need – of 
religion is determined by feelings of insecurity. In societies with greater 
existential risks, the need for religion is greater than in more secure and affluent 
societies.                
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As we can see from these contribution, it is puzzling to define how the 
modernization processes can be related to the secularization ones. This 
challenge is even more difficult because both sides of the relation are very 
complex to define. Concerning modernization, one of the best attempt to define 
it is the one by Ruiter and van Tubergen (2009) who successfully built a “typology 
of Modernities” which is completely suitable both for an accurate theoretical 
specification and for an analytical test. According to them, there are three 
different processes of modernization leading to secularization, each of which 
relies on different mechanisms. These three sets of mechanisms, which can be 
regarded as a summary of the abovementioned contributions, are: i) 
Modernization of ideologies, meaning the mechanism through which the more 
traditional religious worldview erodes (Weber 1922); ii) Modernization of social 
ties, that is the diminishing strength and multiplexity of social ties leading to less 
control of religious communities over their members (Durkheim 1912; Kelley and 
De Graaf 1997); iii) Modernization of economies, which leads to more financial, 
social and political securities for the population, reducing the need for religious 
reassurance (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004).  
 
The process of modernization of ideologies basically refers to the increasing 
schooling and scientific development typical of modernity: higher levels of 
education and technology stimulate principles like spirit of free inquiry and 
freedom of thought which lead to a more mechanistic worldview. Because this 
scientific rationalism erodes the cognitive basis of religious worldviews, 
modernity would lead to lower levels of religious commitment (Ruiter and van 
Tubergen 2009). Modernization of social ties means that the strength and 
multiplexity of social ties is diminishing in modern times. This phenomenon 
would lead to less control of religious communities over their members because 
religious behaviour is a predominantly social phenomenon, in which people are 
socialized, controlled, and possibly sanctioned by their parents, family, 
neighbours, religious community, schoolteachers and other socializing agents 
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(Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009). Process of modernization of economies instead 
means that the more financial, social and political securities typical of modernity 
can reduce the need for religious reassurance (Norris and Inglehart 2004).  
 
Simply starting from these contributions, it clearly emerges how it is complex to 
find a unique definition of secularization. This because process of secularization 
can involve different processes and mechanisms and operate at different levels. 
The various levels of interpretation and the different processes underlying the 
broad concept are important issues to face, especially if we want to find an 
analytical testable version of the secularization theory. The next two paragraphs 
will try to assess more in detail these two issues. I will start from the outstanding 
contribution of José Casanova who, while being at the time one of the fiercer 
critic of secularization theory, built up an enlightening specification of three 
different processes underlying the general theory. This contribution will be 
integrated with the one by Dobbelaere who also proposed a theoretical path 
which links the different mechanisms in the light of the levels they occur whithin. 
2.1.3 One secularization or more mechanisms?  
At the very beginning of sociology, the secularization thesis was accepted by all 
the founding fathers and had gathered the status of a real paradigm. The 
consensus was so widespread that the theory was neither contested nor 
empirically verified. The first attempts to reframe the theory as a more 
systematic and empirically testable one are dated in the sixties. Starting from 
that period some weaknesses became evident, and two basic issues had to be 
assessed; first of all, the secularization theory had to be detached from its 
ideological origins (the “enlightened” critique on religion) and, secondly, the 
theory had to be distinguished from its potential outcomes and results on 
religion (declining or disappearing) and religiosity.  
 
It is precisely from these issues that Casanova starts to better specify the 
secularization theory, avoiding to confuse the historical processes of 
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secularization with the consequences of these processes on religion and 
religiosity. According to the author there are three different processes 
underlying the broad concept of secularization. The first one, “modernization 
leads to functional differentiation and to emancipation of secular spheres (state, 
economy, science) from religious sphere” is the milestone of secularization 
theory. The other two processes, “secularization leads to religious decline” and 
“secularization leads to religious privatization” try instead to grasp the effects of 
the historical processes of secularization on religion and religiosity.  
 
Interpreting secularization as the differentiation between Church and State 
forces to take an historical perspective. If during the medieval time the reality 
was constructed along the single axis religious-secular and “secular” took on a 
meaning only as counterpart of “religious”, in modern times the same reality is 
constructed along multiple axes because of a great distinction and functional 
differentiation also among secular spheres. In this new configuration the 
religious sphere assumed a more peripheral role, specializing on the pure 
“religious functions” and left apart most of the “non-religious functions” 
gathered in centuries of historical processes. Four fundamental events have had 
a capital importance for this process of differentiation and reframing: the 
protestant reformation, the birth of modern states, the development of modern 
capitalism and the first scientific revolution. The protestant reformation worked 
at different levels: it mined the foundations of unity and universality of the 
Catholic Church, it gave relevance to the new bourgeois superstructure and 
boosted the processes of introduction of the new secular ethics already in 
progress. The rise of the secular modern state, instead, undermined the 
monopolist nature of the Church as organization of salvation and as holder of the 
– symbolic – violence. The development of modern capitalism made evident the 
irreconcilable conflict between the new economic relations and the old 
traditional “moral economies”. Money became the most impersonal medium of 
exchange and social interaction. The scientific revolution undermined the 
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religious sphere by introducing a new conflict between the old religious way of 
“searching for the truth” and the new rational way.  
 
Looking instead at secularization as a decline of religion basically means 
considering the effects of modernization on individual and aggregate religiosity. 
While religious decline was a quite well-accepted fact at the beginning of 
religious studies, further researches show a more heterogeneous situation, also 
in the light of the very demanding issues of religious measurement. Regarding 
this point, Casanova suggests caution in claiming a worldwide decline of 
religiosity because, starting from the Second World War, most of the religious 
traditions all over the world have experienced a growth or, at least, have 
maintained their vitality. The – supposed – constant decline of religiosity in most 
of the West-European countries should be considered as an exception and not 
the norm of Worldwide trends of religiosity (Casanova 1994). 
 
If we consider secularization as privatization of religion, we basically accept the 
idea that religion has increasingly shifted from the public space to a more private 
one. Religions are losing more and more their public role being less and less 
present in the mass media, in the education institutions and in the public debate 
in general. 
 
The work of Casanova is the most obvious example of why it is necessary to 
specify what is intended for secularization. Changing the point of view, focusing 
on some countries rather than others, looking at some or other mechanisms, 
choosing what “kind of secularization” is intended, can lead to completely 
different interpretations. As matter of fact, Casanova’s main claim is that, 
starting from the eighties, religion has re-entered the “public sphere” and has 
got exposure among mass media, scientific milieu and population in general. 
Religion, traditionally confined to private sphere, has entered the public arena of 
political and moral dispute (Casanova 1994). As evidence, Casanova lists a series 
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of historical facts driven by religion, like the Islamic revolution in Iran, the 
Solidarnosc movement in Poland, the influential role of Catholicism in the 
Sandinista revolution and in other South-American political conflicts, the grow of 
importance of the Protestant fundamentalism in the States. What is really 
interesting in the religiosity from the eighties is not the inception of “new 
religious movements”, of “new religious experiences” or of “new religious 
conscience”, which are social phenomenon well explained and studied by 
individualization theorists (see next chapters). What instead occurred, is a 
“public rebirth” of “traditional” (Casanova 1994). The core of Casanova’s 
argumentation is that modern world is characterized by a process of de-
privatization of religion. The term “de-privatization” means that traditional 
religions worldwide refuse to accept their marginal and privatized role predicted 
by secularization theorists. In the last years a plenty of social-religious 
movements arose in an open challenge to the primary secular spheres: state and 
market economy. Religious institutions and organizations do not want to be 
limited to the “individual religious and theological care” and therefore they boost 
the debate about the links between public and private morality; lots of issues are 
pushed and the secular system is continuously challenged. These processes, 
Casanova says, do not dismantle the core thesis of secularization theory 
(differentiation of secularized sphere from the religious norms and institutions) 
but they must be taken into account as a possible reverse of what was perceived 
as an irreversible trend. Worldwide religions are entering the public sphere and 
the political arena to safeguard their territory and to join the symbolic struggle 
for defining the borders between public and private, legality and morality, 
individuals and society and so on. 
 
The three processes here presented represent only one attempt to clarify what 
there is behind the otherwise vague concept of secularization. I decided to 
present them because they have two desirable features. They are so genera as to 
include also different – and more precise – meanings while being at the same 
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time so accurate to be empirically testable. Just to give the idea of the myriad of 
various attempts made by sociologist to define the mechanisms behind 
secularization, I here report a list of them presented by Dobbelaere (1999). In 
compiling this list, he refers to three different levels of analysis, which represent 
the second issue to clarify and which will be extensively analysed in the next 
paragraph. According to Dobbelaere, who recalls a similar list made by 
Tschannen (1992), examples of mechanism interconnected with secularization 
and located at the societal (macro) level are: institutional differentiation or 
segmentation (Luckmann 1967), autonomization (Berger 1967; Wilson 1969), 
rationalization (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982), societalization (Wilson 1976), 
disenchantment of the world (Berger 1967; Weber 1920), privatization  (Berger 
1967; Luckmann 1967), and generalization (Bellah 1967; Parsons 1967). At the 
meso-level we can instead find pluralization (Martin 1978), relativization (Berger 
1967) and this-worldliness (Luckmann 1990) and at the individual micro-level we 
find individualization (Bellah et al. 1985), bricolage  (Luckmann 1979), unbelief 
(Berger 1967)  and decline of church religiosity (Martin 1978). 
 
What should be clear after this paragraph is that a good way to clarify the 
various mechanisms behind the secularization process is to evaluate them as 
structured at different levels. This is necessary because the mechanisms 
operating at different levels could not be necessarily related or, if yes, their 
relations need an accurate analysis. If we do not follow this process it would be 
virtually impossible to develop clear and testable hypotheses about mechanism, 
cause and effects of secularization processes. 
2.1.4  Levels of interpretation 
As already seen, the idea of secularization is a broad one and more theoretical 
clarity about the level(s) of interpretation is needed to avoid misunderstandings 
or confused findings. The starting point of this controversial discussion regards 
the assumption – derived from the functional differentiation approach – that as a 
consequence of the decline of religion on the macro level, a waning of religious 
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ideas and practices at the individual level is also to be expected. This statement is 
less straightforward than it looks. Almost every scholar of religious studies tried 
to give its definition of secularization, putting emphasis on one of the two level 
or on both of them.  
 
Peter Berger has long been one of the main theorists of secularization and, 
during his “secularization phase”, said that “processes of secularization are 
taking place on the macro as well on the micro-sociological level” (1967:107). As 
said before, this is far from being the theoretical standard inasmuch several 
contemporary proponents of the theory assert that secularization remains 
confined only to the macro level (Pollack 2008a). Karen Dobbelaere’s thought 
(1999)  is one of the best examples of this. According to him, secularization 
implies that religion ceases to be significant in the societal system, which per se 
proves nothing about the religious consciousness of the individuals. Mark Chaves 
(1994) goes further and confines secularization to the decline of religious 
authority. In his words, secularization mechanisms no longer influence belief in 
God and, instead of dealing with the individual’s religiosity, the debate should 
shift to the capacity of religion to influence institutional spheres, structures and 
individual’s actions.  
 
It is certainly useful to distinguish between the different levels in which 
secularization processes take place because it allows to grasp and to differentiate 
simultaneous and possible contradictory processes. By means of such 
differentiation, it should be possible to define religious change more accurately. 
Given this, it is less useful to consider only one of these levels of interpretation as 
relevant because it prevents to give a correct interpretation of a process which is 
far more complex and articulated. If secularization entails the decline of religion, 
all dimensions are implicated – not only the societal, but also the individual, not 
only the behavioural, but also the cognitive, sentimental, and experimental 
(Pollack 2008a). Even if we assume that societal changes do not have a direct 
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impact on the individual level, it is quite likely that in the long run “the declining 
social significance of religion causes a decline in the number of religious people 
and the extent to which people are religious” (Bruce 2002:3). Belief systems, 
ideas, emotions, attitudes are completely part of religion and are thus affected 
by religious decline and changing role of religious institutions.  
 
As mentioned before, Dobbelaere (1999) gave a very interesting outline of the 
processes related to the descriptive concept of secularization. He did so by 
distinguish three different levels for the interpretations of the concept itself. 
These levels, the macro-level or societal system, the meso-level and the 
individual micro-level need to be accurately analysed as well as the relations 
between them. The Dobbelaere reasoning starts from the consideration that 
modern societies are differentiated along functional lines and so various 
subsystems developed different functional domains like the economy, polity, 
science, family. Each of these subsystems communicate with its own medium 
(money, power, truth, love) and develop their own values and norms. In respect 
to religion, these subsystems claim autonomy and reject religious prescribed 
norms aiming to a kind of autonomization. This autonomization takes the form of 
the “emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority, the separation of 
church and state, the rejection of church prescriptions about birth control and 
abortion, the decline of religious content in literature and arts, and the 
development of science as an autonomous secular perspective” (Dobbelaere 
1999:231). If meant in this way, the term secularization describes the 
consequences of functional differentiation for the religious subsystem. 
Secularization is thus situated at the societal macro-level, and should be 
intended as resulting from the processes of functional differentiation and 
autonomization of the societal subsystems. In this way, secularization “is only 
the particularization of the general process of functional differentiation in the 
religious subsystem” (Dobbelaere 1999:231). Even if so intended, the term 
secularization continues to maintain its central role in the debate because it 
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refers to a specific social conflict linked to the religious resistance to such 
functional differentiation (Chaves 1997:443). Starting from this point, Chaves 
confirms the Dobbelaere’s reasoning and describes secularization as the 
declining scope of religious authority at the societal level (Chaves 1994). 
Consistently with the theoretical model I am here presenting, he distinguishes 
between the same levels of analysis stating that there is a societal secularization 
to differentiate from an organizational secularization (meso level) and an 
individual one (micro level). As consequence of this declining of religious 
authority at the societal level, Dobbelaere mentions the development of 
functional rationality. With this functional rationality, politics became rational, 
economy became rational and also the modern states extended and rationalized 
their administration, leaving aside the concepts of traditional and charismatic 
authority. This new structure needed rational and scientific training and 
education and thus a scientific approach to the world and the teaching of 
technical knowledge progressively replaced a religious-literary formation. This 
rational-scientific approach to the world spread out also in the life-world and 
also domestic and intimate activities became increasingly rationalized and 
predictable. This new cognition wiped out the pre-logical religious concepts and 
was objectified as a new language which changed the image of reality. This new 
language was taken up by the media and thus this change was radicalized and 
became a social phenomenon (Acquaviva 1979). This new rational-scientific 
approach, following the functional differentiation undermined the objectivity of 
religion and de facto relativized its religious contents.  
 
This went hand in hand with a pluralization of religious claims: different religions 
started to compete to keep their followers and to find new ones. This pluralistic 
situation, which results in a religious market placed by Dobbelaere at the meso-
level, pushed religion into crisis of credibility (Berger 1967). This pluralism, had 
undermined the objectivity of religion which started to be perceived as useless 
and was followed by a loss of status and power. This opened the field to the 
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emergence of new – forms of – religions which started to compete in the 
religious market. These new religions, call them exotic, exoteric, spiritual, new 
age, were characterized by a lowered level of transcendence: they became “this-
worldly” or mundane (Luckmann 1990). These new religions work only at the 
level of “intermediate transcendence” (see next chapter), they bridge time and 
space, they promote intersubjective communion, but remain at the immanent 
level of everyday reality. Probably, if employing a functional definition of religion, 
they would not even be defined as such.  
 
We are moving step by step toward the individual level of religious behaviour 
and beliefs. We started from the societal functional differentiation which causes 
an autonomization of the different subsystems from the religious sphere (macro-
level); this caused a loss of credibility of religion and the consequent opening of a 
pluralized religious market (meso-level). All this to say that the focus on 
individual religious behaviours is not a valid indicator of the process of 
secularization, which is a societal process (Dobbelaere 1999). This does not imply 
that people’s religious behaviours and attitudes are not influence by societal 
situation, “but that the explanation of individual behaviour may not be reduced 
to a simple direct effect of the secularization process on the societal level: the 
motivational structure at the micro level is more complex” (Dobbelaere 
1999:236). This reasoning brings us directly to the individual micro-level. What is 
happening at this level is defined in a plenty of ways, often competing: 
individualization, unbelief, bricolage, decline in church religiosity, unchurching of 
individuals, just to name a few. In any way they are defined, these mechanisms 
happening at the individual level come from the fact that the church is more and 
more seen as an organizational structure belonging only to the religious 
subsystem and thus differentiated from the life-world. Churches appear now as 
kind of service stations (see the notions of vicarious religions in the paragraph 
about individualization theory) used by people only on certain occasions with a 
functional and fully utilitarian approach. This directly comes from the functional 
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differentiation presented above, which had a strong impact on the life-world. 
The entire life-world was de-traditionalized, the social and ascriptive roles 
become less pressing, the increased availability of transportation allowed people 
to lessen the control of families and neighbourhoods, traditions were relativized, 
the television brought new messages and ideas in every house, the level of 
education rose, women were liberated from their “biological” roles. This period 
of functional differentiation was followed by an economic boom, people had 
more freedom, more choices and “church members claimed the same freedom 
in religious and ethical matters” (Dobbelaere 1999:238). As consequence, people 
developed the idea that either themselves or specialist could solve their problem 
and this removed God from their life and stimulate unbelief. Even if some people 
continue to believe, God is no longer conceived as a personal God, with which to 
establish a personal relation. This cause the drop out of Christian rituals, since 
they are completely centred on the relationship with “God as a person”. This of 
course causes the number of unchurched people to grow and the members’ 
involvement in the churches to decrease. This loss of church authority and 
relevance, the more pluralistic religious market and the growing individualization 
can also lead to a “religious bricolage”, intending a lower propensity to accept 
and follow religious claim tout court. Whereas in olden times the churches were 
able to impose their doctrines, now they loss authority and religious bricolage is 
substantially accepted, notwithstanding the official opposition of the church.  
 
The idea of unchurching and, in general, of religious decline is the main claim 
from secularization theories whereas this notion of religious bricolage belongs 
more to the branch of research under the name of individualization theory. The 
contact points between the two theories are many, and this is not surprising 
because they share the same starting point: the functional differentiation. 
Anyhow, what should be clear here, is that religiosity at individual level cannot 
be explained exclusively by the secularization of the social system; many other 
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factors like individualization of decisions, mobility, de-traditionalisation and 
utilitarian individualism are at work.  
2.1.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was not to give a fully comprehensive overview of all the 
contribution concerning secularization. Besides the fact that it is virtually 
impossible to do so, our choice was to problematize three main issues very 
relevant to cope with when studying religiosity and its evolution. In doing so I 
decided to report contribution by preeminent scholars from the field who 
explicitly have addressed these issues. Through the contribution by José 
Casanova I have shed some light on the importance to define, especially in the 
empirical analysis, the processes we are focusing on. The difference among 
secularization as decline of religiosity, as individualization of religiosity or as 
differentiation between church and state consists in adopting completely 
different theoretical frameworks, resulting in completely different analytical 
strategies. This emphasis on different mechanisms is the starting point of Karel 
Dobbelaere who expands this issue putting different processes at different 
levels. In light of this, when speaking about secularization, it should be necessary 
to distinguish, for example, between societal secularization and individual 
secularization. According to this approach the secularization of the social system 
does not lead directly to a decrease of the individual religiosity. Other factors are 
at work and the relevant consequence is that, if we talk about analytical 
strategies, the decline of religious beliefs and practices may not be considered as 
a valid indicator for the secularization of the social system, and vice versa. This 
poses a very crucial theoretical issue. If we accept the idea of the various levels, 
every theoretical and analytical framework should therefore include a clear 
assessment about how the different levels influence each other: in other words, 
how societal secularization and individual secularization are related? How 
societal mechanism impact on individual religiosity? This third issue was partially 
addressed when I presented the different types of modernization and their 
possible impact on individual religiosity. Despite the excellent typology I 
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presented (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009), much has still to be done. If the 
mechanism behind the link between modernization and secularization is 
clarified, the whole paradigm of secularization will gain much more theoretical 
power.     
 
The next paragraph makes a step in this direction. The insecurity theory, which is 
the reference theory of this entire work, is a kind of specification of the whole 
secularization theory. One of its strengths is precisely the attempt to clarify how 
religious change can be related to the processes of modernization. I will present 
it in two different sections. In the next paragraph I will report a kind of overview 
using mainly the words by Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2011). In Chapter 3, I 
will instead present a wider explanation which goes deeper into its theoretical 
and practical relevance.       
 
Figure 1: Secularization theory, a brief summary 
Main hypothesis: Processes of modernization foster religious decline 
Main aim: Give the theoretical tools to study and interpret religious decline 
Main  - Levels of interpretation, micro, meso or macro? 
issues: - Different secularizations and different mechanism behind 
 - Define modernization; one modernizations, many modernizations 
 - Identify the real causal mechanisms 
 - Avoid unidirectionality 
 - Territorial focus: is secularization a worldwide process? 
 
2.2 Exploring the causal mechanisms: The Insecurity Theory 
As we saw in the previous paragraph, main issue for secularization theorists is 
the differentiation among different levels and processes. Besides this, 
secularization scholars need also to assess the important question pertaining to 
the causal mechanisms: in which way societal processes influence individual’s 
religious behaviour and belief? “In order to explain which processes conceivably 
cause religious decline”, Pollack says, “it is not sufficient to formulate general 
facets of modernity such as functional differentiation, rationalization or 
pluralization. It is essential to also isolate the causal mechanisms via which 
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sociological trends influence people’s behaviour and attitudes. These 
mechanisms that are regarded as decisive for individuals’ religious attitudes and 
behaviours determine not only the explanatory potential of each respective 
theory, but also their course of argumentation” (2012:9).  
 
The insecurity theory directly arises from the general old-fashioned 
secularization theory trying to push further its explanatory power. Specifically, it 
attempts to cope with the main secularization theory weaknesses: its 
unidirectionality and the absence of a strong causal explanation. The 
secularization theory has been descripted in several ways, among which very 
clear – and quite harsh – is the one by Stark and Finke (2000). According to them, 
this theory can be viewed as a useless elevator going only down. The metaphor 
works quite well. Secularization approach best fits to describe the supposed 
religious decline but, given the absence of real causal explanation, fails to explain 
an eventual reverse path. What if modernization processes stop or reverse? 
What could happen to religiosity? Secularization theory has no answer. The 
classic version of secularization theory clearly needs an upgrade. Moreover, what 
is needed is to update it from a theory of an “inevitable religious decline” to a 
theory explaining variation (Stark and Finke 2000). There is only one way to do 
this: a strong focus on the causal mechanisms influencing religiosity.  
 
Starting from the outstanding work by Norris and Inglehart (2004), insecurity 
theorists have tried to find the mechanisms fostering both the individual and the 
aggregate religiosity. It is not an easy path. Individual and contextual mechanism, 
past and present dynamics, socialization processes and various institutional 
settings coexist. The challenge is puzzling but intriguing, the literature scarce. 
The insecurity theory is in need of development, both theoretically and 
empirically.  To shed light into this quite brand-new theory, I will now proceed 
from the general idea behind and then going to the main related issues. 
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The starting point of this theory appears easy and simplistic but include a lot of 
different aspects. To come straight to the point, it is possible to say that the main 
hypothesis behind is that the more insecure people feel, the more religious they 
will be (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2004). “Feeling 
of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are key factors driving 
religiosity” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:4). The idea is the one of reassurance and 
it is quite well studied also in the psychological literature (Hoelter and Epley 
1979; Pargament 1997; Petersen and Roy 1985). People experiencing insecurity 
feel stressed. The more anxiety one experiences, the less one is capable of 
controlling and predict what will happen. This enhances the need for the 
reassurance driven by religious ideologies. “Religious ideologies provide people 
with predictable rules to help them cope with dangers and immediate problems: 
a supernatural force or God ensures that in the end everything will turn out well 
– either presently or in a possible future afterlife” (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2011:1). People experiencing insecurity and stress have the need for rigid and 
clear rules, searching for the maximum predictability. On the contrary, 
individuals living under conditions of relative security can tolerate more 
ambiguity and they are less in need of the rigidly predictable rules that religious 
sanctions provide (Norris and Inglehart 2004). That is, in situation of pervasive 
risks to life and well-being, “people seek comfort in the idea that their suffering 
may have meaning and/or that an higher power will ultimately protect them” 
(Fairbrother 2013:8). Despite being a very interesting approach, the insecurity 
theory needs however a strong theoretical development. The literature about it 
is scarce but is possible to glimpse some points to expand on.   
2.2.1 Individual Vs contextual  
As already mentioned, the need of religious reassurance is less pressing in 
situations of greater security. The effect of insecurity on religiosity can although 
operate at both the societal-contextual level and the individual-personal level. 
This means that “insecurities can arise from both individual and contextual 
conditions” (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2011:2). For instance, using a classic 
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example of economic insecurity, unemployed people are in an insecure personal 
situation. This can lead to high level of religiosity if compared to people who 
have a job. Over this individual situation, a situation of insecurity can arise when 
other people around are unemployed. Therefore, if the unemployment rate of a 
country is high or whether a particular generation is facing a period of low 
employment, people are more confronted with unemployed friends or relatives. 
Confronting with people in an insecurity situation can worry about a possible 
insecure condition in their own future as well. This twofold nature of insecurity 
theory arise since the very first postulation by Norris and Inglehart (2004). 
Starting from the introduction of their book they require to specify this point: 
“people who experience ego-tropic risks during their formative years (posing 
direct threats to themselves and their families) or socio-tropic risks (threatening 
their community) tend to be far more religious than those who grow up under 
safer, comfortable, and more predictable conditions” (Norris and Inglehart 
2004:5). 
2.2.2 Past vs present 
In the last passage from Norris and Inglehart they mentioned the growing up 
conditions, implicitly stating that past conditions impact on religiosity. In addition 
to this, they implicitly acknowledge that also present insecurities might affect 
religiosity. They report as example major natural disasters which can cause a 
resurgence of insecurity. So, “does it matter whether people are currently 
confronted with an insecurity condition or that they have (ever) experienced 
insecurity in the past?” (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2011:2). Stating that only 
past insecurities matters means stressing that religious values and behaviours 
are acquired early in life and that socialization processes during childhood are 
responsible of lifelong religiosity.  At the moment only the work by Immerzeel 
and van Tubergen has tested these hypotheses. They find that both past and 
present insecurities are related to religiosity (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2011). Although some cautions due to methodological issues, they conclude that 
religiosity is a dynamic personal feature related to both present and past. In 
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other words, this would imply that religiosity is not only the results of 
socialization process, but are also subject to change later in one’ life.  Testing this 
idea in a more coherent and comprehensive way is without doubts one of the 
main goals of insecurity theorists. 
2.2.3 Economic Vs existential 
Recalling the abovementioned general idea, insecurity theory states that the 
importance and the need of religion remains high among vulnerable populations, 
namely who lives in poor or very unequal nations, facing daily survival-
threatening risks. Norris and Inglehart (2004:4) argue that “feeling of 
vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are key factors driving 
religiosity”. But what is intended for risks? It is time to go deep and clarify. The 
best – and probably the only – attempt to specify this point is another time the 
one by Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2011). They basically define two kinds of 
insecurities and associated risks: economic and existential. The general idea 
behind economic insecurities refer to the position of an individual in the market 
economy (Vail 1999). Informative examples can be one’s level of income or 
employment status (individual) but also unemployment rate or country’s social 
welfare spending (contextual). Existential insecurities are instead concerned with 
situation that confront people with life-threatening situations like experience of 
war, death of a friend or parent or bad health.  
2.2.4 Linking insecurity theory and secularization: Reversibility 
After having presented the main issues related to insecurity theory, it is now 
time to understand how and whether it can be considered as an upgrade of 
secularization theory. A good starting point is reasoning about what is meant for 
security. The very core idea denotes freedom from various risks and dangers. At 
the beginning the concept was only used referring to military power to defend 
integrity and security of the nation state. Of course this conception was 
insufficient and needed to be reformulate in a clearer and inclusive way. The 
notion of security only linked to military power was supplemented with many 
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other risks contributing to human security ranging from environmental 
degradation and natural and manmade disasters (floods, earthquakes and so on) 
to violations of human rights, humanitarian crisis and poverty (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). It is clear that economic development is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to create human security, and even if it is, it cannot be 
considered as deterministic. Of course the various stages of modernization 
transform the living conditions for many people reducing their risks, but 
situation-specific factors “make it impossible to predicts exactly what will happen 
in any given society” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:16). The increase of security due 
to modernization processes can therefore be momentarily halted or even 
reversed, also in rich countries, by dramatic events like natural disasters, wars or 
severe recession. If so, insecurity theory can give the conceptual tools to theorize 
also a resurgence of religiosity. 
 
Figure 2: Insecurity theory, a brief summary 
Main hypothesis: More insecure people feel, the more religious they will be 
Main aim: update the classic secularization theory with stronger causal 
explanation, giving the tools to theorize also an – eventual – reverse path. 
Main  - Individual and contextual insecurities 
issues: - Past and present insecurities 
 - Economic and existential insecurities 
 
2.3 Individualization theory 
Theoretically speaking, the individualization theory covers a space in-between 
the secularization theory and the economic market model. Like “secularization”, 
the term “individualization” can be viewed as an umbrella term under which 
different processes and specifications are present. It shares with the 
secularization theory the idea that functional differentiation, rationalization and 
cultural pluralization are driving macro-sociological changes. In contrast to this 
theory, however, it does not assume that these macro-sociological changes lead 
to a decline of societal significance of religion. Concerning this, individualization 
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theory shares with the economic market model the assertion that religion and 
modernity are compatible. Modernization in fact does not lead a decline in the 
religious significance, but rather a change in its forms. This basically means that, 
while religion was institutionalized in the form of Church in pre-modern 
societies, the relationship between Church and religiosity gradually dissolves in 
modern societies. The relation between individuals and religion has emancipated 
itself from the strong medium of religious institutions and religious preferences 
and practice are increasingly subjected to the individual’s autonomous choices 
(Pollack 2008b).  
 
Like secularization theorists, also scholars who refer to individualization theory 
explore the relation between modernization and religiosity. According to this 
thesis, modernization leads to a decline in people’s religious attachment to the 
church. However, the decline in institutional religion does not mean that 
individuals are becoming less religious. Religious beliefs persist, and develop into 
increasingly individualized and privatized forms of religiosity (Nicolet and Tresch 
2009b). Modernization entails a pervasive expansion of instrumental reason in all 
region of life; nevertheless, individual interest in the spiritual and the religious 
has not undergone any decline (Hervieu-Léger 2001). More and more people 
want to believe but without putting this belief into practice (Davie 1990:463). 
According to the individualization thesis’ proponents, modernization contributes 
to religious change rather than religious decline: while individuals have 
increasingly taken their distance from religious institutions, religious beliefs tend 
to persist, and even to come out strengthened (Davie 2002; Hervieu-Léger 1999).  
 
Process of modernization results in a growing rationalization of the different 
domains of society; this functional differentiation reduces the sphere of 
influence of religious institutions so that tasks that were commonly assumed by 
the church are now taken over by specialized professional and organizations 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004). Religion thus loses the all-encompassing and 
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overarching role it once had (Halman and Draulans 2006) because modernization 
leads to a change in the social forms of religion rather than to a decline of its 
social signification (Pollack and Pickel 2007). This undermined preponderance of 
institutional religion, “conventionally interpreted as the spread of secularization, 
should be recognized as the emergence of […] the privatized, social form of 
religion.” (Luckmann 2003:279,280).  
 
To sum up, this “religious modernity” can be described by its two main features. 
First, as a consequence of the weakening of the authority of religious 
institutions, people’s personal beliefs and their sense of attachment to the 
church have become two increasingly distinct dimensions of religiosity. Secondly, 
freed from the authority of the institutionalized churches, individuals have the 
possibility to develop their own belief system, without any references to an 
institutionally validated body of beliefs. Thus, as beliefs persist, they are 
becoming increasingly personal, detached and heterogeneous (Davie 1990, 2002; 
Hervieu-Léger 1999). This process of religious individualization does not mean 
that individual religiosity is weakened; instead, it becomes multifaceted, 
syncretistic, and alienated from church (Pollack and Pickel 2007; Stolz et al. 
2016a). 
 
To deeply investigate the theoretical underpinnings of this branch of religious 
studies, in the next three paragraphs I will present three basic contributions 
based on the works of the three most outstanding advocates of individual 
religiosity. I will start from the classic idea of “believing but not belonging” 
developed by Davie, I will continue with the systems of validation of faith by 
Hervieu-Léger and conclude with the concept of world-view and transcendences 
by Luckmann.     
2.3.1 Believing without belonging 
Starting from the work of Davie (1990), “believing without belonging” has 
become the catchphrase of much European work on religion in the past decades, 
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aiming at grasping this individual and intimate religiosity which is growing as 
opposed to classical and institutional form of religiosity. To better explain and to 
go deeply in the theoretical keystones of this idea, a good starting point are the 
two versions of “believing without belonging” (from now: BWB) developed by 
Voas and Crockett (2005) in their attempt to criticize the theory1.  
 
The strong version of “believing without belonging” states that, with the 
exception of a handful of atheists, Europeans continue to believe in God and to 
have religious sensibilities: the proportion of believers is high and has changed 
little in the recent years. This strong version entails a focus on beliefs as 
something related to a “classic” religious background; what results from religious 
modernization is the different “fruition” of this religiosity. From a religiosity 
based on strong practice and church affiliation to a more individual and self-
related religiosity based on personal beliefs. 
 
The weak interpretation of “believing without belonging” is instead something 
much more attenuated and less related to classic religiosity. In this interpretation 
beliefs are allowed to be vague and even non-religious; they can be described as 
“alternative spirituality” or generic “belief in the supernatural”. This spiritual 
belief can be described with general feelings, experiences and the more 
numinous aspects of religious beliefs (Davie 1994).    
       
In the strong version of BWB individuals give a religious sense to their spiritual 
quest or, in other words, they establish a self-referential relationship between 
their personal belief and a traditional, institutionalized faith. “I feel spiritually 
Christian, but I don’t belong to any church”; “I feel close to Buddhism”. To 
cultivate such personal preferences, commonly expressed with ease by free-
floating believers, it is not necessary to join a particular religious group. In this 
                                                          
1 Voas and Crockett are two of the main opponents of the Believing without belonging thesis. It 
can sound weird to use their words while explaining its basics but this seems a very good 
example of that “knowing the enemy” is the best way to deal with it. 
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sense, believing without belonging means one’s spiritual experience condensate 
into an intimate and purely private relationship with what one choose to call 
“God”. Given this, the eminently personal experience does not require action in 
the world and then membership within a believing community is of secondary 
importance, if not completely useless. 
 
The weak interpretation of BWB instead relates on a more general spirituality or 
supernatural beliefs which characterize modern societies, overwhelmed by rapid 
technological, social and cultural changes. These kind of beliefs form what 
Hervieu-Léger (2001) calls “interior religion”, stressing the fact that modern 
religious scene is not characterized by religious individualism as such; it is rather 
the absorption of religious individualism within modern individualism. The result 
of this commingling between modern individualism and religious sensibilities can 
be described with the simplistic (but certainly evocative) term of “New Age”. This 
kind of religious beliefs is entirely centred upon individuals and their personal 
accomplishments, and characterized by the primacy of personal experience. The 
key issue of these religious/spiritual beliefs is that no authority defines and 
imposes external norms upon the individuals.  
 
This self-perfection is made available through physical and spiritual practices 
borrowed from the great traditions of mysticism and spirituality. These form of 
New-age refer to a strictly “this-worldly” salvation; the goal of power over 
nature, pursued by modern sciences, is linked with the goal of realizing one’s 
physical and psychological capacities. From this arises the importance given by 
many of these believers to “paranormal phenomena” (out-of-the-body 
experiences, journey through previous lives, communication with spirits). These 
New age movements bring to the fore the tendencies generally present in 
renewal movements which shape historic religions: a search for personal 
authenticity, the importance given to experience, the rejection of faith systems 
which offer ready keys to reality, a this-worldly conception of salvation 
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conceived as a form of individual self-perfection, and so forth (Hervieu-Léger 
2001). “Religious modernity” is, fundamentally, a product of this process. It 
incorporates the spiritual quest into a psychological modernity characterized by 
individual concern for the perfection of self. 
 
Despite the strong individual focus of this kind of religion/spiritualism and its 
refusal of institutional legitimation of faith, individuals must find outside of 
themselves a confirmation of the validity of these spiritual meanings. This 
explosion of beliefs is the work of individuals who cobble together, in their 
systems of signification, trying to give a subjective meaning to their own 
experience, and who independently choose the communal affiliations which they 
themselves recognize. It is impossible to speak about religion, even in this 
spiritual/extra-church meaning, without speaking about the systems of validation 
of faith. In the next paragraph a brief outline of the basics systems of validation 
of faith will be presented, putting emphasis on the mutual validation and self-
validation, typical of religious modernity.   
2.3.2 Systems of validation of faith 
In dealing with the various regimes of validation of faith, it can be useful to 
explain both the historical pattern of religious institutionalization and the 
different degrees of such institutionalization and de-institutionalization. The 
most exhaustive typology is the one of Hervieu-Léger (2001), who describe four 
different regimes (see Figure 3). 
 
The regime of the institutional validation concurs with the classical acceptation 
of institutional religion. In these regimes, an institutional authority holds the 
legitimate power to fix the rules of adherence and affiliation which delineate the 
boundaries of religious groups. In Catholicism, for example, the institutional 
magisterium, for which the bishop is the guardian, assumes this function. 
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Figure 3: Systems of validation of faith 
Regime of Validation: INSTITUTIONAL 
Referent for Validation: INSTITUTIONALLY QUALIFIED AUTHORIY 
Criterion for Validation: CONFORMITY 
 
Regime of Validation: COMMUNAL 
Referent for Validation: THE GROUP AS SUCH 
Criterion for Validation: COHERENCE 
 
Regime of Validation: MUTUAL 
Referent for Validation: THE OTHER 
Criterion for Validation: AUTHENTICITY 
 
Regime of Validation: SELF-VALIDATION 
Referent for Validation: THE INDIVIDUAL HIM OR HERSELF 
Criterion for Validation: SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY 
 
 
In the regime of communal validation of faith, it is the group as such which 
constitutes the validation. The relations within the group are supposed to be 
governed by egalitarianism and, also in the case when some leaders emerge, 
they are supposed to express themselves in the name of the whole group. 
 
The regime of mutual validation refers to a system in which the illumination of 
faith’s truth is accomplished within intersubjective interaction. No exterior 
precedent – neither institutions nor community – can prescribe for the individual 
an assemblage of truths of faith. There is no “true faith” but that which is 
personally appropriated. 
 
In the regime of self-validation, all the instances of validation other than the 
individual vanish. It is in individuals themselves, in their subjective certitude of 
possessing the truth, that the confirmation of the truth of faith is found. 
 
How this typology can be useful to describe the abovementioned two versions of 
BWB? Can they be described as different stages of a sort of evolution across 
these four different regimes?  
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The answer could be yes. In the strong version of BWB, as already said, there is a 
shift from a traditional, institutionalized “fruition” of religion to a more 
individualized and self-referential one. This basically means a progressive 
distancing from a religiosity strongly based of institutional precepts (like weekly 
church attendance for roman Catholics) to a religiosity subjectively experienced 
or, at least, shared with small communities of parishes. This would result in an 
increasingly shift from a regime of institutional validation where the rules of 
adherence are fixed by an institutional authority and where these rules delineate 
the boundaries, to a regime of self-validation. This regime of self-validation can, 
in turn, take the shape of a regime of mutual validation if groups and networks 
make use of flexible and unstable forms of social affinity, founded upon the 
spiritual, social, and cultural proximity of the individuals who are involved.  
 
The weak version of BWB relies instead on a reverse path. The starting point is a 
purely subjective conception of the truth, and the key issue of these 
religious/spiritual beliefs is that no authority defines and imposes norms and 
boundaries upon the individuals; we are speaking, of course, of a regime of self-
validation. But a regime only based on self-validation is short lived: if more 
people cobble together a small-scale system of beliefs adjusted to their needs 
they will, soon or later, aspire to share this experience with others who share the 
same type of spiritual aspiration. At the very beginning, the bonds between the 
disciples of this nebulous spirituality are produced by episodic recourse to 
resource centres: bookstores, educational facilities, convention centres, and so 
forth. These bonds bear witness to spiritual affinities, but not bind the 
participants “religiously” together. The validation of faith remains, at the core of 
these cooperatives of spiritual resources, a truly individual discipline (Hervieu-
Léger 2001). After this phase of strong self-validation, individuals must find 
outside of themselves a confirmation of the validity of these meanings; it is in the 
mutual exchange that individuals can hope to find a way to establish a personal 
47 
 
universe of meaning with which they might equip themselves. If no one ever 
affirms, “what makes sense to you also makes sense to me”, these individually 
produced meanings will not make sense in the long term. This phase of mutual 
exchange, based strongly than before to a common consumption of cultural 
products, can be easily identified as the regime of mutual validation in the 
Hervieu-Léger’s typology. This sharing of reading materials and activities can 
constitutes one of the motivating factors in binding together networks of 
individual: these fluid, flexible, unstable, and even virtual networks can 
constitute the “degree zero” of a spiritual communalization. This 
communalization can evolve, if it allows for the subjective and objective 
incorporation of these insterested into a faith lineage recognized by them as 
such, towards a forms of religious communalization. 
  
A good way to complete and to give more clues to the work of Hervieu-Léger is 
to present Thomas Luckmann’s idea of different trascendences underlying the 
general world-views; understanding the relations among these various 
trascendence and among the different “providers” of these trascendence can 
give more insight to the mechanisms of religious individualization, putting 
enphasis also on the historical patterns.                   
2.3.3 World-views and transcendence in Luckmann’s work 
The statement that religion has to be considered incompatible with modernity, 
declared by sociology’s founding fathers and scholars from secularization theory, 
is stated as false by scholars from individualization theory. As Luckmann (2003) 
says, religion is not a passing phase in the evolution of mankind but a universal 
aspect of the conditio humana. Religion can appear under different socio-
structural conditions in various historical forms, but it remains a constituent 
element of human life, bonding the individual human being, most particularly its 
experiences of transcendence, to a collective view of good life.  
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The basic idea in Luckmann’s speech is that of society’s world-view. These world-
views, inherent features of every society, present to every individual born into a 
particular society a conception of the nature of life and death; they define the 
relation of everyday reality to an extraordinary, transcendent reality, and they 
articulate a given view of what is good and what is evil. These world-views, with 
their core of relation between good life and transcendent realities, are 
transmitted in long historical chains of communicative processes to successive 
generations.   
 
A phenomenological description of the subjective experiences of transcendence 
related to world-views reveals three different levels. The continuous minor 
transcendences, defined by the boundaries of time and space, and the 
intermediate transcendences defined by the otherness of fellow being, are 
related to the ordinary everyday experience. Managing the minor transcendence 
is the domain of magic while the intermediate/social transcendence 
circumscribes the domain of political religion. The great transcendences are 
experienced in dreams, ecstasies, meditation, pain and in the sight of death; in 
the classic view of religion, all the collective representations trying to cope with 
this great transcendence are the only conventionally viewed as being properly 
religious. Actually, world-views in general and their religious core in particular 
contain all three levels, although their proportion may differ (Luckmann 2003). 
 
The mutual relation between this religious part of the world-view and the rest of 
collective representations well defines some societal features and permits to 
draw a sort of historical pattern, focusing on the separation among sacred and 
profane. In archaic societies, marked by a simple division of labour, the 
transmission and maintenance of the sacred were based on the entire social 
structure, without strong differentiation of religious functions. A second step of 
religious development can be identified in the Pharaonic Egypt and in the old 
societies of the Near East. In these societies, although the transcendent realities 
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continue to legitimate the entire social structure, the specifically religious part of 
the world-view had highly visible ties to the institutions of power, as in divine 
kingship. In a period more or less corresponding with the Roman Empire it was 
possible to find the pre-modern roots of a functionally specialized institution 
system. In these societies, the sacred part of reality was sharply segregated from 
the profane, and religion acquired a visibly separate location in a special set of 
social institutions. This institutional specialization of religious functions, and the 
monopolization of these functions by one unique religious institution, resulted in 
a Church which, during the Middle Ages, was capable of contesting the state or 
entering into profitable alliance with it. This situation persisted until the 
beginning of modern era and the social transformations of the late 18th and the 
19th centuries; from that period, the consequences of the general functional 
specialization of institutions have helped to undermine the preponderance of 
religion in modern societies. The institutional specialization of religion in modern 
societies entails that norms embedded in social institutions are no longer 
perceived as subjectively significant by individuals, and thereby lose their 
effectiveness as models for the integration of sense. Since social institutions, 
among them the Church, are no longer embedded within the sacred cosmos of 
the worldview, they lose their ability to provide a ‘subjectively meaningful 
system of “ultimate” significance’ for individuals. This process, conventionally 
interpreted as the spread of secularization, should be recognized as the 
emergence of a fourth, the privatized, social form of religion (Luckmann 2003). 
 
Starting from the beginning of the modern era, both religion and morals were 
increasingly individualized and privatized. Religion became faith, morality 
became conscience. The “privatized” social form of religion did not simply 
replace the institutionally specialized social form; it redefined the general social-
structural and cultural framework within which Churches were to coexist with 
other, in the main, highly individualized objectivations of religious experience. In 
modern era, different world-views became available to everyone; the belief in 
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the uniqueness and superiority of one’s own view of transcendence was 
challenged and their dominance in the conduct of ordinary life was undermined 
(Berger and Luckmann 1995).  
 
Basically, this de-monopolization of the production and distribution of world-
views represents the main feature of the “modern privatized” social form of 
religion. Religious collective representations are produced in a sort of open 
market and the canonization of one world-view for the entire society become 
impossible. In this new religious open-market, Churches remain important in 
providing products which are clearly labelled as religious. Moreover, they are at 
the same time in competition with other contemporary constructions of a sacred 
cosmos which attempt to cope with the subjective experiences of the great 
transcendence. The “New” religious communities and the “large-scale 
commercialized enterprises” labelled as “New Age” are present among the new 
religious suppliers.  
2.3.4 From believing without belonging to vicarious religion 
In the previous two paragraphs we explored a sort of historical path in the 
evolution and weakening of institutional religions. The sociological debate about 
the interpretation of the last stage (the one of “modernized privatized religions”) 
of this evolution is quite intense. On one hand, scholars like Wilson, Bruce, Gill 
and Voas, argue that the mismatch between believing and belonging is simply a 
temporary phenomenon and that it is only a matter of time before belief, not 
sustained by regular attendance, will diminish to match the more rigorous 
indicators of religiosity. On the other hand, it is possible to find scholars from 
individualization theory who state that certain dimensions of belief and 
belonging may well be inverse rather than direct related.  
 
This theoretical debate about the separation of (individual) belief and belonging 
(focused also on the institutional dimension) can offer fruitful ways for going 
further in the analysis of religion in modern Europe. The most interesting 
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contribution in this way is the one by Davie (2000, 2001) who introduce the idea 
of “vicarious religion”. By vicarious, she means the “notion of religion performed 
by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at 
least) not only understand, but quite clearly approve of what the minority is 
doing” (Davie 2012:169). To explain her idea of vicarious religion, Davie refers to 
Lutheran churches in Northern countries. Despite the fact that attendance in 
these countries is the lowest among European countries, it seems that 
individuals remain members of their churches; they use them extensively for the 
occasional offices and regard membership as part of national just as much as 
religious identity. Davie pushes the debate reversing the formula of believing 
without belonging and introducing the idea of belonging without believing. 
Institutional Churches seems to be something inherent to the cultural heritage of 
a nation, which are “used” only in special occasions (birth, marriage, death) or 
when catastrophic episodes occur. For this last aspect, she shows the examples 
of the shipwreck of the Swedish ferry Estonia or the death of Princess Diana. 
Both these episodes were linked to a massive and extensive recourse to 
Churches in two of the most secular countries in Europe.  
 
These two examples are, according to the author, simply large-scale and media-
hyped versions of what goes on all the time in the life-cycles of ordinary people. 
Individual families and communities regularly pause for thought at critical 
moments in their existence, frequently marking these with some forms of liturgy. 
The vicariousness of European Churches can thus be viewed in their continuing 
role in the life-cycles of European people; European populations continue to see 
Churches as public utilities maintained for the common good, for maintain the 
status quo. This vicariousness, according to Davie, still resonates in Europe in the 
early years of the twenty-first century and will do the same for the foreseeable 
future; this concept seems to be more penetrating and more accurate than 
believing without belonging but, of course, the longer term is rather more 
difficult to predict. A whole range of issues needs to be taken into account, 
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including a clear mutation in the religious lives in Europe which entailed a shift 
from a culture of obligation to one of consumption.  
 
Modern religiosity can be described from the start of the twentieth century with 
two basic sets of interrelated shifts. First, historic churches are systematically 
losing their capacity to discipline the religious thinking of large sections of the 
population, especially amongst the youngest. Second, the range of religious 
choices is becoming wider as innovative forms of religiosity are growing or are 
coming from outside Europe. In this sense a genuine religious market is emerging 
in most parts of the continent. To summarize, what until moderately recently 
was simply imposed or inherited becomes a matter of personal choice; “I go to 
church […] because I want to, maybe for a short period or maybe for longer, to 
fulfil a particular rather than a general need in my life and where I will continue 
my attachment so long as it provides what I want, but I have no obligation either 
to attend in the first place or to continue if I don’t want to” (Davie 2012:173). 
Here the shift from the classical culture of obligation to a new, modern and 
individualized culture of consumption. 
 
 
Figure 4: Individualization theory, a brief summary 
Main hypothesis: religion is not declining but rather changing from classic 
institutionalized forms to more individualized and personal ones. 
Main aim: to oppose the classic secularization theory and its emphasis to 
irreversible decline. Change the lens with which religion is interpreted. 
Main  - Individual Vs institutionalised religiosity 
issues: - Vague Spirituality (weak version of BWB) Vs personalized 
religion (strong version of BWB) 
 - Vicarious religion: from a culture of 0bligation to a culture of 
consumption 
 
2.4 Religious market theory 
There are some contributions which casted doubts about the plausibly of 
secularization theory and the idea of secularization as an all-embracing theory. 
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These are the works by Bainbridge, Finke, Iannacone and Stark whose theoretical 
work basically stresses the importance of the supply of attractive religious 
options assuming a stable demand by individuals.  
 
While the various scholars within the secularization theory discern a strained 
relationship between religion and modernity, adherents of the economic market 
model (also called “supply-side model”) presume compatibility between the two. 
While speculating about this supposed compatibility between modernity and 
religiosity, the economic market model assumes that the processes of religious 
pluralization unfolding in modern societies have a positive effect on the stability 
of religious communities, convictions or practices.  
 
The more pluralist the religious market, the greater the competition between the 
various religious providers. Competition prompts each religious community and 
its representatives to improve their services in order to retain their clients and to 
attract new ones. In contrast, in cases where one religious community occupies a 
monopoly position, the clergy tends to become indolent and lazy, and to 
disregard people’s needs (Pollack 2008b). This model, according to its 
proponents, well fits also considering the level of individual consumers. If various 
religious offers exists, individual is more likely to “find the pair of shoes that fits 
him best” (Pollack 2008a:5). In contrast, under the conditions of religious 
monopoly, the likelihood of product dissatisfaction rises, as individual needs vary 
and cannot be satisfied optimally by a single provider.  
 
In the model, religious pluralism can unfold if there is strict separation between 
church and state, because no religious community holds a privileged position 
over another. In this situation, the starting costs for smaller religious 
communities to establish themselves beside the large churches are low enough 
only if the state does not intervene in religious affairs and does not favour one of 
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the large churches. Once religious pluralism is stablished, the productivity of the 
entire religious market rises due to growing competition (Pollack 2008a, 2008b). 
 
The theoretical starting point of this theory is the idea of religious economy. 
According to Stark (1966), a religious system, such as the economic system, 
entails the interaction between supply and demand. In the religious economy the 
“traded” goods are “supernatural explanations”, through which individuals use 
and build relations with transcendent being and subjects. These relations are 
used to obtain the access to “scarce rewards” (every kind of good to which the 
individual attaches value, love, richness, health, job, power) or “not available 
here-and-now rewards” (available only within supernatural contexts, freedom 
from illness, eternal happiness). Therefore, according to this theory, religion is a 
sort of market where people demand for “supernatural explanations” while 
religious enterprises provide answers. Religious firms are social enterprises 
which primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply religion to some set of 
individuals (Stark and Iannaccone 1994).  
 
The idea of religious market and supply side approach triggered a huge amount 
of empirical research and a stream of book and journal articles. The main 
criticism moved to the use of the market logic (where assumptions from rational 
choice approach are involved) is that scholars excel in formal modelling but fail 
to provide empirical evidence, or when they use data, it is typically to show that 
their models indeed apply post hoc (De Graaf 2013). As Goldthorpe (2000) noted, 
scholars using Rational Choice are driven mainly by the intellectual challenge of 
providing a theoretical model for a theoretical puzzle, caring less about the 
empirical evidence. This criticism seems to apply less to the study of religion 
because this Rational Choice approach has not only inspired the theoretical 
discussions but has also encouraged the gathering of unique data sources, the 
refining in the use of secondary data and an impressive interplay between theory 
and empirical research. Despite this amount of empirical research, the literature 
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has still been plagued by the habit of ignoring empirical findings that do not fit 
the theory, seriously challenging the theoretical progress in this field (De Graaf 
2013).  
 
The supply side approach to religion implies individual’s cost-benefits analysis. 
The starting point is that religion can be perceived as an economic exchange 
between people and imagined supernatural agents for goods that are scarce or 
impossible to obtain in the real world. As Iannacone demonstrated (1991), the 
idea of an economic theory of religious institution was already expressed by 
Adam Smith (1965) who showed the disadvantage of a monopoly and the 
advantages of competition. According to him, the clergy of established churches 
might become lazy, and this is an advantage for new religious enthusiastic 
looking for followers. This can be considered as the theoretical milestone for all 
the improvements came after. As far as it is possible to foresee from this 
introduction, the economic market theoretical model can be seen both from the 
point of view of the individuals and from the point of view of the religious 
context. In presenting the basic features of this theory, I will therefore start from 
its micro and macro foundations, moving then to the three most problematic 
issues. 
2.4.1 Religious Market Theory: Micro and Macro Foundations 
The micro foundation of supply side theory basically resides in what individuals 
look for in a religious market. These “religious goods”, in their classical 
acceptation, are supernatural and no verifiable compensator and they are 
“treated by humans as if they were rewards” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1996: 36). The 
supernatural and no verifiable nature of these rewards suggested to Stark 
(1999a) to replace the label “compensator” with “otherworldly rewards”; the 
focus on such final goals of religion is similar to the “salvation goals” theorized by 
Weber (Stolz, 2006:15). The self-evident problem in managing this kind of goods 
is intrinsic in their nature: how it is possible to evaluate these rewards if they are 
not transparent, not objective and maybe unreal? According to Wilson (2002), 
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this micro foundation of Stark’s theory provide us with goods we cannot have; if 
these goods cannot be produced by human action, supernatural agents are 
invented to provide, or promise to provide, these goods in the afterlife, and 
people pray for such goods.  
 
This conception however might capture only half of the meaning; it totally 
ignores the kind of goods that can be produced by human actions and the role of 
religion in achieving this. It ignores basically the social dimension of religious life. 
Within religious networks people can support each other and may receive 
positive support, both psychological (comfort, company) and practical (food, 
economic support). Summarizing, we can speak at least of two kind of religious 
goods “exchanged in the market”: social support and otherworldly support. The 
first can be found also in other markets, whereas the latter is monopolized by 
religious market.  
 
The micro foundation of religious market theory mainly focuses on individual and 
psychological need for religious supply (which are very hard to measure); what 
instead has inspired most research is the macro theoretical model of religious 
economies explicating what stimulate religious participation. More or less every 
empirical work concerning supply side theory tries to explain which contextual 
features can drive religiosity. As starting point to present these macro 
propositions, I am going to consider three relevant proposition made by Stark 
and Finke in their “Acts of Faith: Explaining the human Side of Religion” 
(2000:198-201): 
 
Proposition 71: “To the degree that a religious economy is unregulated, it will 
tend to be very pluralistic.” In this context “unregulated market” means that the 
state does not support a specific church and does not restrict competition 
between churches. Pluralism is related to the number of religious firms active in 
the economy; more firms will hold to more pluralism. 
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Proposition 72: “The capacity of a single religious firm to monopolize a religious 
economy depends upon the degree to which the state uses coercive force to 
regulate the religious economy.” 
Proposition 73: “To the degree that religious economies are unregulated and 
competitive, overall levels of religious participation will be high. Conversely, 
lacking competition, the dominant firm[s] will be too inefficient to sustain 
vigorous marketing effort, and the result will be an overall level of religious 
participation, with the average person minimizing and delaying payment of 
religious costs”. 
 
Summarizing up these three proposition it is possible to say that, according to 
religious market theory, countries with a strong religious competition, more 
pluralism and low level of religious regulation will have more religious suppliers 
thus producing attractive religious commodities. This can sound interesting in a 
situation of classical and perfect market but, is religious market a perfect or a 
classical market? To answer this question, or to give more insight, we have to 
refer to the three basic issues which still remain unsolved theoretical dilemmas. 
These three issues refer to the basic (and at the same time problematic) 
underpinnings of religious market theory, namely the i) strong focus on the 
supply side and on the market competition, the ii) implicit assumption that 
religious market is like any other market and the iii) strong assumption of a 
stable demand of religion over time and place. I will assess these three issues 
separately. 
2.4.2 Market Competition and Religious Competition 
One of the main issues concerning religious market as a pure market is the idea 
of competition. From the general theoretical framework, it seems that both a 
lack of regulation and a high level of pluralism positively affect competition. In 
reality, a clear definition of competition and especially of the causal mechanism 
among pluralism, regulation and competition is missing. This makes it difficult to 
measure competition, with the results of a possible misunderstanding of the 
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findings. Authors might, for example, agree on the increase of religious pluralism 
in a society but disagree on whether this should be interpreted as an increase or 
decrease of competition (Olson 2002). Trying to overcome this theoretical lack of 
specification, Olson suggests two different definitions of religious competition. 
The first, which can fit to the claims by Stark and colleague, holds that 
competition is indicated by the number of potential substitutes to one’s own 
religious group. The second instead takes into consideration the substitutability, 
suggesting the idea of submarkets (De Graaf 2013). The underlying idea is that 
there is real competition only when different submarkets can substitute each 
other. In making religious choices, people try to conserve their religious capital 
and, for example, Lutheran congregation are unlikely to compete with the 
nearby mosque, while both try to meet religious needs (Olson 2002:142). 
Because of religious capital, people would be unlikely to switch to a totally 
different denomination. What is noticed in Europe, for example, is that typically 
the only options about what a Catholic decides is whether to stay a Catholic or to 
become nonreligious (De Graaf 2013); similar findings exist among Orthodox 
members (Need and Evans 2004). It is very unlikely that people switch to another 
religion and, if they do so, the switch concerns a new church that is very similar, 
since it is costly not to conserve one’s religious capital (Stark and Finke 2000).  
 
As said before the absence of a clear definition of religious competition is 
problematic. This issues is usually not addresses and, because of the lack of 
direct measures of competition, pluralism is often used as a proxy for 
competitiveness (Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996). Causally, one expects that 
pluralism is required for making competition possible but in reality pluralism is a 
necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Stark and Finke (2000:218) state 
that “it must be noted that in some circumstance, pluralism does not results in 
competition and thus will not be associated with higher levels of religious 
commitment”. This not-causal relation between pluralism, competition and 
religious commitment can be seen in a situation of conflict because, “even where 
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competition is limited, religious firms can generate high levels of participation to 
the extent that firms serve as the primary organizational vehicles for social 
conflicts. Conversely, if religious firms become significantly less important as 
vehicles for social conflict, they will be correspondingly less able to generate 
commitment” (Stark and Finke 2000:202). 
 
Starting from this consideration about competition and conflict, Olson (2002) 
suggests that it is not competition but religious opposition that is the central 
driving force (De Graaf 2013). Religious competition and religious conflict can be 
combined in what Olson called “religious opposition”. He defines religious 
opposition as “behaviour (or threatened behaviour) that obstructs (or is believed 
to obstruct) a religious group’s attainment of its goals” (Olson 2002:139). 
Religious competition and religious conflict may increase religious commitment, 
but they have different causal mechanisms due to different levels of 
consciousness: religious conflict involves conscious opposition, whereas religious 
competition can be unconscious. In situation of conscious religious conflict, 
religious adherents may, perceiving themselves as a target and without appeal 
from religious leaders, start to perceive religious group as a source of 
organizational strength and as a means to protect their interests. This is 
therefore more a demand side issue, quite inconsistent with the claims of 
religious market theory (Olson 2002). Also regarding unconscious religious 
competition some theoretical problems are present. Hamberg and Petterson 
stress the issue that producers in a religious competitive market may not 
consciously compete with each other (2002). Since competition is totally 
conscious in the classical market definition, it is important to investigate whether 
and to what extent the religious market is special. 
2.4.3 Comparing Markets 
The approach of considering religious market in the same ways as the other 
markets clashes immediately with the most controversial issue of this theory. In 
a classic market, individuals look for buying a certain good, at a certain prize and 
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considering all the dealers at a reasonable distance. A large number of dealers 
implies more competition. Interestingly, scholars from the religious market 
theory replace indicators measuring competition (i.e. number of Churches) with 
indicators of pluralism. This can be the first theoretical and analytical problem in 
considering religious market as a classic market. Anyhow, any indicator will be 
used, it “must be assessed from the point-of-view of the individual and thus is a 
local phenomenon, limited to an easily travelled area” (Stark and Finke 2002:37). 
This idea of “reasonable distance” has to be considered if religious market has to 
be treated as a classical market. 
 
Second sensible issue in comparing religious to classic market is the state 
intervention and the resulting situation of monopoly, oligopoly or real free 
market. As Stark and Finke hypothesize, “the capacity of a single religious firm to 
monopolize a religious economy depends upon the degree to which the state 
uses coercive force to regulate the religious economy” (2002:37). According to 
this point, it seems that the state in modern societies has an incentive to use 
coercive force to regulate the market for commercial commodities in order to 
maximize competition. On the contrary, we see that states, with only a few 
exceptions, are increasingly reluctant to intervene with the religious market, 
which anyway maximizes the competition among religions (De Graaf 2013:330). 
Regarding to state intervention and to comparability between religious and 
classical markets, it seems that different approaches give the same result, 
namely more competition. This is undoubtedly a relevant point that needs to be 
clarified by religious market’s supporters.    
 
Another point of contrast between religious and classic markets regards the 
nature of the exchanged goods. In classic markets exchanged goods are 
“experience goods” for which the quality can be assessed, with a certain degree 
of certainty, using them and building their reputation. Religious goods are 
instead “inscrutable goods” and both buyers and sellers have no reliable 
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information on the quality of the product (i.e. salvation). This point contradicts 
one of the basic assumptions of Rational Choice Theory applied to market 
strategy, namely that the choice is not only rational but based on well-founded 
beliefs. In the case of inscrutable goods, religious firms have to rely only to their 
reputation to avoid the continually proofing of the quality of products. Churches 
basically use symbols instead of signs to build and demonstrate the validity of 
their products. “The more a commodity approaches inscrutability, the greater 
the incentive to invest in symbolic resources, and the fiercer the competition 
selecting successful symbols” (Gambetta 1994:359).  
 
Of course religious goods have to be considered as inscrutable but it is quite 
common that religious people might not judge these goods as inscrutable, simply 
because they are looking for verifications only: only positive signals are 
considered. Nobody questions the role of the saints in the cases in which people 
do not survive, for example, a serious car accident; more common among 
religious individuals to thank God, saints or supernatural entities when someone 
survive to such accident. Every seller working in a classic market should be 
jealous of such one-sidedness where negative empirical facts are simply ignored. 
2.4.4 Religious Demand Stable Over Time and Place? 
The third crucial issues that we need to discuss here regards the assumption that 
people would have a constant demand with respect to religious products. This 
fact has been debated a lot since the first Stark’s postulates. The statement that 
“in pursuit of rewards, humans will seek to exchange with a God or Gods” (Stark 
1999a:270) has been expanded stating that “regardless of power, persons and 
groups will tend to accept religious compensators for rewards that do not exist in 
this life. […] in some regards everyone is deprived and everyone has a motive for 
being religious – that since everyone faces death, doctrines of an afterlife appeal 
to all. We could call this the universal form of religious commitment” (Stark 
1997:8). Religion is the only plausible source of certain rewards for which there is 
a general and inexhaustible demand (Stark and Finke 2002). A less strictly 
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formulation of this idea is that: “important religious developments derive from 
change in the incentives and opportunities facing religious producers, not some 
sudden shift in the material or psychological state of the populace. Of course, 
religious markets respond to the equilibrating forces of both supply and demand, 
but, as a matter of historical fact, religious demand proves much more stable 
than religious supply” (Finke and Iannaccone 1993:28). It can be quite hard to 
demonstrate or to falsify this statement; here I am presenting two different 
considerations which can give more insight to assess the issue.  
 
The first consideration is rooted in the work of the evolutionary anthropologist 
Robin Dunbar (2004). He describes four important functions of every religion: “i) 
providing coherence for the world in which we live (a metaphysical scheme that 
explains why the world is as it is, and thus makes sense of it for us); ii) allowing 
us to feel we have greater control (through prayer and other rituals) over the 
vagaries of life than we would otherwise do; iii) enforcing rules about how we 
should behave in society (ethics and moral systems); and iv) allowing a minority 
to exert political control over the community” (ibid.:168). This would imply that if 
something else could replace these functions, or we do not need these functions 
anymore, the demand for religion could decline (De Graaf 2013). In modern 
times the problem for contemporary rationalist is how to create this sense of 
community without resorting to the mechanism of religion, because religion 
works […] when we abandon rational thought and surrender ourselves to the 
mysterious and the ineffable” (Dunbar 2004:200). Consequently, according to 
Dunbar the best prediction for the future is a stable demand. 
 
Second test as to whether the demand is stable or not is provided by the former 
communist societies in Eastern Europe. In these countries the communist 
regimes tried, although not always very successfully, to abolish religion. At the 
end of these regimes the coercive force to destroy religion disappeared and, if 
religious demand is indeed stable, one would expect an increase in the number 
63 
 
of church members. This issue was tested quite extensively, with heterogeneous 
and interesting results. Need and Evans concluded that “while the communist 
regimes were indeed rather unsuccessful in destroying private religion, the 
forces of modernization continued this process regardless” (Need and Evans 
2004:206). Greeley (1994) conversely sees a religious revival in Russia while Voas 
and Doebler (2011) reveals rather mixed results. The most interesting results are 
the ones by Froese and Pfaff (2001, 2004) who show that religiosity, in former 
communist countries, has increased in Orthodox countries but not in Catholic 
countries. These findings suggest that the demand for religion might be stable, at 
least for particular cases like Orthodox countries. Far from being the definitive 
evidence for the stability of religious demand, the case of former Communist 
countries remains an interesting quasi-experiment to scrutinize deeply (I will do 
so in Chapter 6).  
 
 
Figure 5: Religious market theory, a brief summary 
Main hypothesis: processes of religious pluralization have a positive effect on 
the stability of religious communities, convictions, or practices 
Main aim: oppose the classic secularization theory and presuming 
compatibility between modernization and religiosity 
Main  - Demand of belief stable in time and space 
issues: - Religious market working as the other markets 
 - Market Competition Vs religious competition 
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Chapter 3  
 
INSECURITY AND RELIGIOSITY - WHEN PSYCHOLOGY HELPS 
SOCIOLOGY 
An overview of the main theories behind the idea of religion as reassurance 
 
 
 
 
The idea that religious behaviour and belief is somehow linked to the situations 
of insecurity individuals experience has become a kind of common-sense 
knowledge both in the academia and in the media. What clashes with this is that 
very little research been conducted on this connection; especially in the field of 
sociology of religion only few attempts have been made but many academics, 
columnists and reporters alike continue to claim the individuals facing 
uncertainty will likely turn to religion. For decades scholar have taken for granted 
the fact that people experiencing situations of uncertainty are more likely to be 
religious. 
3.1 A few bits of literature 
Some attempts to study (American) religion and its relationship with economic 
circumstances were carried on during the ’70 (Glock and Stark 1965; Stark 1972)  
but what follows were 30 years of research void. What brought attention back to 
this topic was the seminal work by Norris and Inglehart (2004) which had the 
undeniable merit to refocus the attention and to avoid leaving the insecurity 
theory in the domain of common-sense theories. In their book Sacred and 
Secular, the two authors re-examine the secularization debate with the idea that 
religiosity increases when individuals feel a sense of vulnerability. The more 
affluent nations, they say, will show lower levels of religiosity if compared to the 
poorer ones. “The process of secularization – […] – has occurred most clearly 
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among the most prosperous social sectors living in affluent and secure post-
industrial nations” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:5). And vice-versa “people who 
experience ego-tropic risks during their formative years (posing direct threats to 
themselves and their families) or socio-tropic risks (threatening their community) 
tend to be far more religious than those who grow up under safer, comfortable, 
and more predictable conditions” (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Although it is 
rightly considered as the cornerstone of this field of study, their book basically 
lacks in a fundamental aspect: an attempt to refer to the causal mechanism 
behind the association is completely missing. There are only few words about 
how the link between insecurity and religiosity works and about the micro-level 
factors and their effects on religiosity. In order to better understand what is 
going on for worldwide religiosity and to correctly place the insecurity theory in 
the broad framework of secularization theory, the individual experience should 
be included in the “formula”. The main theoretical approach, while linking 
modernization to secularization best fits to describe a – supposed –  religious 
decline but, given the absence of this causal explanation, fails to explain an 
eventual reverse path. What could happen to religiosity if modernization 
processes stop or reverse? Secularization theory, as it is drawn, has no answer. 
The classic version of secularization theory clearly needs an upgrade; what is 
needed is to update from a theory of an “inevitable religious decline” to a theory 
explaining variation (Stark and Finke 2000). One of the way for doing that is 
absolutely a strong focus on the real causal mechanisms influencing religiosity 
and insecurity theory could be one of the prime suspects.  
 
Given the importance of developing this approach, since the work by Norris and 
Inglehart some attempts were made. For example, some following cross-national 
studies found that socio-economic inequality and social welfare spending were 
associated with religiosity (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Ruiter and van Tubergen 
2009). From these studies it appears that the role of contextual economic 
insecurities (e.g. income inequality) basically confirm the insecurity theory but 
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evidences on individual economic insecurities (e.g. unemployment and income) 
are less consistent. Whereas some studies found that people in more insecure 
economic conditions tend to be more religious (e.g. Ruiter and van Tubergen 
2009), other studies did not (e.g te Grotenhuis, de Graaf, and Peters 1997). 
Another reason to explore the micro-level of the relation. Moreover, it could be 
misleading to relegate the idea of insecurity only to economic or financial status: 
insecurity could also be existential in nature (e.g. loss of a loved one). If possible, 
even fewer studies have tried to face this issue (e.g. Sosis 2007; Ruiter and van 
Tubergen 2009). 
 
As far as the literature suggests, the only sociological systematic attempt to 
study religion as reassurance for situations of insecurity is the one by Immerzeel 
and van Tubergen (2011). Despite they tested a lot of variables concerning 
economic and existential insecurities, past and present insecurities and individual 
and contextual insecurities, their results, by their own admission, need to be 
refined and scrutinized also using longitudinal data.  
 
All that has been reported in this brief introduction goes in the direction of 
depicting the insecurity theory as a very interesting approach. However, to truly 
become one of the missing links of the wide secularization theory, much light 
must be shed on the ongoing individual mechanisms that lie behind the generic 
statement “in situations of insecurity people turn religious”. At present, the 
insecurity theory is in need of development, both theoretically and empirically 
(Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2011). 
3.1.1 Linking insecurity theory to secularization debate 
I have already spoken about the lack of academic research interest in this topic. 
However, the sociological debate about secularization would have much to gain 
from a better understanding of the link between insecurity and religiosity. As 
previously underpinned, what lacks in the secularization theory is a mechanism 
which could expain also an – eventual – reverse path. Until the mechanisms 
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behind the various patterns of religiosity become clearer, the secularization 
theory will always be lacking. The insecurity theory could surely help to fill some 
of these gaps.  
 
The majority of the literature concerning secularization processes have studied 
them with a macro-institutional perspective through historical comparative 
analysis and with many different theoretical lenses. All of them put before the 
understanding of the religious patterns – under what conditions they are 
strengthened or weakened, under which circumstances they turn upward or 
downward. As told, only few studies have examined secularization at the 
individual level.  
 
There is no doubt about the fact that religion is strongly tied to the social 
institutions of the states, to their economy, to their legal system, to their whole 
public apparatus. It is therefore even more evident that each change in one or 
more of these institutions can be related to a shift in religiosity (Asad 2003; 
Casanova 1994). These shifts clearly depend on the specific contexts of these 
institutions over time and therefore religious patterns and institutional contexts 
are likely to be strictly connected. This way of reasoning makes every 
generalization about secularization and religiosity worldwide very difficult but, 
above all, completely forget the individual experience. In trying to understand 
religion only as a social phenomenon, a very important piece of the equation will 
surely be missing. Of course the strength and the patterns of religiosity depend 
on the institutions religion is tied to, but these institutional frameworks clearly 
shape the individual religious behaviour as well as all the situations individuals 
face and which can promote or suppress their religiosity. Aim of the insecurity 
theory is basically to reconstruct this link and to explore how and if the 
institutional context can influence individual situations with a resulting impact on 
their religiosity. Only looking deeply into this black box the secularization theory 
can aspire to become fully comprehensive.  
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Despite the undoubted importance of this way of reasoning for sociology, it is 
puzzling the almost total absence of explicit attempts to test this theory. It is 
even more puzzling because, conversely, the psychological literature has 
extensively dealt with the idea of religion as reassurance and coping strategy. 
Given the fact that this research aims to focus mainly on the individual 
mechanism driving religiosity, these contributions must be absolutely taken into 
account. In the next paragraphs I will firstly present the sociological contributions 
moving then to the psychological ones. This is this one a clear example on how 
fruitful collaborations between different science can foster a better understand 
of a human phenomenon.       
3.2 A sociological view: Religion, Theodicy and Existential Insecurity 
The postulation of the idea of insecurity and religiosity in the sociological field is 
only the last step of a long lasting path which involved philosopher, theologians 
and, only recently, sociologists. It all began with the notion of theodicy which 
was first proposed by the German philosopher Goffried Wilhelm Leibniz (Leibniz 
1710|1951). Theodicy literally means “vindication of the justice of God” and 
basically refers to the efforts that have to be made to justify the presence of evil 
in a world dominated by a morally perfect and omnipotent God which although 
permits this evil. The symbolic load of this notion is so evident that not 
surprisingly many philosopher and theologians dealt with it.  
 
What is interesting for framing our discourse about insecurity is however the 
interpretation given by sociology. Theodicy, in the Social Sciences, refers to the 
ways in which individuals and societies react, reflect and deal with this 
“unknown” by means of social action. Since the seminal works by Max Weber, 
the idea of these dealing strategies caught the attention of early sociologists. 
According to him, the possible reactions to the problem of theodicy can take a 
variety of forms, corresponding to different patterns of social actions. Whatever 
the chosen pattern, these mankind behaviours disclose the same human need to 
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deal with the contradiction of “why bad thigs happen to good people” (Weber 
1915).       
 
Peter Berger started from this notion of theodicy and expanded it through his 
theory of social dialectic. This theory basically explore how social reality is 
constructed in a continuous interplay between macro-level structures and 
individuals (Berger 1967; Berger and Luckmann 1966). According to the theory, 
humans aim to create an ordered reality that gives meaning, predictability and 
security to their existence. They do so using three different dialectic phenomena: 
externalization, objectification and internalization. These three processes 
represent the way by which mankind creates meaning, symbols and institutions 
in a general way (externalization), gives them a character of objectivity 
(objectification) and finally takes them back as a coherent system 
(internalization) (Berger and Luckmann 1966) . This idea of “order bricolage” 
serves our purposes for two different reasons. First of all, it declares social reality 
as an ongoing process coming out from the continuous interaction between 
different macro-level structures and their expression through the individual 
actions. Secondly, religion – in Berger’s theory – contributes to the social 
construction of reality as an ordered and meaningful “social reality” (Berger 
1967) . Religion, in this idea, acts as a kind of shield which protects man against 
the chaos in the form of particularly aspects that endanger the order of the 
world. This “sacred cosmos”, Berger says, “is confronted by man as an 
immensely powerful reality other than himself.  Yet this reality addresses itself to 
him and locates his life in an ultimately meaningful order” (Berger 1967:26). 
Religion is therefore not simply a macro variable – like the economy or politics – 
which is in relation to other macro variables. It is instead a tool used my men to 
make sense of the world; it is the “sacred canopy” that keeps men together and 
gives meaning to various aspects of life, especially in situations of uncertainty.   
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Norris and Inglehart (2004) start exactly from this point and advance this idea of 
religion as response to theodicy with their theory of “existential insecurity”. 
According to them, processes of modernization and human development are 
boosting the safety and thus reducing the exposure to social and individual risks. 
This situation diminishes the levels of anxiety within a certain society and besides 
increases feeling of psychosocial well-being and security. What they state is 
therefore that any differences in levels of religiosity between societies can be 
explained through variables which refer to their paths toward modernization, 
like human development, economic inequalities and so on. As we previously 
revealed, they completely ignore the mechanisms behind the “existential 
insecurity”; they restrict themselves basically stating that this notion exists and is 
linked to feeling of vulnerability, which can be ameliorated by religiosity and its 
transcendental reassurance.    
 
A more precise focus on the various sociological mechanism which link insecurity 
and religiosity can be found in Stolz (2009). While reviewing the main 
approaches to explain religiosity and religious change, the author argues that 
may be rational to turn to a religion that “offers help in various forms” (Stolz 
2009:351). Religion can help by providing a sense of meaning to deprivation by 
mean of myths and it can embed suffering into rituals and rules of conduct. In 
addition it can help to render the suffering bearable through specific habitus and 
promise hope and good outcomes for the future. Apart from this “supernatural” 
goods, religion and religious groups can also furnish very concrete help in the 
form of housing, food, comfort and financial assistance.   
 
Starting from these last rows of potential mechanisms at work, I will now present 
another way of looking at the idea of religious reassurance. I then switch from an 
approach strongly focused on the social significance of religiosity to an approach 
strongly focused on individuals and their psychology.                 
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3.3 A psychological view: Stress Coping Strategies 
The starting point psychologists use to analyse religion as reassurance deals with 
the notions of stress coping strategies. Everyone in this world, with more or less 
extent, suffer from, or has suffered from, some kind of stress. What we – and the 
majority of the scholar from the field – intend for stress is the mental and 
physical response and adaptation by our bodies to the real or perceived changes 
and challenges in our lives. We can also consider a stressor like any real or 
perceived physical, social, or psychological event or stimulus that causes our 
bodies to react or respond. What is really useful for our purposes is also to note 
that stress can take different forms: on the one side, it can be short-lived, 
meaning a single event with a sharp and defined time span and that acts as a 
shock for those who experience it. On the other side, it can be long-term, 
meaning when some circumstances continue to have impact throughout the 
whole – or part of it – life course. In any case, stress requires solutions unless 
individuals want it to cause physical, psychological or emotional damages 
(Wheaton 1997).    
 
This distinction between short-lived and long-term stressors – also referred to as 
event stressor and chronic stressor – well fits to the distinction between 
economic and existential insecurity seldom presented in the literature. Whereas 
events like the death of a loved one or physical accidents fall in the category of 
event stressors, the economic insecurity is one of the best example of chronic 
stressor. Also when this insecurity is caused by a single event like the loss of a 
job, it is characterized by its enduring nature and ability to permeate the entire 
life course. Coping with this kind of chronic stressors hence requires a great 
amount of energy without the assurance of an immediate resolution (Gottleib 
1997). An event stressor, conversely, usually comes with a traumatic event that 
occurs unexpectedly, is relatively short-lived and usually is followed by a definite 
resolution.  
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In the literature it is possible to find two characteristics which identifies a 
stressful event: i) it has to be perceived as demanding or threatening and ii) the 
individual who is suffering from it has to believe he or she lacks resources to 
cope with the situation (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). When faced with this kind 
of stressors, people can use various strategies to cope with them; i) they can stay 
vigilant and ready for rapidly respond to situations affecting well-being: ii) they 
can use problem focused strategies for that kind of stressor events which can be 
faced with problem-solving mechanisms; iii) they can look at the nearly future 
with positive attitude; iv) they can try to work on the causes and the purposes of 
the stressful situation and, finally v) they can simply accept that the stressful 
situation cannot be altered. The literature in the field of stress coping 
consistently supports claims that the choice of a coping strategy and its 
effectiveness depend on personal characteristics like the economic status, 
gender and race. In addition, other factors such the presence, the quantity and 
the quality of social support networks can play a role.  
 
In its “Coping with Chronic Stress”, Gottlieb (1997) only mentions a general 
relation between religious beliefs and practices and the onset of a chronic stress. 
He generally says that religious – and spiritual – experiences can contribute in a 
variety of coping strategies, namely the kind of strategies that try to make 
meaning out of a stressor event or routine or that try to utilize religious 
communities for material or social support. This “meaning making” coping 
strategies are therefore the most closely linked with the religious-oriented 
strategies and has been shown to have positive effects by adjusting individual’s 
“situational meaning” and the general “global meaning” (Skaggs and Barron 
2006). These basic and preliminary considerations about stress coping strategies 
and religion underline the needs to assess this relation more in detail; what I will 
present in the next paragraph is an attempt to put together the aforementioned 
sociological considerations with these notions from the psychological literature, 
expanding more on the notion of religiosity as coping strategy. It is obviously not 
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an easy path, but in the view of the author, it represents the most appropriate 
way to build a reliable theoretical ground for the insecurity theory.            
3.4 Religious coping strategies 
The starting point for combining the psychological and sociological notions of 
religion as reassurance and coping strategy is the basic idea that religious coping 
strategies are one among many types of strategies from which individuals can 
choose. We have already said that the appropriateness of religion as coping 
strategy reside in its ability to help people to “make meaning” out of stressful 
situations. In the Berger’s theory of social construction of reality, religion can be 
displayed as part of an ordered and meaningful “social reality” (Berger 1967; 
Berger and Luckmann 1966). In this sense, individuals use religion as a medium 
to make sense of their suffering: it is something like a shield against the chaos. 
 
I said in the previous paragraph that the most influent sociological work about 
insecurity and religiosity – the Norris and Inglehart one – completely ignores the 
mechanism involved in their notion of existential insecurity. Almost the same do 
all the other sociological works on this topic. They uniquely state that religiosity 
prevails in those society with higher level of insecurity and that prosperous 
societies – like the post-industrial ones – demonstrate lower levels If compared 
to the poorer ones. The only explanation of the link between insecurity and 
religiosity they give is based on the idea of “feeling of reassurance” provided by 
religions (Norris and Inglehart 2004). 
       
If the insecurity theory would gain theoretical strength, this mechanism has 
absolutely to be deepened. According to one of the most relevant books about 
religion and coping (Pargament 1997) what individuals seek through coping is 
what the author calls “grounding”. A “grounded” individual is an individual who 
feels psychologically balanced and with an overall sense of optimism and 
positivity. Religion is a system which can provide a framework for this 
“grounding”. Stressed individuals need a system which can help them to 
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reconstruct a sense of and deal with the world: of course, religion can be one of 
the available systems (Pargament 1997). The literature which deals with stress 
coping strategies has shown that religious coping strategies can work at various 
levels and in different ways. They can provide positive beliefs (Krok 2015), 
appraisal of stressors through religious attributions (Beagan, Etowa, and Bernard 
2012) , coping behaviour like prayer or meditation and social support networks 
via religious communities (Beagan et al. 2012; Gall et al. 2005). Individual using 
religious coping strategies are moreover more resilient than who do not (Park 
2005).  
 
Whatever their intrinsic nature, religious coping strategies are used by 
individuals for two main reasons: i) because religion is an available part of 
individual’s “orienting systems” and ii) because religion is a compelling way to 
cope (Pargament 1997). In linking psychological approach with the sociological 
one, it is relevant to recognize that “religion is more likely to be accessed in 
coping when it is more available to the individual, that is, when it is a larger part 
of the individual’s orienting system for relating with the world” (Pargament 
1997:144). Individuals who have greater nonreligious coping resources are 
therefore less likely to use religion as coping strategy. To put in another way, 
religious oriented coping strategies are largely determined by an individual’s 
inclination toward religion and this inclination basically arises through religious 
communities that are contextual in nature (Pargament 2002). Religion, in this 
sense, is part of everyone cultural toolkit (Swidler 2001) which informs and 
drives the habits, skills and styles people use to choose among and to build 
“strategies of action” to manage every-day life and especially stressful events 
and situations (Swidler 1986). Religion, being part of a culture, supplies with a set 
of religious-oriented elements among which individuals can choose from when 
facing a particular situation. Individuals can make meaning out of the world using 
these “religious tools” to read their environment, to recommend their actions 
and to influence their decision within the context of their religious environment 
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(Dahinden and Zittoun 2013). This bring the discourse back to the words of 
Berger because religion can therefore give meaning only through a sociocultural 
dialectic which consider that the religious meaning is created in relation with the 
social, political and cultural institutions that exist within its environment 
(Duemmler and Nagel 2013). Verter (2013) pushes the discourse further and, 
influenced by Pierre Bourdieu, claims that religion works as a form of “spiritual 
capital” and religious knowledge and competencies act as commodities within a 
symbolic economy. Religious and spiritual dispositions are thus a product of the 
social relations tied to the realm of the religious. Given this, religious 
communities are essential to produce – and reproduce – religious beliefs and 
practices, which influence the mechanisms toward decision-making and actions. 
These mechanism affecting strategies can include the regulation of individual 
lifestyles and behaviours, the provision of coping resources as well as community 
social resources (Verter 2013). To conclude, Brandt and Henry (2012) best 
summarize all the key-points of the discourse. Religion, in their view, can be 
considered as a form of psychological protection against insecurities which works 
by providing a worldview that permeates everyday life with meaning, value and 
certainty, furnish life-standards and beliefs, provides a sense of identity and 
moral community, and foster social connections.             
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Chapter 4  
 
ABOUT THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION 
Measurement, techniques and approaches behind the study of religion with 
survey data 
 
 
 
 
The empirical test of sociological theories is something always complex, the 
debate about it is huge and will last forever. If we focus on religiosity, its 
empirical study is puzzling but intriguing at the same time. Far from our purposes 
to deal with the debate of measurement per se, I will instead tackle four 
different issues which, in the eyes of the author, need to be carefully considered 
when studying religion and religious change with survey data. These four issues – 
the multidimensionality of the concept, the different levels of the relations, the 
different kind of data we can use and the age-period-cohort issue – are so 
relevant that I devoted a paragraph to each of them. The attempt here is to 
scrutinize and to justify some methodological choice I will do along this entire 
work.     
4.1 What is religiosity? A multidimensional approach 
In the previous chapter, I gave a brief outline of the various theories concerning 
religion and religiosity. Starting from there, it is quite straightforward to 
understand that religion, and religiosity, is something hard to theorize and, even 
more, hard to measure.  
 
Religion is normally difficult to conceptualize and operationalize because its 
supernatural, practical, ritual and normative aspects are very interrelated. A 
good starting point to define religion can be the one of Bruce (2011:1): “beliefs, 
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actions, and institutions based on the existence of supernatural entities with 
powers of agency (that is, Gods) or impersonal processes possessed of moral 
purpose […] that set the conditions of, or intervene in, human affairs”. Following 
instead the working definition by Norris and Inglehart (2004) it is possible to 
switch from a general definition of “religion” to a more useful definition of 
“religiosity”. Religion can be seen as the complex system of answers to individual 
impulses or strategies of life, whereas the concept of religiosity refers to the 
concrete ways, empirically observable, by which individuals or groups express 
the various dimensions of their religion (Norris and Inglehart 2004). The plural 
construct is precisely what best describe the concept of religiosity: a very 
multidimensional concept.  
 
People think, feel and act differently when it comes to religion and even within a 
single religious tradition, many variations can be found (Glock 1962). Having a 
way to measure different commitment to religion it is a prerequisite to answer 
every question regarding the sources and the consequences of individual 
religiosity. There is a dangerous tendency in religious field to focus upon one or 
another of the diverse manifestations of religiosity and to ignore all others (Glock 
1962). Besides that, the particular aspect of religion being studied is rarely placed 
in the context of its relations to other expressions of religiosity. This issue is 
puzzling; also looking at different religions we see extremely varied religious 
expressions. Different religions expect quite different things from their 
adherents.  
 
Following Glock (1962, 1964) and Glock and Stark (1965), it is possible to identify 
five dimensions that underlie the broader concept of religiosity; within one or 
another, all of the many manifestations of religiosity prescribed by the different 
religions can be ordered. Such dimensions shall be called the experiential, the 
ritualistic, the ideological, the intellectual and the consequential. In the literature 
there are some quite well accepted equivalent terms which I am going to use in 
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the next chapters. Speaking about the Ideological Dimension means speaking 
about Religious Belief, the Ritualistic Dimension refers to Religious Practice, the 
Experiential Dimension to Religious Feeling, the Intellectual Dimension to 
Religious Knowledge and the Consequential Dimension to Religious Effects. It is 
scarcely plausible that these dimensions are entirely independent; indeed, there 
are several studies suggesting that being religious on one dimension does not 
necessarily imply religiosity on other dimensions (Glock 1962). What Glock 
suggests is therefore to try to build more adequate measures of religion within 
and between these dimensions. “We cannot assume a priori (…) either that the 
dimensions are unilateral or that a single indicator will be sufficient to distinguish 
religious orientations within a dimension. Nor can we assume that religiosity 
expressed on one dimension automatically assures it is being manifested on 
other dimensions as well” (Glock 1962).    
 
The five dimensions provide a clear frame for assessing religiosity but, ironically, 
“there is not a single piece of research in the literature which has looked at all 
five dimensions simultaneously” (Glock 1962:99). Maybe something has changed 
from the time of Glock’s masterpieces (Huber and Huber 2012), but it is surely 
true that most research has taken a unilateral rather than a multidimensional 
approach. This is clearly a weakness, especially when testing the main theories 
about religion. Implicitly or explicitly, every theory is built up around the 
reciprocal connections among these five dimensions and it is therefore crucial to 
rely on a multidimensional research design. For secularization theorists, i.e., 
recent history is characterized by a clear decline of each dimension whereas for 
the individualization theorists by a decline in religious practice but a stability (or 
even an increase) of religious beliefs. Also religious market scholars, as said 
before, considered religious belief as something constant (exogenous) and 
religious practice dependent on the religious environment.  
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Given these preliminary considerations, an obvious further step is to give some 
insights to these different dimensions, both from a theoretical and a 
methodological point of view. After having listed them, another plausible sixth 
dimension will be discussed. It relies to the individual perception of religiosity or, 
to widen the definition, to the belonging to some kind of religious institution or 
to the religious community in its broader sense. 
4.1.1 The Ritualistic Dimension: Religious Practice 
The ritualistic dimension refers to the religious practices expected from religious 
adherents. It comprises such activities as worship, prayer, sacraments and 
fasting. Primary focus is on what people do rather than the meaning of such 
activities. Glock suggests three different possible approaches to studying 
religious practice. i) Firstly, one may simply give attention to the frequency of 
individual’s engagement in ritualistic activities. ii) Secondly, it is possible to look 
at variations in nature of a particular practice such as prayer. iii) Third approach 
instead may be studying the meanings of ritual acts for the individuals. The first 
approach is the simplest one and require the researcher to specify which 
religious practice he wants to focus on. Since different religions have different 
practices, it is needed to specify whether to focus on practices common to 
different traditions or to take account of differences as well. From this derive the 
need to choose a combination of indicators which provide a reliable measure of 
the practice the researcher wants to focus on. Do not supplementing the study 
of frequency with an assessment of the differences in nature of a particular 
practice could lead to jumbled interpretations. If we look, for instance, at the act 
of praying, qualitative differences may be of such a magnitude as to invalidate 
the simple act of prayer as an indicator of religiosity. The knowledge of the 
variations existing for some religious practices is perhaps the first step to 
understanding their meaning for individuals, which is in turn the first step toward 
a clear explanation of differential religious participation.   
 
80 
 
What is usually done in empirical research is to try to simplify focusing on one 
kind of practice common to all religious traditions under study. In this regard, 
religious practice – and mainly Church attendance – is the most investigated 
dimension in sociology because of its social and collective nature and its high 
degree of availability and comparability. “Religious behaviour ‐ such as prayer or 
attendance at services – may be an exacting standard, requiring a commitment 
of time” (McAndrew and Voas 2011:3). “Religion is not simply a matter of 
believing in a God: those who don’t attend mass evidently do not believe in a god 
who is sufficiently important to merit collective celebration on any regular basis” 
(Voas and Crockett 2005:14). There are a plenty of reasons for focusing on 
religious practice. It measures the ritualistic dimension of individuals and it has 
been often used to detect strong forms of religiosity. Also methodologically, the 
associated question to tap (church attendance) is relatively simple to formulate 
and easy to understand for respondents (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2014), also 
being present in every international survey.  
4.1.2 The Ideological Dimension: Religious Belief 
The ideological dimension is constituted by “the expectations that a religious 
person will hold to certain beliefs” (Glock 1962:99). Every religion assumes some 
sets of belief to which its followers are expected to adhere. This system of 
religious beliefs concern a mix of dogma or truth of faith which have to be 
accepted and recognized to adhere a transcendent value (Pace 2007). These 
beliefs are a sort of “autonomous knowledge” very different from rational or 
empirical knowledge. In studying religious belief, scholars may inquire simply 
into what people believe. Or, one may go on to inquire into the saliency of belief, 
or going even further, into the functions of belief for the individual. These ways 
of interpreting and investigating religious belief go together with some 
peculiarities of the belief structure. i) First of all, every religion has a set of belief 
whose primary role is to assure the existence of the divine and to define its 
character. If we look at Christianity, such belief would correspond to belief in 
God, in Christ and his miracles, in Heaven, and so on. People who accept these 
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beliefs are accepting the existence of God, of a personal God. ii) Distinguished 
from these beliefs are the ones explaining divine purpose and defining man’s role 
with regard to that purpose (Glock 1962). Within Christianity, these beliefs would 
be belief in original sin, in man’s redemption, in final judgment, eternal salvation 
and so on. These purposive beliefs are the foundation for the third kind of 
beliefs; iii) these correspond to the means by which the divine purpose has to be 
implemented. These implementing beliefs refer to the proper conducts of man 
towards God and toward other men for the realization of divine purpose. These 
beliefs thus provide the ground for a religious ethical structure.  
 
It is predictable that different religions give different emphasis to these three 
components of belief. This directly suggests that, in all probability, the degree or 
religiosity cannot be measured by the sheer number of beliefs “owned” by a 
person. Just as different religions stress different beliefs, it is quite realistic to 
find some individuals whose religion stress primarily a type of belief rather than 
another. There is therefore the need to develop typologies of religious belief 
rather than a single scale of religious commitment common to all individuals.      
4.1.3 The Experiential Dimension: Religious Feelings  
The experiential dimension is tied someway to the religious experience 
individuals are expected to encounter. All religions have some expectations that 
their participants will achieve a kind of knowledge of ultimate reality or will 
experience religious emotion (Glock 1962). As stated before, also the emotions 
experienced by different individuals may vary widely both between and within 
different religions. From terror to exaltation, from humility to joyfulness, from 
peace of soul to passionate union with the divine, the emphasis placed on 
religious feelings is mixed and miscellaneous.  
 
In the sociological research “there has been a tendency to associate religious 
feeling with the more extreme forms of religious expression” (Glock 1962:104), 
which can be conversions, being visited by the Holy Spirit and so on. Of course 
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there are more stable and less visible feeling that need attention by sociologists, 
even more than the extreme ones. Faith, trust and communion connote this kind 
of beliefs. The difficulties to study the experiential dimension are, however, 
evident. The individual’s feelings or the sensitivities to the divine are not likely to 
be openly expressed in everyday life. A serious attempt to study them should 
therefore rely on some kind of ordering around all the related notions. i) Firstly, 
individuals differ in their concern for a transcendentally based ideology; how an 
individual is concerned would be one component of his religiosity within this 
dimensions. ii) Second component of the experiential dimension could be the 
capacity of individuals for cognition or awareness of the divine (Glock 1962). This 
cognition can range from an intense episode of conversion to a weaker 
“contemplating God in the beauty of nature”; besides it may be manifested 
publicly – in a religious service – or privately – in isolation from others. iii) Third 
component bears on the individual’s sense that his life is somehow in the divine’s 
hands, in which trust can be reposed. The problem of measure this kind of faith 
is, as expected, a complex one and indirect approaches should be preferred. iv) 
Fourth and last component is in some way “the other side” of trust: the fear of 
divine. Giving its nature, also in this case indirect approaches should be referred; 
a productive approach is, for instance, to see whether and how fear is 
represented in the other dimensions of religiosity.                 
4.1.4 The Intellectual Dimension: Religious Knowledge 
The intellectual dimension is linked to the expectation that a religious person has 
to be informed and knowledgeable about the basic creeds of its confession and 
its sacred scripture. It is clear-cut that knowledge and belief are related since 
knowledge of a belief is a basic condition for its acceptance. Widening this 
definition, religious knowledge dimension could also refer to the need of 
transcendent answers typical of the human being. Religion, in this sense, stands 
for an internally coherent system of reassuring answers to this basic need. In 
doing this, religious systems compete with other systems based, for example, on 
rational thought, science or even paranormal and exoteric knowledges. This 
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expectation that a religious person has to be informed about his faith is common 
to all religions. There is however a great variation in the kind of knowledge 
requested by different religions. These great differences between and within 
religions make it difficult to judge what kind of knowledge has to be considered 
as indicator of religious commitment (Glock 1962). This knowledge, moreover, 
can be seen as a system of definitions, notions and norms systematized by a 
bunch of professionals like priests, theologians and so on. It is a kind of specialist 
knowledge which is frequently unbounded with a more popular and less rigorous 
knowledge. It is also for this reason that religious knowledge is very hard to 
analyse: it is basically impossible to identify a core of dogma, precepts and 
definitions necessary to identify, at least, a lower threshold of religious 
knowledge (Pace 2007).   
4.1.5 The Consequential Dimension: Religious Effects and Values  
The consequential dimension it is different in kind from the other four. It 
basically includes all the secular effects of religious belief, practice, experience 
and knowledge. Under this dimension we can find “all of those religious 
prescriptions which specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they 
ought to hold as a consequence of their religion” (Glock 1962:99). Religious 
effects and values, in this sense, means the goals that people prioritize for their 
society, community, families, and themselves. They basically refer to the 
translation of religious precepts and beliefs in every-day life. Sacred is something 
perceived by individuals as a presence in their life, as something which creates a 
way of think and act which drive the individual and social action (Pace 2007). 
These implications of religion for practical conduct differ a lot between religions; 
they are stated very explicitly in some ones whereas they are very abstract in 
others. This religious-secular link depends on how a religion is integrated in the 
social structure (Glock 1962); if it is, everyday actions of man are likely to be 
defined by religious imperatives. Almost every religion sets some kind of rewards 
for this conduct; these could be immediate rewards like peace of mind, freedom 
from worry or even material success. These could also be future rewards like 
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salvation, eternal life, reincarnation and so on. Given their strong link with all the 
other dimensions of religiosity, research on religious effects cannot be done in 
isolation from research on the other aspects, especially from research on beliefs. 
This is because it cannot be sure that a certain act is, in fact, a religious effect. To 
better study this, Glock proposed an interesting dichotomy to categorize the way 
for researching about religious effects. He suggests to distinguish between 
rewards and responsibility. The “reward” approach, he says, is most 
appropriately studied within the framework of religious beliefs but the research 
on immediate rewards has been relative sparse (Glock 1962). On the contrary, 
the research done on religious effects has been mainly focused om the 
“responsibility” side of the dichotomy, namely on what individuals do or do not 
as consequence of their religion.  
4.1.6 Identity and Self-Definition: Religious Belonging 
Beyond the five-dimensions typology just mentioned, there is another nuance of 
religiosity which not well fit in it. This basically try to grasp the identitarian power 
of religiosity – how a person define himself beyond practice or belief. It relies to 
self-definition and it is very important to consider it, especially in modern 
societies, because it could be quite common that an individual defines himself as 
religious only for national, cultural or heritage motivation. Religious belonging 
could therefore be intended both as the set of attitudes identifying the belonging 
to a group or a religious institution and the mechanisms of affiliation, 
engagement and formal participation to such institutions. Whereas the first 
connotation is quite easy to detect, the second is obviously more jumbled. These 
mechanisms of affiliation and participation refer to a mix of personal relations 
and networks carried out by people sharing concrete ties among them and with 
the formal institution. In the first meaning, instead, the religious belonging could 
be quite overlapped with the notion of civil religion, firstly postulated by 
Rousseau and well investigated by Robert Bellah (1967). In this sense, religion 
can be strictly linked with the notion of national identity. This well-accepted way 
of reasoning suggests to consider religious belonging like a permanent or semi-
85 
 
permanent characteristic akin to nationality or ethnicity, coming from family, 
community or cultural heritage (McAndrew and Voas 2011; Voas 2014). In 
addition to this “civil” meaning of being religious, Davie (2000, 2001) proposed 
the notion of “vicarious religion”, meaning the idea of a religion “performed by 
an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at 
least) not only understand, but quite clearly approve of what the minority is 
doing” (Davie 2012:169)”. In this sense, religions can stand for something used 
by individuals only for occasional offices like marriages, funerals or baptisms. 
Also in this case, the church membership has to be determined as part of the 
national or cultural identity. Relying on these branches of theory is it clear that 
the cultural identification to a religion is grasped by no-one of the previous 
dimensions and so it becomes necessary to combine the Glock’s ones with a 
clear assessment of this kind of belonging.      
4.2 Macro causes and micro effects? Micro causes and macro effects?   
Since the use of statistical methods became widespread in the social sciences 
nothing has been more debated than which kind of analyses – and thus which 
kind of data – are better to test and demonstrate sociological relations. It is a 
huge debate which involves methodological issues as well as epistemological and 
philosophical ones. The choice of the focus of analysis is what matter most in 
shaping the research design, the theoretical background and the research itself.  
 
Starting from the community studies of the earlier sociologists, moving to the 
ecological studies and to the individual studies related to classic quantitative 
methodologies and finishing with the huge amount of techniques of analytical 
sociologists, the definition of the object of study is the core point of each 
research. Starting from the Parsonian attempt to construct a theory of action, 
moving towards the Mertonian Structural-Functionalism and from the 
replacement of the word “action” with the word “behaviour” made by the earlier 
survey methologists, the debate is moving throughout the whole history of 
sociology. It is absolutely beyond the scope of this paragraph the summarize 
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more than one century of sociological evolution. The attempt here is to sketch a 
scheme to describe the various kind of relations which can arise when studying a 
social phenomenon. This scheme can be very useful in framing every research 
question as well as to avoid the risk of drawing false conclusions. 
 
The starting point is almost naturally Coleman (1986) and his attempt to bring all 
these aspects together. Its famous and widely known “Coleman boat” is what is 
taught in the very first classes of sociology and, in the view of the author, 
represent the best way to frame a sociological problem. The rise of this approach 
takes root in a precise moment of the history of sociology which himself define 
as a “Watershed”. This moment, which can be placed around the ‘40s, marks the 
transition between a period when community studies represented the dominant 
approach to a period of “survey research” domination. This shift has taken place 
for three main different reasons: a change of society itself, the need to transform 
sociology into something more suitable for policy making and the development 
of a bunch of statistical techniques which can efficiently deal with this new kind 
of data. Whatever the reasons that led to these changes, only partially caught by 
these points, the unquestionable major change regards the units or the focus of 
social research. Indeed, this replacement of community studies by survey 
research can be basically interpreted as a shift in the units of analysis (the unit 
about which empirical statements were made): from the community to the 
individual (Coleman 1986). In the following works the focus thus shifted from the 
social processes within the communities shaping the system’s behaviour to 
psychological or demographic processes shaping individual behaviour. Main 
result of this process was that the effort to make statements about communities 
or organization was overwhelmed by the greater statistical rigor of characterizing 
"populations" and analysing behaviour of individuals as "independently drawn" 
members of the population. 
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Of course, it is impossible to identify the precise moment when this happened 
but it is reasonable to speak about a three-step process. i) everything started 
with a change in society, which has become more individualistic with individual 
paths becoming more and more disconnected from family and communities; ii) 
the mainstream of social research has then shifted from explaining the 
functioning of social systems (i.e. communities) to accounting for individual 
behaviour. “Properties of social systems have largely been relegated to the 
status of factors affecting individual behaviours and are seldom the focus of 
investigation” (Coleman 1986:1319). iii) Simultaneously with this shift in focus 
from the social system to the individual, the dominant mode of explanation (the 
one in which purposive action of individuals, taken in combination and subject to 
various constraints, explained the functioning of social systems) was replaced by 
a form of behaviourism, in which various factors external to the individual's 
consciousness are introduced to account for variations in individual behaviour.   
 
This way of reasoning, which is the framework of this research thesis, is also 
what pushed Coleman to think about a way to systematize this new approach for 
social research. In doing this it could be possible to bring out and face all the 
weaknesses – and strength – of this methodological individualism while 
increasing, at the same time, its explanatory power. Far from being the solution 
for every sociological problem, I intend the Coleman’s diagram as the most 
complete cognitive tool for sociological thinking (Ylikoski 2016).  What follows is 
an attempt by the author, starting from Coleman’s widely renowned “boat” and 
following also Ruiter and van Tubergen (2009), to describe all the relations which 
can arise in a sociological research when both individuals and contexts are 
involved.  
 
Starting from the scheme in Figure 6, every single relation will be discussed. To 
better clarify the different points, an example of research question and – when 
possible – of hypothesis will be provided for each relation. These examples are 
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drawn starting from a generic statement like “education decreases religiosity” 
and reframed according to the kind of relation is going to be explained. It is 
obvious that the following pages cannot be considered as exhaustive; for each of 
the relations many books were written and many will and it make no sense to 
summarize one century of sociological debate into few rows. The approach will 
thus inevitably be more focused on methodology and on the methods to frame 
the research questions in the most appropriate way.      
 
As already said, the starting point is the original version of the Coleman boat 
(1986) which is here supplemented with two more “arrows” to account for more 
complex kind of relations. This scheme is made by four main objects and six rows 
connecting them. The four objects represent the units of analysis of every 
sociological problem. We have so: the macro characteristic of the research object 
as well as the micro characteristics of the individual who belong to it. These 
characteristics are supposed to have an impact on certain others – the outcomes 
– which can also be macro or individual. These four “objects” can be connected 
in several ways, which will now be analysed.      
 
Figure 6: How to frame a sociological question: Micro Vs Macro 
 
 
 
Ⓐ: MACRO to MACRO  
RQ: Does country’s tertiary enrolment rate is related to country religiosity?  
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HP: Countries with higher tertiary enrolment rate are less religious. Higher the 
country’s tertiary enrolment rate, lower the religiosity.  
 
This kind of macro-to-macro relation is what is universally named as “ecological 
analysis”. It basically represents the relation between certain macrolevel 
predictors and macrolevel outcomes. We can find examples of this way of 
reasoning among many of the sociological masterpieces; firstly, was Durkheim in 
his research about suicide to infer that it was promoted by the social conditions 
of Protestantism. In doing so he based his conclusion on the observation that 
suicide rates were higher in countries that were more heavily Protestant 
(Durkheim 1966). Remaining in the field of religious studies, and more precisely 
in the field of studies about insecurity and religiosity, also the masterwork of this 
literature by Norris and Inglehart (2004) refers to variables defined at country 
level to demonstrate its thesis. Main weakness of this kind of approach is what is 
universally known as “ecological fallacy”. The ecological fallacy consists in 
thinking that relationships observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals: if 
countries with more Protestants tend to have higher suicide rates, then 
Protestants must be more likely to commit suicide, if we want to refer to 
Durkheim’s work. Since it first postulation (Selvin 1958), this problem was well 
investigated both from a theoretical and a methodological (i.e. Subramanian et 
al. 2009) point of view. Researchers are quite unanimous in naming it as a 
“methodological crime”. The point is, only to be clear, that aggregate data can be 
a very big resource for sociologists but it is wrong to extend relations found at 
aggregate level to the individual one. These considerations suggested Coleman 
to develop his famous boat under the consideration that every relation observed 
between macro variable is not a real relation and thus it becomes essential to 
“down a level” to investigate such relations.   
 
 Ⓑ: COMPOSITIONAL EFFECT  
RQ: Do countries differ in the share of individuals enrolled in tertiary education?  
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The idea of compositional effect basically stands for a situation in which there is, 
in a certain sample/country/dataset an unequal distribution of individual 
characteristics. When differences in an outcome are attributable to differences 
in group composition (that is, in the characteristics of the individuals of which 
the groups are comprised) they are said to result from compositional effects 
(Diez Roux 2004). When to compare, only as example, two different countries 
about the impact of education on religiosity, the individual relation can arise – 
and differ – basically in two different ways. The relation between X and Y can be 
truly stronger in one country compared to the other (see Ⓒ) or it can be the 
same but differs in regard to the share of high educated people in the two 
countries. If the latter, it is not really the relation between X and Y to differ, but 
we have a composition effect, and that is why it is crucial to “control” for some 
characteristics of the population we are studying.     
 
Ⓒ: MICRO to MICRO  
RQ: Does individual educational degree impact on individual religiosity?  
HP: Higher the individuals educational level, lower their religiosity. 
 
The micro-to-micro relations represent associations between individual 
predictors and individual outcomes. This is exactly what I have described at the 
beginning of this paragraph. In the sociological approach based on survey, the 
research focus is on individuals and their behaviours. Looking for a micro-to-
micro relation basically means investigate whether some individual features can 
have an impact – or can be related – on other individual features. As macro-to-
macro relations are characterized by the perils of ecological fallacy, micro-to-
macro one have its counterpart. The so called “atomistic fallacy” manifests itself 
when drawing inferences regarding variability across groups (or the relation 
between group level variables) based on individual level data (Diez Roux 2004). 
To put it in general terms, atomistic fallacy is the fallacy of drawing inferences 
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regarding variability across units defined at a higher level based on data collected 
for units at a lower level. To give an example, we have atomistic fallacy when we 
found that tertiary educated individuals are less likely to be religious and we 
conclude also that countries with higher tertiary education rate present lover 
level of religiosity.  
 
Ⓔ: MACRO to MICRO  
RQ: Does the country of residence’s tertiary enrolment rate impact on individual 
religiosity, over and above its degree?  
HP: In countries with higher tertiary enrolment rate individuals tend to be less 
religious, no matter their degree. 
 
Speaking about macro-to-micro relations basically means speaking about 
contextual characteristics having impact on individual outcomes, over and above 
individual characteristics. This kind of relations emerge when there is an effect of 
collective or group characteristics on individual level outcomes. What is 
necessary to do while speaking about contextual effects is to control for 
individual level potential confounders and specific statistical models are needed 
in order to do this in the proper way.   
  
Ⓕ: CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTION  
RQ: Does some country characteristics – including tertiary enrolment rate – 
shape the relation between individual education and religiosity?  
HP: The higher the tertiary education enrolment rate in a country, the smaller 
the effect of personal degree on individual religiosity. 
 
We speak about cross-level interaction effects when contextual characteristics 
condition the relation between individual characteristics and individual outcome. 
To put in another words, with the term cross-level interaction we refer to 
modification of the effects of lower level variables by characteristics of the 
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higher level units to which the lower level units belong (Diez Roux 2004). 
Speaking about our example, the relation between tertiary degree and lower 
religiosity is likely to be stronger in less secularized countries whereas is likely to 
be weaker if someone lives in a very secular country where there is little 
exposure to religious dictates. 
 
Ⓓ: MACRO to MICRO. I left this relation for last on purposes because it is the 
most difficult part about which sociology is struggling since it was born. It can be 
simple aggregation if – and only if – the macro outcome is aggregational in-
nature. Otherwise, its definition can be problematic if the institutional and 
contextual impact are present. In every case, a lot of attention must be paid to 
the mechanism transforming some individual outcomes in a collective outcome 
and this relation cannot absolutely be taken for granted. In fact, “the major 
theoretical obstacle to social theory built on a theory of action is not the proper 
refinement of the action theory itself, but the means by which purposive actions 
of individuals combine to produce a social outcome” (Coleman 1986:1321).  
4.3 Considering time. Cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches 
The study of social change has always been central for sociological thought. Born 
in a period of hectic improvement produced by the industrial revolution, the 
early sociology was forthwith focused on the study of the great transitions. 
Society needs to be studied when it can no longer be taken for granted 
(Jedlowski 1998). Every sociological explanation is therefore historical in nature: 
every social reality is an historical reality. The term “longitudinal” refers exactly 
to this kind of relation between phenomena: every fact that needs to be studied 
over time can be considered as diachronic. In diachronic sociological research 
time has hence to be explicitly considered in the design. Data has to be gathered 
in at least two different points in time and the cases studied have to be 
comparable – or the same – between different periods. All of this because the 
scope of diachronic analysis is to compare data gathered in different periods.  
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There are three main different typologies – that I will deepen in the next 
paragraphs – of longitudinal data which are inextricably linked with different 
research designs and analyses: there are repeated cross-sectional studies, 
perspective longitudinal studies (also known as panel study) and retrospective 
longitudinal studies. 
 
Longitudinal data include a very high heuristic power; in particular, they permit: 
 The study of variables changes between periods 
 The analysis of duration of social phenomena 
 The identification of the so called “sleeper effects”, meaning the 
connections between events happening far away in time  
 The identification of the causes of social phenomena, in particular the 
direction and the magnitude of causal relation 
The issues of causation and causal relation is undoubtedly one of the main – or 
the main – sociological issue. Given its complexity, the temporal order of the 
various event is considered one of the best approximation of the cause-effect 
relation. The basic of the notion of causality resides in the idea that social 
phenomena should follow one another in a real process of cause-effect, and 
everything that does not follow this law is due to chance. Of course, in scientific 
research is impossible to have a deterministic way to assure causality, but there 
are at least three essential criteria which are well accepted as ways to establish 
causal relations (see also Goldthorpe (2000a) for a complete discussion about 
causality): 
 The various phenomena (and the related variables) have to covary: a 
change in an independent variable X (cause) has to be related in a change 
for the dependent variable Y (effect) 
 The relation between X and Y must not be due to other variables (it must 
not be spurious) 
 The change in the cause (X) has to forerun the change in the effect (Y) 
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Whereas the first two criteria could be tested in principle using cross-sectional 
data, real diachronic data are needed to test the adherence to the third criteria. 
In particular, for this last objective also repeated cross-sectional data may be 
inadequate. It is essentially for this reason that the connections between the 
hypothesis one want to test and the research design have to be carefully 
checked and calibrated on the kind of data one want to use.    
4.3.1 Repeated Cross-sectional data (Trend studies) 
Repeated cross-sectional studies are repeated – and thus comparable – surveys 
where the main sample changes between each wave. This kind of studies focus 
on a section of the population – a sample – in a certain point of time and this 
sample changes between each point in time. These repeated cross-sectional 
surveys – like the British General Household survey, the Italian Istat Indagine 
Multiscopo sulle Famiglie Italiane and Banca d’Italia Indagine sui Bilanci delle 
Famiglie Italiane, the European Eurobarometer, European Value Study, European 
Social Survey and the worldwide International Social Survey Programmes and 
World Value Survey, just to name a few – can help the study of social change. 
Given the different samples between each wave they however only permits to 
focus on aggregate changes. These kind of studies supply with a series of static 
pictures of the population in a given point in time and they are thus quite cheap 
and easy to organize; exactly for these reasons they have represented – and 
represent even now –  the pillar of sociological research. Despite their 
widespread use, social scientists need to be cautious in doing diachronic 
inference using this kind of data because they have to implicitly assume that the 
observed phenomenon is someway “in equilibrium” (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; 
Coleman 1981). Repeated Cross-Sectional data can be organized in two main 
ways. They can be gathered at individual level and thus the raw-vectors contain 
the same variable measured for different individuals at different points in time. 
The datasets from the various wave can then be pooled to obtain a unique 
dataset which comprises a sort of temporal dimension. The other way to gather 
and organize these repeated cross-sectional data is to treat them as aggregate 
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data, summarizing the individual information – i.e. between countries – and 
using time as main independent variable. 
 
Also from this brief description it appears clear what the main strengths and 
weaknesses of cross-sectional data are. Compared to true longitudinal research 
designs they are of course cheaper, easier to manage and do not suffer from 
attrition problems. On the contrary, being the sample different between each 
wave, they only permit aggregate analyses, preventing moreover the 
disentanglement between age, period and cohort effects (see next paragraph).  
 
Table 1: Repeated comparative cross-sectional surveys: some examples 
NAME PERIOD 
TERRITORIAL 
COVERAGE 
METHODS OF 
INTERVIEWING 
EVS 
European Value 
Study 
4 waves (1981-
1990-1999-2008) 
(ongoing) 
47 European 
Countries 
(last wave) 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
ESS 
European Social 
Survey 
7 waves (biennial 
from 2002 to 
2014) (ongoing) 
36 European 
Countries 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
ISSP 
International Social 
Survey Programme 
Several survey for 
different topics 
starting from 
1985 and carried 
out yearly 
(ongoing) 
45 Worldwide 
countries 
Face-to-face-
interviews, 
postal survey 
and self-
completion 
questionnaire 
WVS 
World Value Survey 
6 wave starting 
from 1981 to 
2014 (ongoing) 
60 Worldwide 
countries (last 
wave) 
Face-to-face 
interviews (or 
phone interviews for 
remote areas) 
     
4.3.2 Panel Data (Perspective longitudinal studies) 
In panel studies the same individuals are surveyed across time. In this kind of 
studies – like the British Household Panel Study which recently became 
Understanding Society, the German Socio-Economic Panel and the Italian 
Indagine Longitudinale sulle Famiglie Italiane – the same individuals are 
interviewed repeatedly and this thus permits the study of individual change. This 
aspect makes Panel studies the real fundamental for deepen the study of 
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diachronic features of social phenomena. The benefit of this kind of data, if 
compared to repeated cross-sectional surveys, is obvious: it makes clear whether 
some observed changes are due to new individual surveyed or to a real change in 
behaviour. Moreover, this kind of approach is useful to grasp the real dynamics 
of very irregular behaviours: many results of panel data analysis show that 
changes in family and individual lives are much larger than it appears in cross-
sectional analysis (Dale and Davies 1994). The advantages of panel data can be 
thus summarized as follows:    
 they allow analysis of how individuals and households experience change 
in their socioeconomic environment and how they respond to such 
changes; 
 they allow an analysis of how conditions, life events, behaviour and 
values are linked with each other dynamically over time; 
 they allow analysts to control for unobserved heterogeneity in cross-
sectional models through difference analysis. 
Having clarified the main advantages of this kind of data I will now expand on 
their weaknesses, which basically reside in the complex structure of the data-
gathering process and analysis.  
 The attrition issue is the peculiar feature of panel data: it appears 
because wave after wave some individuals will leave the sample. Given 
this process not-casual – it can be due to refusals, migration, deaths and 
so on – it may invalidate or distort the inferences built on the remaining 
sample 
 The treatment of missing values is more serious than cross-sectional 
because their repetition can seriously distort the sample 
 Like the missing values, also the methodological error is more serious 
than cross-sectional because it replicates in time 
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 The respondents likely suffer from the so called “panel conditioning”, 
namely the impact of repeated answering procedures which can distort 
the same phenomena they observe. 
 Panel design research can produce only information discrete in time 
which thus be biased by particular occurrences. 
 Given the discrete answer procedure, the time flow between cause and 
effects (lag) – if short – can be lost because the two events are recorded 
at the same point in time.     
 The time effects could be not linear – but cyclical or even more complex – 
and thus their measure depends on when data are gathered.  
 To conduct a good panel analysis a lot of waves are necessary. 
Of course all these puzzling issues do not invalidate the utility of panel data, but 
they must be kept in mind in planning and analysing these data, also because a 
lot of useful technique to deal with them have been developed.   
 
Table 2: Perspective longitudinal surveys: some examples 
NAME PERIOD 
TERRITORIAL 
COVERAGE 
METHODS OF 
INTERVIEWING 
GSOEP 
German Socio-
Economic Panel 
30 yearly wave from 
1984 to 2014 
(ongoing) 
Germany 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
BHPS 
British Household 
Panel Study 
18 yearly wave from 
1991 to 2009 
U.K. 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
UNDERSTANDING 
SOCIETY 
UK Household 
Longitudinal 
Study 
4 yearly wave from 
2008 (ongoing). Data 
could be merged 
with the 18 waves of 
BHPS 
U.K. 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
PSID 
Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics 
Starting yearly in 
1968. Bi-annual since 
1997 (ongoing) 
U.S. 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
ILFI 
Indagine 
Longitudinale 
sulle Famiglie 
Italiane 
5 waves (1997, 1999, 
2001, 2003 and 
2005) 
Italy 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
98 
 
4.3.3 Event oriented Data (Retrospective longitudinal studies) 
We have retrospective longitudinal studies when the individuals surveyed are 
stimulate to remember and record past events to reconstruct their life-course. 
This approach permits to reassemble the individuals’ – or families’ – stories in 
terms of trajectories, transitions and events conditional on time flow. This kind of 
data includes a clear time positioning about when a certain event starts or finish. 
The discrete events are thus placed on a continuous time axis and this permits 
the study of sequences of events and their time intervals. In doing this it is also 
possible to study the individual trajectories – or life courses – as embedded in 
the macro social context. The advantages of these event oriented data are 
manifold: 
 It is possible to study the changes between conditions occurrence in 
time 
 Event oriented data permits – unlike the (discrete) panel data – to 
study individual change on a continuous time axis 
 In summary they permit the reconstruction of individual life 
trajectories along all the life course    
Despite their collection is cheaper than panel data – data are gathered only once 
– they present many disadvantages which are mainly related to memory and 
potential distortions. These disadvantages indeed regard the quantity of 
information an individual can remember, and this issue is particularly severe for 
questions regarding cognitive states and attitudes. It is really hard for individuals 
to remember changes in their moods and the length of these changes. Even 
when the questions relate to more practical issues like income or weight, it is 
often difficult to retrieve the information. Generally speaking, data quality 
decreases going back in time and this is due to two different effects. We have 
“omission effects” when relevant events are forgotten and “telescope effects” – 
which can be either “forward telescoping” or “backward telescoping” –  when 
the timing of the events is forgotten. Moreover, the way by which individuals 
remember their past is influenced by subsequent events in a continuous attempt 
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to show coherence. Given the amount of information to gather, the duration of 
the interview –  usually between 1 and 2 hours –  could be another relevant 
problem.         
4.4 Age-Period-Cohort. Why it is important to disentangle? 
All the main theories concerning religiosity deal with a time dimension. Speaking 
about religious reawakening or decline, progressive institutional differentiation 
or religious change means – also – speaking about time.  The issue of age, period 
and cohort effect disentanglement is one of the most puzzling and intriguing 
sociological facts. This problem basically arises because any two of the factors 
determine the third. For instance, age is simply the year of observation minus 
the year of birth and so on. This problem is far for being solved but a lot of 
possible ways to deal with it are in place. They can be divided in two different 
approaches: statistical and theoretical. A lot of clever and innovative statistical 
techniques – decomposition techniques – have been developed but this is not 
the place to investigate them. This is instead the place to better define how 
these three different kind of effects arise and why it is important to find a 
theoretical way to cope with them.      
 
Age effects result from the biological and social processes of aging, such as 
physiological changes and the build-up of social experience (Segall 2013). Period 
effects are defined as external variations across time periods that influence all 
the age groups at the same time. They refer a wide range of historical, social and 
environmental factors such as wars, technological innovation, economic crises as 
well as changes in income and relative prices (Reither, Hauser, and Yang 2009). 
Cohort effects, instead, capture the idea that a group of individuals experiences 
the same historical, social, and environmental events at the same age. These 
processes potentially give rise to cohort-specific values, attitudes and 
preferences. This notion cover in some way the interpretative space in-between 
age and period, as clearly emerge from this graphical representation (Reither et 
al. 2009). 
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Figure 7: Age, Period and Cohort; a graphical representation 
 
 
 
To go deeply, changes in individual behaviours happen because of three different 
phenomena such as aging, time flow and cohort replacement. These of course 
correspond to the three sides of the Age-Period-Cohort issues. I will now go 
through them by using as example an indicator we will deeply scrutinize in the 
next chapters: weekly Church attendance.   
 
The process of aging is usually identified with changes among individual linked to 
their getting older, to gain experience, to become more mature, to become 
physical or cognitive impair, to experiment life-events like marriage or 
parenthood. To put it simpler, aging is the effect of having lived more of life. 
Figure 8 shows the rates of weekly Church attendance in Europe divided by Age 
(EVS 2011). Despite some rumour due to the small numerosity of the last age 
groups, the pattern is clear. 18-years-olds basically replicate the parents’ 
religiosity; the Church attendance rate decrease along the adolescence period 
while starting to increase around 28-years-old, approximately the family 
formation and parenthood age. 
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Figure 8: Probability of Weekly Church attendance by Age 
 
 
 
This rate continues to increase until the old age, when physical disablement can 
compromise Church attendance. Youngers are less Church-goers than adults so, 
given this pattern, interpreting the presumed European secularization in term of 
Age effects means asserting that Church attendance is decreasing because the 
population is getting younger. Nothing more wrong, as the basic demographic 
statistics show.  
 
The second possible source of change is a period effect. This comprises people’s 
responses to historical events and processes. We have a period effect when the 
entire society is affected by a widespread set of historical events, such as wars, 
economic depression and social revolutions, beyond people’s age or year of 
birth. It is impossible for most members of society to remain unaffected by some 
changes like, for example, the computer era impact on communication or the 
period of Civil Rights movement on attitudes about race. 
102 
 
Figure 9: Probability of Weekly Church attendance by Survey Wave 
 
 
 
If we look at Church attendance rates (EVS 2011) with the lens of the “period 
effect” (Figure 9) we see a clear – linear – decrease of religious practice along 
time. This is in fact one of the main evidences from secularization theorists. 
 
The third possible source of change in societies is cohort succession. This refers 
to the replacement of earlier born cohorts by later ones. The term “cohort” quite 
overlap with the notion of “generation”, but the former is usually preferred to 
avoid misunderstandings with the use of “generation” as a kinship term 
(relationship between individuals with a common ancestor). Cohort is so 
intended as a group of people born at about the same time, living in the same 
period and sharing a kind of identity (Alwin and McCammon 2007). To put it in 
another way, a cohort is a group of people who have shared a critical experience 
(birth in the simplest case) at the same time. The term cohort is thus usually used 
as shorthand for “birth cohort”, and refers to the unique historical period in 
which group’s common experiences are embedded. Speaking about time change 
in term of cohort replacement basically means that earlier-birth cohorts die off 
and are replaced by those born more recently. When the effects of historical 
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events tied to particular eras mainly affect the youngsters, we have a cohort 
effect. A clear example of a cohort effect is the one of the “Depression 
generation”, namely individuals born during the Great Depression who became 
particularly self-consciously thrifty. As this cohort die off, a new less frugal set of 
cohorts arise, changing the overall attitudes about life-style and money-saving. 
Cohort analysis seems to be the most useful approach in studying religious 
trends (see next chapters for details) because most of the assumption behind 
well fit with religious beliefs and behaviours. If we use cohort replacement as 
explanation of social change we have to make – implicitly or explicitly – some 
critical assumption: i) childhood is an impressionable period of life in which 
individuals are largely open to socialization influences; ii) people acquire values, 
attitudes and belief during these years and maintain those views over most of 
their lives; iii) the unique cohort experiences are formed due to the distinctive 
influences of historical events; and iv) that public opinion and social norms 
change gradually in the direction of the more recent cohorts. If these 
assumptions can match the theoretical knowledge about the phenomena, cohort 
replacement can be the best way to study social change. Returning to the 
example, we can see that the trend of weekly Church attendance (EVS 2011) in 
the lights of cohort effect (Figure 10) shows a different pattern if compared to 
Age or Period effects. It is neither fluctuating like age effect nor linearly 
decreasing like period effect. The trend is steeply decreasing in the older cohorts 
while starts to flatten in the younger one.  
 
What is important to keep from this brief summary of the Age-Period-Cohort 
issue is that, beyond technicalities, it is really important what for time-flow is 
intended. Focusing on religious change with the lens of one of these three 
aspects can bring to completely different conclusions. Therefore, an essential 
starting point of every research concerning religious change has to be a clear 
assessment on how and why time-flow has to be intended. 
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Figure 10: Probability of Weekly Church attendance by Cohort 
 
 
105 
 
Chapter 5  
 
EUROPEAN RELIGIOSITY 
A multidimensional study of religious change in Europe 
 
 
 
 
Religious decline in Europe is the main evidence reported by secularization 
theorists (Crockett and Voas 2006a; Dobbelaere 1987; Halman and Draulans 
2006; Pollack 2008b; Voas and Doebler 2011). Generally speaking, religious 
patterns in Europe seems coherent with those reported for the others post-
industrial countries. At the same time, when compared to countries like U.S. or 
Japan a lot of differences are present (Brenner 2016; Voas and Chaves 2016). 
Some scholars push this argument further stating that Europe is a real 
exceptional case and that secularization paradigm has to be restricted to 
European countries (Davie 2006). If so, a lot of relevant questions arise when 
trying to predict European future. “Will Europe continue within the trajectory set 
by its past or will it become more like the patterns found elsewhere? Or (…) will 
the rest of the world become more like Europe?” (Davie 2006:1). This is not the 
place to widen the secularization debate to other non-European countries, but is 
certainly the place to describe the evolution of European religiosity in the last 
decades. In doing so, we need to take into account some European peculiarities.  
 
First of all, Europe is mainly Christian, but there are at least three main different 
confessions that can shape the meaning of religion and religiosity. Secondly, but 
strictly related, in the last decades some European countries have been 
controlled by Communist regimes which tried to suppress every form of religious 
behaviour with a kind of state-imposed atheism. As a matter of fact, many 
scholars report a religious revival in Eastern Europe in the years immediately 
following the fall of communism in 1989 (Bandeij and Mahutga 2010; Borowik 
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2006; Greeley 1994; Pickel and Sammet 2012; Titarenko 2008; Tomka 2010). 
Third issues, which can be extended worldwide, is the way to consider religiosity. 
Considering religiosity as a whole or focusing only on one dimension (see 
previous chapter) could be not instructive. Despite some practical advantages, 
this approach oversimplifies the study of religiosity and could be no longer 
adequate to grasp the real meanings of religious evolution.  
 
This is even truer if we consider that different Christian doctrines can give totally 
different meanings to different aspects of religious behaviour and belief. 
Statements like the following could be extended to all the dimensions 
“attendance has different meanings in different religious contexts. Roman 
Catholics are required to attend church weekly, whereas Anglicans are not, and 
so it is possible to be a religious and compliant Anglican while attending church 
less often than a Roman Catholic” (McAndrew and Voas 2011:5). 
 
In this chapter I will attempt to give a clear picture of European religiosity. I will 
start reasoning about the involved dimensions and on the ways to operationalize 
them. After that, I will move to brief explanation of the different Christian 
doctrines, trying to understand whether and why different dimensions could 
have completely different meanings among them. I will then try to link the 
chosen indicators to the main theories in contemporary religious studies 
(secularization and individualization); I will do so by building a kind of typology of 
religiosity that can be useful to grasp some particulars of religious evolution. 
After these preliminary stages I will present a kind of static picture of European 
religiosity (reporting data both for the single indicators and the typology). I will 
conclude with the most relevant part which tries to give a longitudinal picture of 
religiosity in Europe. Also in this case I will present two different models: in the 
first I will report cohort trends for the three different indicators whereas in the 
second the trends for the various category of the typology.            
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5.1 European religiosity: secularization vs individualization debate 
In Chapter 2 I highlighted the main theoretical approach in religious studies. 
Leaving aside for now the market approach, which relies on completely different 
assumptions and which is less suitable to study religious evolution in Europe 
(Chaves and Gorski 2001; Halman and Draulans 2006; Pollack and Pickel 2007; 
Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002), religious scholars are struggling to understand 
how the processes of modernization have impacted the role and significance of 
religion in Europe. The main controversy, involving secularization and 
individualization theorists, opposes a religious decline observed for all the 
dimensions of religiosity to a religious change in which institutional religiosity is 
giving way to individual forms of religiosity.  
 
Of course secularization theorists state that, however you look at it, religion in 
Europe is declining. Modernization is progressively fostering this decline and 
religion is day after day losing its significance. On the other hand, supporters of 
the religious individualization thesis (Davie 1994; Hervieu-Léger 1999) argue that 
modernization contributes to religious change rather than religious decline. The 
influence of religious institutions is weakened in modern times, but the 
consequence is that Church and religion have become more and more distinct 
from each other (Nicolet and Tresch 2009a). Individuals are increasingly taking 
the distances from religious institutions, but religious beliefs tend to persist 
(Davie 2002; Hervieu-Léger 1999). The decline of institutional religion in the form 
of religious practice is thus undisputed across the literature. What is heavily 
contentious is the evolution of religious belief: secularization theorists claim that 
both institutional religion and individual religious belief are expected to decline 
due to modernity; on the other hand, supporters or religious individualization 
thesis argue that religious belief is likely to persist or even to increase. Another 
point of contact between the proponents of both approach is the idea that 
processes of modernization results in a growing rationalization of the different 
domain of society (Nicolet and Tresch 2009a). This functional differentiation 
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reduces the sphere of influence of religious institutions and “tasks that were 
commonly assumed by the church are now taken over by specialized 
professionals and organizations” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:9). Religion hence 
loses the all-encompassing role it once had (Halman and Draulans 2006).  
 
For secularization theorists, the process of secularization fostering the decline of 
the social significance of religion is multidimensional and visible at the societal,  
institutional and individual level (Dobbelaere 1985; Wilson 1982). At the societal 
level, the various domain of society (the economy, the state, the educational 
system) are becoming more and more emancipated and independent from the 
Church. At the institutional level religious institutions gradually lose their 
importance and their social standing and, if looking at the individual level, the 
extent to which people practice, belief and conform their lives to religious 
expectances is diminishing (Bruce 2002). What is really important for this debate 
is that, for secularization theorists, the social significance of religion and the 
individual religiosity are closely connected (Bruce 2002; Wilson 1982): a decline 
in the social importance of religion is expected to go hand in hand – or even to 
cause – a decline in the number of individuals who are religious. There is also 
something more: according to these scholars, individuals’ relationship to the 
Church and their religious beliefs are expected to be similarly – and negatively – 
impacted by the process of secularization (Nicolet and Tresch 2009a).       
 
In contrast, individualization thesis’ theorists, argue that modernization leads to 
a change in religion rather than to a decline (Pollack and Pickel 2007). Of course, 
the accepted functional specialization has undermined the preponderance of 
religious institutions. However, this process “conventionally interpreted as the 
spread of secularization, should be recognized as the emergence of (…) the 
privatized social form of religion” (Luckmann 2003:279, 280). This modern – 
privatized – social form of religion is characterized by the “de-monopolization of 
the production and distribution of world-views” (Luckmann 2003:281). Following 
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this, a decline in the social significance of institutional religion does not mean 
that individual, private forms of religion have lost their importance.  
 
Also Hervieu-Léger and Davie, doubtless two of the main supporters of the 
individualization thesis, stress this point. They identify two main features of 
religious modernity. First of all, as a consequence of the weakening of the 
religion institutions’ authority, personal belief and people’s sense of attachment 
to the Church have become two increasingly distinct dimensions of religiosity 
(Davie 1994, 2002; Hervieu-Léger 1999). Given this, indicators of religious 
attachment such ritual participation “display an undeniable degree of 
secularization throughout Western Europe” (Davie 2002:5). On the contrary, 
variables capturing feelings, experience and the more transcendental beliefs 
“demonstrate considerable persistence” (Davie 2002:5). This situation is well 
caught  in the Davie’s most famous quote “Believing without Belonging”, which is 
expected to become more and more widespread throughout Western Europe 
“since a growing detachment from religious institutions does not imply a parallel 
loss in personal religious sensitivity”  (Nicolet and Tresch 2009b:6). Second point 
is that, faced with an increased plurality of worldviews and freed from the 
authority of religious institutions, individuals are free to develop their own belief 
system, without any reference to an – institutionally – validated body of beliefs 
(Hervieu-Léger 1999). These two point are well-summarized by Voas and 
Crockett (2005) when they distinguish between a strong and a weak formulation 
of “Believing without Belonging”. In the strong version, corresponding to the first 
point, the focus is on belief as something related to a classic religious background 
whereas in the weak version belief are “allowed to be non-Christian, vague, and 
even non- religious” (Voas and Crockett 2005:12). 
 
To sum up, according to the religious individualization thesis, religious beliefs are 
likely to persist and to develop into increasingly individualized and privatized 
forms of religiosity. To the contrary, according to secularization theorists, the 
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decline in institutionalized religion is expected to lead in a parallel decline in 
religious beliefs. The contention is still open: some researchers affirm that 
individualized and privatized forms of religiosity are growing (Davie 1994, 2002; 
Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Hervieu-Léger 1999) whereas others argue that 
secularization still constitutes the dominant trend across Western Europe (Bruce 
2002; Pollack 2008b; Pollack and Pickel 2007; Voas and Crockett 2005).  
 
Toward a religious typology? 
 
In the light of the theoretical debate I have just reported, it is not surprising that 
there is also confusion – when not disagreement –  about the empirical 
evidences for the evolution of European religiosity. This confusion partly comes 
from the difficulties of a common understanding of what needs to be examined 
(Nicolet and Tresch 2009b). Some authors mainly focus on indicators of Church-
related behaviours like Church attendance; others are interested in the 
expression of religious feelings while many others on alterative spirituality and 
practices. It is precisely for this reason that relying on a religious typology could 
be a good way to clarify what is going on in Europe. As a way to shed light on 
these issues, I will now present two examples of religious typologies (Nicolet and 
Tresch 2009a; Pollack and Pickel 2007) which constitute also the theoretical 
bases of the typology I will present later. 
 
The first typology I present is the one by Nicolet and Tresch (2009a, 2009b) 
which relies on two different dimensions, namely the institutional dimension – 
referring to individual’s relationship to established churches – and the spiritual 
one – referring to people’s personal beliefs. This typology works perfectly in 
capturing the basic idea of Believing without Belonging (Davie 2002) because 
captures the evolution of personal religiosity – the beliefs people hold regarding 
the transcendent and numinous entities as well as the validity of the sacred 
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truths – and their attachment to religious institutions in the form of Church 
involvement.  
 
From the side of the institutional dimension they differentiate between three 
forms of relationship with the Church: the parishioners display a strong 
involvement in the Church in the form of regular churchgoing, the ambivalents 
are not regular churchgoers but they don’t overtly reject it and the distanced are 
people taking the distance from the Church and having a negative judgment on 
it. From the side of the spiritual dimension they instead draw two main 
distinctions. They examine first whether people express belief in transcendence, 
irrespective of the type of transcendence (can be also something supernatural, 
or any kind of superior force) and secondly the beliefs directly related to 
Christian faith. For this second kind of belief they distinguish between individuals 
who share the main tenets of Christian faith – i.e. belief in God – and the ones 
who don’t. This results in three different forms of believing: The Christian type is 
characterized by beliefs in the Christian tenets, the second type relies to the 
general spirituality (not of Christian inspiration) and the last type is defined by 
atheist and people who do not express any kind of belief (Nicolet and Tresch 
2009a). It is quite glaring that this distinction conceptually overlaps with the Voas 
and Crockett's (2005) one which distinguish between strong and weak form of 
Believing without Belonging.      
 
Starting from these two dimensions, the authors depict six different groups. The 
first one consists of “practicing Christians”, corresponding to the parishioner type 
on institutional dimension and to Christian belief on the spiritual one. Second, 
the “uncommitted Christians” are characterized by their Christian beliefs but also 
by their ambivalence on the institutional dimension. The third group is composed 
by individuals who belong (parishioner) but without believing in the Christian 
tenets – either because they hold other types of beliefs or because they don’t 
have beliefs at all. These three groups basically refer to traditional ways of being 
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religious. Moving from them to the so-called post-traditional forms of religiosity 
we can find other three groups. First of all, the “believers without belonging” 
display Christian beliefs but with a total absence of an institutional relationship. 
They basically correspond to the strong form of BWB (Voas and Crockett 2005). 
The second group consists of individuals who are also far from the official Church 
but who believe in other transcendence than God. They, of course, correspond 
to the weak formulation of BWB. The last and remaining group is of course the 
one of “non-religious” people which is characterized by their ambivalence or 
distance from the Church and their absence of beliefs in transcendence.(Nicolet 
and Tresch 2009b). 
 
Some cues from the Nicolet and Tresch's (2009b) typology can also be found in 
the one by Pollack and Pickel (2007). It is right and proper to highlight that both 
typologies were built to test the ideas of individualization theories. Also Pollack 
and Pickel define six different groups regarding different ways for being religious. 
The first two groups, the “Church religious” and the “committed Christians” are 
characterized by a high level of Church affiliation and Christian religiosity. 
Despite the similarities, the religiosity of committed Christians focuses more on 
participation in Church life whereas the Church-religious group centres more on 
individual religiosity. The “average Christian” instead hardly go to Church but 
they tend to define themselves as religious and to believe in God somehow more 
than non-religious people. Moving from traditional to post-traditional forms of 
religiosity we can find the “syncretists” who evidence a mix of traditional Church 
affiliation, individual Christian religiosity, and non-Church religiosity; quite 
related are the “non-Church religious” individuals, who focus on non-Church 
religious forms more than the syncretists (Pollack and Pickel 2007). At the end 
we can find the “non-religious” group, which exhibits a profile made by the 
rejection of all forms of religiosity – traditional, Christian and non-Church. 
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As told, these two typologies represent the theoretical base of the one we will 
use in the next paragraph. The only difference regards their calibration. The 
Nicolet and Tresch (2009b) and Pollack and Pickel (2007) ones were built to 
explicitly consider all the various shades of individual religiosity and are thus 
focused also on the non-traditional forms of religiosity. Our aim for this chapter 
is slightly different because I want to “narrow the field” only to traditional forms 
of being religious. The resulting typology will be thus based on the combination 
of three indicators describing three different dimensions of traditional Christian 
religiosity.    
5.2 European Christian doctrines 
When I introduced the issues related to the study of European religiosity, I 
mentioned the different Christian confessions and the different ways they can 
shape the meaning of the various religious dimensions. With an over-
simplification, we can see European Christianity as made up by three different 
doctrines, namely Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Far 
be it from me to present a thorough description of their theological pillars, my 
intention here is to present some clues about why the various dimensions should 
have different meanings moving from one Christian doctrine to another. 
 
Roman Catholicism is theologically and historically focused on the figure of the 
Pope. His positions as Vicar of Christ makes his teaching considered as infallible 
and binding. At the same pace with Pope’s role, the Holy Scripture can be seen as 
the other pillar of the Roman Catholic tradition. Main point is that only the 
Roman Catholic Church has the authority to interpret the Holy Scripture. Jointly 
considering these two aspects, it is clear the importance of the Church in 
mediating the religious experience. Church is the foundation of Roman 
Catholicism both as an institution and as source of religious law. The implications 
are many, starting from the seven sacraments as fundamental precepts, passing 
through the vow of celibacy and the existence of the purgatory as place to 
expiate sins and finishing with Holy Mass as main precept in which the Christ’s 
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sacrifice is celebrated. A rough summary should describe Roman Catholicism as a 
much-institutionalized religion, with a strong and clearly defined social and ritual 
dimension in which individual self-exploration is left basically aside. 
 
Main differences between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy relate 
mainly on liturgical and ecclesiastical tradition instead of being substantial in the 
theological pillars. First, contrarily to Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxies consider 
the church as a whole as enlightened by Holy Spirit: there is no need for a higher 
authority and Priests and Patriarchs are basically “primus inter pares”. It derives 
a quite strong emphasis on Holy Scripture but alongside with the substance 
designated for the religious tradition. Some differences occur with the 
sacraments (baptism, holy communion and confirmation are given at the same 
time), with the celibacy (pre-ordination marriage is allowed) and the purgatory 
(which is absent and substituted by the idea of eternal damnation). Holy Mass is 
considered a strong precept as in the Catholicism but it is celebrated with 
different rituals. To sum up, Orthodoxy shares with Roman Catholicism the 
strong social and ritual dimension that is however based on community and 
tradition rather than on institutionalized Church. 
 
Whereas Eastern Orthodoxy is considered as schismatic from Roman 
Catholicism, Protestantism comes from the XVI century’s reform and is 
considered as heretical. There are many differences concerning the theological, 
traditional and substantial aspects of the doctrine. First of all, Protestantism is 
based upon the so call “Priesthood of all believers”. Central role is given to the 
human experience and only Jesus can be considered as mediator between 
humans and divine being. It is quite straightforward the absence of unconditional 
subjection to Pope’s Authority. Strong emphasis is given to the Holy Scripture, 
which are the foundation of every religious norm and rule. The interpretation of 
the Scripture is the duty of each believer who has to establish a personal relation 
with God. Milestone of Protestantism is the individual human experience against 
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the emphasis on sacraments and rituals. Only Baptism and Holy Communion are 
present, there is no vow of celibacy, no purgatory (the idea of predestination is 
the hallmark of Protestantism) and Churches are considered as meeting place for 
community. Strong emphasis is given on the fulfilment of professional and civic 
duties to attain salvation. Conversely to Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, 
Protestantism should thus be considered as an individual religion, where 
ritualistic and collective dimension, formal belonging and social dimension, are 
no longer suitable to grasp the real essence of religious experience.  
5.3 Data and operationalization 
This chapter is basically made by three analytical sections: a cross-sectional 
picture of European religiosity, a trend assessment for the different dimensions 
of religiosity and a trend assessment for the different categories of the religious 
typology. Given that the involved variables and their operationalization is 
common among the three, I will present them only once in this paragraph. 
 
This work is built up on the four waves of EVS (European Value Study) data, a 
large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic 
human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, 
values and opinions of citizens all over Europe (EVS 2011). The European Values 
Study (EVS) started in 1981 and has repeated every nine years in an increasing 
number of countries. The fourth wave in 2008 covers no less than 47 European 
countries/regions. From this huge dataset, I choose a subsample of 32 Christian 
countries that participated at, at least, two waves of the survey. The countries 
surveyed are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and Ukraine (see Appendix 1). The resulting sample was therefore made 
by 135,645 individuals. 
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5.3.1 Variables 
Along the entire chapter, I will basically use four different sets of variables and I 
will now present the way I operationalized them. I will start from the dependent 
variables referring to the single dimensions moving then to the religious typology 
dependent variable. After that I will present the main independent variables and 
the control variables. 
Dependent variables – single dimensions 
Main aim of this chapter is to analyse the patterns of European religiosity relying 
on the main debate between secularization theory and individualization theory. 
These two compelling theories speak about reciprocal connections between 
religious dimensions. While secularization theorists relate on an overall decline 
for all the religious dimensions, individualization theorists speak about a decline 
of institutional forms but a stability – or even an increase – of individual 
religiosity. In the methodological chapter I gave a comprehensive description of 
the different dimensions which underlie the broad concept of religiosity. In doing 
this I relied on the basic contributions by Glock (1962) and Glock and Stark (1965) 
and I supplemented them with the idea of religious self-definition referring to 
the ideas of civil religions (Bellah 1967) and vicarious religions (Davie 2012). 
Starting from this, I decided to focus on the three dimensions more involved in 
the European debate. I operationalized these variables – religious practice, belief 
and self-definition – as follow. 
 
Religious practice: The way to measure religious practice is fairly standardized 
and it basically refers to church attendance (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2013, 
2014; Fairbrother 2013; te Grotenhuis et al. 2015; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2011; van Ingen and Moor 2015; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Ruiter and van 
Tubergen 2009; Voas and Doebler 2011). Starting from the item “Apart from 
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days?” I built up a dummy variable recoding “more than once a 
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week” and “once a week” into “Weekly Church attendance” and coding it as 1. 
The other response categories were coded as 0.  
 
Self-definition: As stated before, “self-definition” represents in some way the 
individually perceived sense of belonging. Especially in modern context it could 
be instructive to test how individuals perceive themselves beyond practice. The 
starting point was the item “Independently of whether you go to church or not, 
would you say you are ...”. I recoded the answer “a religious person” as 1 and the 
other two possible answers (“not a religious person”, “a convinced atheist”) as 0. 
 
Religious Belief: The notion of belief is the hardest to conceptualize and 
operationalize. It could refer to a godly power, supernatural energies or any kind 
of superior force. It is also allowed to be “non-Christian, vague, and even non-
religious” (Voas and Crockett 2005:12). In this research, I want to test the real 
core of Christian beliefs, trying to disentangle them from a more general and 
spiritual “I know there is something out there”. I have relied to a set of items 
asking “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?”. I coded as 1 a person 
answering “Yes” to all the item concerning “God”, “Heaven” and “Hell”, 0 
otherwise. This choice has clear theoretical and methodological reasons. 
Theoretically speaking, beliefs in God, Heaven and Hell represent the main 
convictions of Christian theological system. Also methodologically, it is quite 
reasonable to use these three items. Relying on the work of van Schuur (2003) 
who built up both a Mokken scale and a Rasch scale using these items, it is 
possible to see them as ordered and suitable to measure a latent trait, namely 
religious belief. “Belief in God” and “Belief in Hell” represent the higher and 
lower bounds of the scale and using them (plus “Belief in Heaven”, which is in 
the middle of rank) therefore permits to focus on Christian belief in the strictest 
sense, trying to avoid generic spirituality 2.  
                                                          
2 : as robustness check also other combinations were tested. Building up the “belief” indicator 
using both “God and Hell” and “God, Heaven, Life after death and Hell” show pretty much the 
same results 
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Dependent variable – typology 
 
Using the typologies from the paragraph 5.1 as an inspiration, I proceed in 
building our typology based on the abovementioned dimensions: religious 
Practice, Belief and Self-Definition. It is clearly a simple and sharp typology, but it 
can give a lot of insights about the European religious evolution. In building it, I 
have focused on the main theoretical approaches within the sociology of religion 
field and this resulted in a 5-category typology. All the individuals who do not 
clearly fall in one of these categories (because of unusual combinations or high 
number of missing values in the three variables) are jointly considered in the 
category “other/missing”.     
 
At the extremes of the typology we can find the groups of the “Fully religious” 
and “Fully atheists”. The first one is composed by individuals who are regular 
Churchgoers, who believe in the main Christian tenets and who define 
themselves as religious. On the contrary, the “Fully atheist” are not regular 
Churchgoers, do not believe in the main Christian tenets and do not define 
themselves as religious. By drawing from the idea of religiosity as national and 
cultural feature and heritage (Bellah 1967; Davie 2000; McAndrew and Voas 
2011) we will instead define the third group: the “Identitarian religious”. These 
are basically individual who define themselves as religious, but without believing 
in the main Christian precepts nor being regular Churchgoers. The last two 
profiles we need to draw are the ones related to the post-traditional forms of 
religiosity. They correspond to the much-quoted idea of “Believers without 
belong” and to its exact contrary, the ones who “Belong without believe”. The 
names are quite self-explanatory: the “believing without belonging” group is 
formed by individuals who believe in the main Christian tenets but without being 
regular Churchgoers; the opposite is represented by the “belonging without 
believing” groups, which is characterized by a strong Church attendance but 
without the belief in the main Christian precepts. It is important to always keep 
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in mind that this typology is completely based on Christianity (namely is not 
suitable to group individuals from other denominations) and it is intentionally 
sharp. In the opinion of who is writing, this is the best way, given the theoretical 
framework and the available data, to describe the European religious evolution. I 
have operationalized this typology as follows: 
 
Fully Religious: Are the ones who declare weekly religious practice (Religious 
Practice=1), who believe in the main Christian tenets (Religious Belief=1) and 
who define themselves as religious (Self-Definition=1). 
Fully Atheists: Are the ones who do not declare to attend Church weekly 
(Religious Practice=0), do not believe in the main Christian tenets (Religious 
Belief=0) and do not define themselves as religious (Self-Definition=0).  
Identitarian Religious: Are the ones who do not declare to attend Church weekly 
(Religious Practice=0), do not believe in the main Christian tenets (Religious 
Belief=0) but who define themselves as religious (Self-Definition=1).  
Believing without belonging: Are the ones who do not declare to attend Church 
weekly (Religious Practice=0) but who believe in the main Christian tenets 
(Religious Belief=1). 
Belonging without believing: Are the ones declaring weekly religious practice 
(Religious Practice=1) but without believing in the main Christian tenets 
(Religious Belief=0). 
Other/missing: Is the residual category. It includes those who are missing in at 
least two indicators and those who show unusual combinations on the three. 
 
Independent and control variables 
 
For the purposes of this chapter I rely on two substantial independent variables – 
religious doctrine and cohort – and to two control variables – gender and survey 
wave. 
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Religious doctrine: In considering the religious context, I will treat Christian 
doctrine as a country variable. I built up this variable summarizing the individual 
information gathered with the question “Which religious denomination?”. 
Countries with an unclear situation (sharing high percentages – at least 25% – on 
two different denominations) were coded as “mixed” (see Figure 11 and 
Appendix 2 for details).  
 
Figure 11:  Countries by denomination 
Roman Catholics Protestants Eastern Orthodox Mixed 
Austria Denmark Bulgaria Estonia 
Belgium Finland Belarus Germany 
Croatia Great Britain Greece Latvia 
Czech Republic Iceland Romania Netherlands 
France Norway Russian Federation 
 
Hungary Sweden Ukraine 
 
Ireland 
   
Italy 
   
Lithuania 
   
Luxembourg 
   
Malta 
   
Poland 
   
Portugal 
   
Slovak Republic 
   
Slovenia 
   
Spain       
 
 
Cohorts: The definition and operationalization of cohorts is quite 
straightforward. I refer to the year of birth divided into decades, starting from 
the ones birth before 1930. Due to small numerosity of the last available cohort 
(born after 1990, n=741), I aggregated it with the one born after 1980. For the 
purposes of the analysis 458 observations were excluded due to missing values 
(see Appendix 3). 
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Control variables: as control variables I rely on “Gender” (Male=0, Female=1, 
dichotomous) and “Survey wave” (“1981-1984”, “1990-1993”, “1999-2001”, 
“2008-2010”, categorical). 
5.4 European religiosity: a cross-sectional picture 
This paragraph represents the first of three-analytical paragraph aiming to 
describe European religiosity. In particular, in the next pages I will try to draw an 
accurate picture of the religious differences among European countries. I will do 
so by using either the single indicators and the typology described before. 
 
Table 3 shows the means for the three religious indicators I have chosen for each 
country of our dataset (EVS 2011). Only as remark, the dataset was built from the 
EVS longitudinal file and includes all the European Christian countries which are 
present in at least two waves of the survey. Being the three variables 
dichotomous, the means can be interpreted as rates; for example, the average of 
0.75 for Self-Definition in Austria means that the 75% of Austrian respondents 
declare themselves as religious.  
 
Rates for Self-Definition are the ones showing the highest values, ranging from 
30% of Belarus to 92% of Poland. A first attempt to look this data in the lights of 
a – potential – religious-territorial cleavage is by stating that the lowest rates are 
found for some former Communist countries (Estonia=37%, Czech Republic=40%) 
and for some northern countries (Norway=47%, Sweden=25%). The European 
religious cleavage become more evident if we look at rates of religious Belief. 
They range from the 9% of Denmark to the 85% of Malta. Widen the 
observation, we can see the lowest rates for the northern countries (9% 
Denmark, 10% Sweden, 15% Iceland, 16% The Netherlands, 20% Norway) and 
the highest ones for some former communist countries and for southern 
countries plus Ireland (85% Malta, 68% Romania, 60% Lithuania, 57% Ireland, 
51% Greece, 50% Croatia, 46% Italy). Patterns of religious Practice are the 
clearest ones. They basically divide some northern countries (Denmark=3%, 
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Finland=4%, Sweden=5%, Norway=5%) and some former communist countries 
(Belarus=6%, Latvia=6%, Russian Federation=4%) from some southern countries 
(Malta=84%, Italy=36%, Portugal=36%, Spain=30%), Central-European ones 
(Poland=58%, Slovakia=38%%) and Ireland (69%). 
 
Table 3: Average Self-definition, Belief and Practice for European Christian countries 
Country Freq. 
Self-
Definition Belief Practice 
Austria 4,492 0.75 0.24 0.22 
Belgium 7,358 0.67 0.18 0.22 
Bulgaria 3,534 0.51 0.23 0.07 
Belarus 2,500 0.30 0.40 0.06 
Croatia 2,528 0.84 0.50 0.28 
Czech Republic 5,838 0.40 0.15 0.08 
Denmark 4,742 0.73 0.09 0.03 
Estonia 3,531 0.37 0.17 0.04 
Finland 2,760 0.59 0.30 0.04 
France 5,318 0.48 0.17 0.09 
Germany 8,853 0.49 0.15 0.13 
Great Britain 5,212 0.51 0.33 0.14 
Greece 2,642 0.84 0.51 0.18 
Hungary 3,512 0.56 0.22 0.11 
Iceland 3,405 0.71 0.15 0.03 
Ireland 4,242 0.71 0.57 0.69 
Italy 6,885 0.85 0.46 0.36 
Latvia 3,422 0.73 0.29 0.06 
Lithuania 3,518 0.77 0.60 0.13 
Luxembourg 2,821 0.57 0.19 0.15 
Malta 3,362 0.77 0.85 0.84 
Netherlands 4,795 0.64 0.16 0.19 
Norway 3,380 0.47 0.20 0.05 
Poland 3,587 0.92 0.61 0.58 
Portugal 3,738 0.82 0.38 0.36 
Romania 3,738 0.81 0.68 0.25 
Russian Federation 4,004 0.70 0.40 0.04 
Slovakia 3,976 0.82 0.46 0.38 
Slovenia 3,407 0.72 0.19 0.19 
Spain 7,640 0.62 0.34 0.30 
Sweden 4,203 0.35 0.10 0.05 
Ukraine 2,702 0.83 0.49 0.11 
Total 135,645 0.64 0.32 0.21 
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If looking at the rates from Table 3 the European situation could appear more 
jumbled than it really is. A good way to have a clearer picture is to look at the 
same rates reported as gradient colours in a map. 
 
Figure 12: Average Religious Self-Definition 
 
 
 
If we look at Self-Definition (Figure 12), despite high values for almost every 
country (always above 25%), the pattern is clear. The countries showing the 
highest values are the southern and centre-eastern ones. It seems there is a 
central block of European countries where the religious self-definition is really 
relevant.  
 
The “central block” we have found for self-definition is widen to former 
communist countries if we look at religious belief (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Average Religious Belief 
 
 
Some southern and centre-eastern countries continue to show the highest rates 
but the entire block of former-communist countries has rates of belief similar to 
southern European countries. The countries showing the lowest rates are indeed 
the continental and the Scandinavian ones 
Figure 14: Average Religious Practice 
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Looking at European religious practice (Figure 14) is instead a downward game. 
Almost every country shows very low rates of weekly Church attendance. The 
only exceptions are represented by southern Catholic countries plus Poland and 
Ireland, universally well-known example of strong religious practice (Brenner 
2016).  
 
To summarize what we have just seen it is possible to divide European Christian 
countries in three different groups. On the first side we have the Scandinavian 
countries and the northern European countries, which basically show low values 
on all the three indicators. On the second side we have southern European 
countries plus some Central countries (Poland) and Ireland, which show the 
highest values for Practice and high values also for Belief. On the third side, 
former Communist countries show the highest values for Belief but lower values 
for Practice.  
 
If we look at this rough distinction it is obvious to see the overlapping with the 
Christian doctrine one. The first group is basically represented by the Protestant 
countries, the second one by the Catholic countries whereas the third by the 
Orthodox ones. In the light of this, it is reasonable to continue the reasoning 
dividing the European countries according to their main denomination. We have 
already seen (see paragraph Data and operationalization5.3) how this division was 
made so we can go straight to the point.  
 
Table 4: Average Self-definition, Belief and Practice for European Christian Denominations 
  Freq. Definition Belief Practice 
Roman Catholic 72,222 0.69 0.36 0.30 
Mixed 20,601 0.55 0.18 0.12 
Protestants 23,702 0.56 0.19 0.06 
Eastern Orthodox 19,120 0.68 0.46 0.12 
Total 135,645 0.64 0.32 0.21 
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The pattern is clear and interesting. Protestant and mixed countries show the 
lowest score for all the three indicators: the religious self-definition is the lowest 
(while remaining quite high) within European countries and the same for 
religious belief and weekly Church attendance. Roman Catholic countries and 
Orthodox ones are someway complementary: the rates of self-definition are 
basically the same whereas Roman Catholics show higher values on Practice if 
compared to Orthodox and lower on Belief. Vice-versa, Orthodox countries show 
lower values on Practice and higher on Belief. These findings are quite consistent 
with our previous statements about the characteristics of the Christian 
theologies. In paragraph 5.2 I have described Protestantism as an individual 
religion where ritualistic and collective dimension are not likely to be relevant; 
on the contrary, Roman Catholicism is the much-institutionalized religion with a 
strong social and ritual dimension whereas Orthodoxy is more based on 
traditional rituals and belief rather than on an institutionalized Church. These 
features are clearly grasped in the results I have just presented. 
 
Religious typology in Europe 
 
Looking at the European religiosity with the lens of a typology means not only 
looking at the indicator’s distribution but also at the ways they combine. Given 
what I described in the previous paragraphs, it is quite relevant to look at four 
specific groups – fully religious, atheists, believers without belonging and 
Identitarian religious – to better understand what is going on and to give some 
cues about the secularization-individualization debate.  In Table 5 it is reported 
the share of the categories for all the European countries in our dataset.  
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Table 5: Religious Typology for European Christian Countries 
Country 
Fully 
Religious 
Fully 
Atheist 
Believing 
without 
belonging 
Belonging 
without 
Believing 
Identity 
Religious 
Other/       
missing 
Total 
Austria 8.44 16.72 9.97 8.21 39.34 17.32 100.00 
Belgium 7.52 25.46 7.42 10.19 34.98 14.43 100.00 
Bulgaria 3.00 33.67 13.78 1.90 28.24 19.41 100.00 
Belarus 4.08 34.48 23.96 0.88 10.68 25.92 100.00 
Croatia 18.16 11.75 24.01 5.74 29.63 10.72 100.00 
Czech Rep. 5.09 45.46 6.18 1.71 22.80 18.76 100.00 
Denmark 1.43 22.71 5.40 0.74 58.01 11.70 100.00 
Estonia 1.78 29.65 7.50 0.71 18.55 41.80 100.00 
Finland 3.01 24.09 16.92 0.98 33.77 21.23 100.00 
France 3.69 41.48 10.61 3.54 28.79 11.90 100.00 
Germany 5.39 37.13 6.46 5.04 26.26 19.72 100.00 
Great Britain 7.94 28.43 17.11 3.80 24.44 18.27 100.00 
Greece 12.34 10.30 28.12 3.29 36.87 9.08 100.00 
Hungary 5.92 36.28 12.90 3.36 32.03 9.51 100.00 
Iceland 1.47 21.35 11.01 1.29 57.00 7.87 100.00 
Ireland 32.67 8.27 8.98 21.03 8.79 20.25 100.00 
Italy 20.87 9.72 14.54 8.98 32.06 13.84 100.00 
Latvia 2.83 14.38 13.35 1.26 38.49 29.69 100.00 
Lithuania 6.31 5.51 16.91 0.71 28.79 41.76 100.00 
Luxembourg 4.96 32.15 10.28 6.63 30.59 15.38 100.00 
Malta 60.08 4.13 7.76 7.64 2.74 17.64 100.00 
Netherlands 7.95 30.47 5.46 8.13 38.10 9.89 100.00 
Norway 3.76 40.47 12.93 1.12 29.62 12.10 100.00 
Poland 35.15 4.24 15.67 13.69 17.48 13.77 100.00 
Portugal 15.94 12.04 13.72 13.38 32.96 11.96 100.00 
Romania 17.28 7.44 35.31 3.00 24.96 12.01 100.00 
Russian Fed. 3.02 19.46 22.73 0.55 38.16 16.08 100.00 
Slovakia 24.72 14.46 9.68 6.04 28.22 16.88 100.00 
Slovenia 8.34 22.48 7.78 7.46 39.07 14.88 100.00 
Spain 15.79 24.79 10.98 9.21 22.89 16.34 100.00 
Sweden 2.50 43.85 4.02 1.31 24.10 24.22 100.00 
Ukraine 8.14 10.88 25.06 1.67 40.45 13.80 100.00 
Total 11.07 23.79 12.5 5.52 29.87 17.24 100.00 
 
 
Looking at the European countries, we can find the highest proportion of “Fully 
religious” in the same Catholic countries (Malta 60.08%, Poland 35.15%, Ireland 
32.67%, Slovakia 24.72%, Italy 20.87%) that leaped out in the previous analysis 
about single indicators. If we look at percentages of “Fully atheist” instead, 
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something unexpected appears. In addition to some – expected – Nordic 
countries (Sweden 43.85%, Norway 40.47%) we find highest proportions for 
France (41.48 %), Czech Republic (which 45.46% sounds like an antagonism to 
religious Slovakia) and Germany (37.13%). There is no trace in the highest 
positions of the other Nordic countries – Finland, Denmark, Iceland and the 
Netherlands. On the contrary, we find the lowest values for the countries scoring 
higher on “Fully Religious” – Malta, Italy, Poland and Ireland. Given these 
consideration, it is right to define Italy, Ireland, Poland and Malta as the most 
religious countries in Europe, in which both the institutional and the spiritual 
dimension of religiosity coexist. On the contrary we need caution to define all 
the northern countries as main examples of widespread atheism.  
 
Going further in this reasoning, next step is to look at the “Religious identity” 
group, namely individual who neither attend Church regularly nor believe in the 
main Christian tenets, but who define themselves as religious. As expected, we 
find the highest proportions for the countries which were missed when looking 
at atheism. Denmark (58.01%), Iceland (57.00%) and the Netherlands (38.10%) 
are some countries standing at the top, followed by Austria (39.34%), Belgium 
(34.98%), Slovenia (39.07%) and by a block of former Communist countries – 
Ukraine (40.45%), Russian Federation (38.16%) and Latvia (38.49%). Moving from 
these traditional forms of religiosity to the “Believing without belonging”, it 
appears clear that this category catches mostly the ex-Sovietic way of being 
religious. In fact, the countries scoring higher are entirely from the block of 
former communist countries – Belarus (23.96%), Romania (35.31%), Russian 
federation (22.73%) and Ukraine (25.06%). In addition to them we can find 
Greece (28.12%), another Orthodox country, and Croatia (24.01%).  
 
Given this result some doubts appears regarding the use of this typology. At first 
quick glance it seems suitable to measure inherent features of the different 
theologies instead of transversal European religious features. We will come back 
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to this point when looking at the temporal evolution of these groups. What is 
clear, however, is that different religious confessions among Christianity show 
different ways of being religious. In order to summarize and clarify what we have 
just seen, next step is obviously to look at the different categories and at how 
they are shaped by the different confessions.  
 
Table 6: Religious Typology for European Christian Denominations 
Country 
Fully 
Religious 
Fully 
Atheist 
Believing 
without 
belonging 
Belonging 
without 
Believing 
Identity 
Religious 
Other/       
missing 
Total 
Catholic 16.10 20.98 11.18 8.08 27.26 16.40 100.00 
Mixed 4.94 30.52 7.55 4.39 29.73 22.87 100.00 
Protestants 3.57 30.22 10.95 1.67 37.60 15.98 100.00 
Orthodox 7.96 19.22 24.77 1.86 30.30 15.90 100.00 
Total 11.07 23.79 12.50 5.52 29.87 17.24 100.00 
 
 
Table 6 reports the proportion for the different categories divided by the various 
Christian doctrines. Roman Catholics countries show the highest proportion of 
fully religious and almost the lowest of fully atheist. In addition, they show a low 
rate of believers without belonging, the highest of belonging without believing 
and the lowest of religious Identitarian. Every sign goes in the direction of 
highlight the institutional dimension of Roman Catholicism: the emphasis is on 
religious practice as pre-requisite of every form of religiosity. Eastern 
Orthodoxies countries show instead low rate of both fully religious and fully 
atheist but the higher rate of believers without belonging. Also in this case the 
expectations are confirmed: Eastern Orthodoxy is characterized by the emphasis 
on beliefs as the driver-dimension of religiosity; Church attendance is not a 
strong determinant as for Catholics. Protestants are the missing piece of the 
puzzle; they show the lowest rate of fully religious, a high rate of fully atheist but 
low rates for believers without belonging and belongs without believing. In 
addition, they show the highest proportion of Identitarian religious. Everything 
goes in the direction of a disaffection from religious engagement, both in the 
130 
 
form of Church attendance and belief in the main tenets. It is quite interesting 
that, despite this decline of religiosity, Protestants continue to define themselves 
as religious, and this peculiarity reinforce both the idea of “civil religion” (Bellah 
1967) and  “vicarious religion” by grace Davie (2000, 2001). The latter is the most 
interesting, being developed explicitly referring to Lutheran Churches in northern 
countries. Despite the low attendance rates in these countries, it seems that 
individuals remain members of their churches. The mechanism behind is the one 
of “vicarious religion”, meaning the “notion of religion performed by an active 
minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only 
understand, but quite clearly approve of what the minority is doing” (Davie 
2012:169). According to this, individuals use Churches extensively only for the 
occasional offices and regard membership as part of national just as much as 
religious identity.     
5.5 Religious shift among cohorts in Europe 
In the previous paragraph, I drew a static picture of the European religious 
landscape. This is a good starting point but obviously a good assessment of what 
is happening in Europe needs a longitudinal approach. This is even truer because 
of the debate involving different theories which speaks about different trends for 
different dimensions of religiosity. In this paragraph I will go into this longitudinal 
assessment by modelling cohort trends for the three – practice, belief and self-
definition – dimensions of religiosity. Given the peculiarities which every 
Christian doctrine give to these dimensions, I will also model the trends dividing 
them among these doctrines.    
5.5.1 Research questions 
As already said, religion has to be seen as a multidimensional concept where at 
least five different dimensions are interrelated. The emphasis on these 
dimensions is the key point to better understand, test and interpret the main 
theoretical approaches on religiosity. Considering religiosity as a whole (i.e. 
building a scale) or focusing only on one dimension could be not instructive. 
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Despite some practical advantages, this approach oversimplifies the study of 
religiosity and could be no longer adequate to grasp the real meanings of 
religious trends (Voas 2015).  
 
Aim of this part of research is to give a clear assessment about how these 
dimensions are related and how and if their trends show a common pattern or 
differ. I do so focusing on European Christian countries and considering the 
cohorts starting from the ’30. I also take into account the different Christian 
denominations to better investigate the trends and to underline possible 
peculiarity.  
 
First step is to understand how these three dimensions are correlated. Having 
the comparative framework considered, these correlations have to be evaluated 
at both the individual and the country level trying to avoid both the ecologic 
fallacy and the atomistic one. Assessing the correlations in this way permits to 
better understand whether the three indicators measure or not the same 
underlying dimension of religiosity. Starting from this, the first research question 
is:  
 
RQ1: How correlated are the three dimensions (at the country and individual 
level)? Are they measuring the same underlying dimension of religion? 
 
As previously said, this research consists in building the trends for three different 
dimensions. The decision to use cohorts to account for time has clear theoretical 
foundations and this issue is so relevant that I will devote the entire next 
paragraph to it. This leads directly to the second research question, namely if the 
abovementioned dimensions show different or similar patterns: 
 
RQ2: Do the three dimensions of religiosity show different trends moving from 
the older to the youngest cohort? 
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In the paragraph 5.2, I went through the three main European Christian 
doctrines, trying to underline some theological pillars that could condition the 
meaning and the interpretation they give to the different dimensions. The third 
research question basically assesses this point:      
 
RQ3: Are the trends different or the same for each of the Christian doctrines? 
5.5.2 Why cohorts? 
As stated in the methodological chapter, the Age-Period-Cohort issue has to be 
one of the focal points in assessing religious change. Luckily, we have at this 
point a kind of state of the art concerning it. First of all, we have to exclude age 
effect as main cause of long-term trends. Age effects on religiosity arise because 
of life-course events like setting up home independently, marrying, having 
children, or retiring (see also Figure 8). These effects are therefore unlikely to be 
linear over an adult lifespan, excluding them for the explanation of long-term 
trends (Voas and Chaves 2016). The youngers tend to be less religious not 
because they represent permanent long-term social change but because they are 
young (Greeley 2003). The debate about the appropriate lens to study religious 
change thus narrows to Period or Cohort effects. Keeping in mind the blurred 
boundaries between the two and the consequent identification problem, cohort 
replacement seems to be the most appropriate interpretation for religious 
change.  
 
Starting from the works of Voas (Voas 2009; Voas and Chaves 2016), cohort 
replacement has started to be considered as the main mechanism behind 
religious decline. “The religious changes we observe in Europe occur largely 
across rather than within generations” (Voas 2009:161). The time differences 
should therefore be explained because of cohort and not age or period effects. 
Voas and Crockett (2005), among others, state that the level of religious 
affiliation falls for each successive generation and that the gap between these 
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cohorts has been increased. In their estimation of trends for each cohort they 
report an essentially flat lines; this thus suggest the absence of any period effects 
over and above the generational differences. In another research concerning 
England, (Crockett and Voas 2006b) clearly state that the religious decline 
occurred in the last century was overwhelmingly generational in nature: they 
report that decade by decade each birth cohort was less religious than the one 
before. In addition to these, many previous studies (Firebaugh and Harley 1991; 
Schwadel 2010; Voas and Doebler 2011) suggest that the major changes 
observed in religiosity arise from difference between cohorts (Müller, De Graaf, 
and Schmidt 2014). This cohort effect it is likely to be considered as a mix of 
different mechanisms: these comprise a pure environmental and contextual 
effect during childhood as well as the impact of this context on the parental 
effort for religious education. 
 
A good way to clarify some of these possible mechanisms is to distinguish 
between compositional change and contextual change. There is a compositional 
change when there has been little change in people with similar characteristics 
whereas there is a change in the frequency of these attributes (e.g. higher 
education, women employment, childbearing) (Voas and Doebler 2011). A 
contextual change instead occurs if people have not changed, but the 
environment in which they behave has changed (e.g. religious diversity, security). 
It remains clear that the boundaries between these factors are blurred but the 
need to clarify them remains theoretically and practically relevant. For example, 
increased access to higher education (contextual feature) may have a 
compositional effect (if more educated individuals are less religious if compared 
to others), which could in turn create a new contextual effect (the widespread of 
a non-religious worldview) (Voas and Doebler 2011). Focusing on religion, 
contextual effect on religiosity can be incentive to believe and belong (like 
material insecurity), available education (religious Vs secular instruction), 
prohibition on Sunday working, availability of competing secular activities, 
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media-promoted worldviews, social norms about women working, family 
formation and so on. From this derive the relevance of the context in which 
individuals grew up and been socialized.          
 
Concluding, it seems fair to say that “society is changing religiously not because 
individuals are changing, but rather because old people are gradually replaced by 
younger people with different characteristics” (Voas and Doebler 2011:1). If we 
accept this, the mechanism that produces cohort effects is straightforward: “we 
are socialized by the religious environment of our upbringing, and members of 
each successive cohort (…) are less likely to have been raised in religious 
households and are therefore less likely to be religious as adults” (Voas and 
Chaves 2016:19).   
5.5.3 Methods and modelling strategy 
To analyse the relations between variables defined at different levels and to take 
into account the heterogeneity of religious trajectories between different 
countries, multilevel modelling is the most suitable approach. It provides with a 
set of articulated and flexible models that reassemble the disconnection 
between two independent traditions of research: ecological analysis and the 
individual variables analysis (Subramanian et al. 2009). For this research, a 
particular kind of multilevel models was used; this kind, called multivariate 
multilevel model or multiple response variables models, basically represent 
contemporary measurements of distinctive but not unrelated outcome variables. 
The three outcomes (practice, belief and self-definition) are thus modelled 
simultaneously. I do this through a multivariate multilevel model whereby the 
three outcomes at level 0 are conceptualized as nesting within the individuals at 
level 1 which are nested within countries at level 2. Given the three outcomes 
binary, I used a multilevel model in which the dependent variables are related to 
the predictor variables through a logit link. The unexplained differences between 
individuals are treated as a Binomial distribution and a covariance structure is 
specified to allow correlations between the outcomes. This kind of technique 
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deals efficiently with missing observations (this facility is based on the rather 
undemanding “missing at random” assumption (Little and Rubin 2002)): as long 
as at least one of the three outcome responses is observed it is possible to 
include that case in the analysis (Deeming and Jones 2015). In short, this 
multilevel approach handles multiple outcomes in an overall model, permits 
imbalance and missingness, allows for the assessment of correlations between 
outcomes at each level, corrects standard errors for mis-estimated precision and 
analyses micro and macro models simultaneously (Deeming and Jones 2015). 
 
As a workflow, I drew upon a step-by-step modelling. I built up three different 
models of increasing complexity in order to answer to the three research 
questions (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Modelling strategy 
 
 
 
In order to answer to the first (RQ1: How correlated are the three dimensions? 
Are they measuring the same underlying dimension of religion?) we basically 
refer to the so called null model, meaning a model with no predictors where the 
constant term is allowed to vary between countries. In doing so we can obtain 
the correlation coefficients between the three dependent variables reported for 
the two different levels (individuals and countries) (see Appendix 4). Model 1 is 
the null model supplemented by the 2nd order polynomial term for cohorts and 
survey wave and gender as control variables. With this model, we are able to 
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answer to the second research question (RQ2: Do the three dimensions of 
religiosity show different trends?). In this model the coefficients for the two 
polynomial terms are allowed to vary between countries in order to take into 
account the different slopes and shapes of the trends (see Appendix 5). Finally, 
with model 2, we are able to answer the third research question (RQ3: Are the 
trends different or the same for each of the Christian doctrines?). This model is 
basically model 1 supplemented by fixed effects for the different Christian 
doctrines (Protestants as reference category in contrast coding) and an 
interaction term between cohorts and Christian doctrines (see Appendix 6)3.  
5.5.4 Results 
First step in multilevel modelling is to assess whether there is enough country 
variance to justify its use. There are two different steps to assess the 
appropriateness of this approach. Firstly, country-level variance has to be 
statistically significant. If yes, it is possible to calculate the VPC, alias the variance 
partition coefficient, which points the proportion of total variance explained by 
higher level units (countries in this case).  
 
Table 7: Model 0 (null) estimation. Coefficients in odds scale 
  Definition Belief Practice 
Fixed Part 
   Cons 0.607*** -0.706*** -1.387 *** 
    Random Part 
   Cons 2 var 0.526*** 0.701*** 1.505*** 
    VPC 0.137 0.175 0.314 
    Units: Countries 32 32 32 
Units: Individuals 134,997 134,997 134,997 
Units: Responses 363,839 363,839 363,839 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
                                                          
3: Model estimated within MLWiN (http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/software/mlwin/) via 
runmlwin (Leckie and Charlton 2012), RIGLS (restricted maximum likelihood) estimation 
procedure. 
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Table 7 shows everything is needed for this prior stage. As we can see level 2 
variance is statistically significant for all the three outcomes and this justify the 
choice of multilevel modelling. Starting from these level 2 variances it is possible 
to look at VPC coefficients, calculated as 4:  
 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑗 =
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜋2/3 
 
 
 
VPC coefficients have to be interpreted as proportion of total variance explained 
by higher level and show some insights about how the different outcomes differ 
in this regard. The outcome showing the higher VPC is religious practice, with 
31.4% or variance explained by country differences. These coefficients for the 
other two items are lower (13.7% for self-definition and 17.5% for belief) and 
this mean a lower level of country differences in respect to the within countries 
ones.  
 
RQ1: How correlated are the three dimensions? Are they measuring the same 
underlying dimension of religion? 
 
All these preliminary considerations justify the modelling strategy but say almost 
nothing about how the different outcomes are related and whether they work 
together or not. To move toward this issues a good starting point is to plot the 
residuals pairwise. Figure 16 shows the country residuals obtained from the null 
model. There are clearly large differences between countries but the residuals 
show quite a common pattern. It seems that the clearest linear pattern is when 
comparing Practice and Belief, meaning that countries with higher levels of Belief 
also show higher level of Practice, and vice versa. The other two comparisons 
seem to be less clear-cut, even though the patterns are still present.  
 
                                                          
4 : VPC Calculated under the assumption of Latent Variable Distribution  
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Figure 16: Country residuals (log-odds scale) 
 
 
 
If we look instead at individual residuals (Figure 17), two main things can be 
noticed. First of all, the residuals patterns are more jumbled, meaning a not so 
clear relation between each couple of item. Secondly, the residuals are in some 
way clustered. This reinforce the idea of using multilevel modelling and cast 
doubts about the suitability of these items to measure an overall concept of 
religiosity.  
 
We can better describe this situation by looking at Table 8. It displays the 
correlations between the three outcomes at each level, net from the effect of 
the other level. It is not surprisingly that all correlations are positive such there is 
a general tendency for all the three religious indicators to go together. 
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Figure 17: Individual residuals (log-odds scale) 
 
 
As previously foreseen, the highest correlations are the country level ones, which 
are all between 0.564 and 0.718. At the individual level there is also a tendency 
for the three outcomes to go together, but the coefficients are weaker and 
between 0.284 (Practice and Self-Definition) and 0.336 (Practice and Belief). 
 
Table 8: Correlation between outcomes for Countries and Individuals 
  
Self-
Definition Belief Practice 
COUNTRIES       
Self-Definition 1     
Belief 0.612 1   
Practice 0.564 0.718 1 
        
INDIVIDUALS       
Self-Definition 1     
Belief 0.344 1   
Practice 0.284 0.336 1 
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To give a brief summary, there is general tendency of the three dimensions of 
religiosity to go together and this is particularly marked at country level. At the 
individual level, the three outcomes represent somewhat different and unrelated 
dimensions, as the correlation coefficients are not high. A good way to give a 
graphical representation of these individual results is by Figure 18 which reports 
the Venn diagram for the three variables. The picture cannot be clearer: it shows 
that the three dimensions overlap only for few individual over the entire EVS 
sample. 
 
Figure 18: Venn diagram for the three dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
RQ2: Different trends for different dimensions 
 
In answering the second research question, we primarily have a look at the 
Model 1 coefficients for both terms related to cohorts (Table 9). Having in mind 
that these coefficients are conditional on gender and survey wave (to control for 
period effects), it is quite clear that all of them are negative and statistically 
significant for the 1st grade of the polynomial term. This means that there is a 
general decrease on the three outcomes. The steep of the decrease does not 
vary so much between the three outcomes. Looking instead at the 2nd grade of 
the polynomial some differences are present. This term is significant for all the 
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three outcomes (even thought for Practice is critical), with a bigger coefficient for 
belief (being quadratic also small differences can have a strong impact). Looking 
at the constant instead, it is possible to see that the indicator measuring self-
definition is the bigger one, meaning a higher “starting point”, whereas the other 
two show lower values. 
 
Table 9: Model 1 estimation. Coefficients in log-odds scale 
  Self-Definition Belief Practice 
Fixed Part       
Cons 1.384*** -0,332* -0.786*** 
Cohort -0.399*** -0.435*** -0.429*** 
Cohort^2 0.020*** 0.041*** 0.020*** 
Female (ref: male) 0.713*** 0.457*** 0.574*** 
1990-1993 (ref:1981-1984) -0.032 -0.180*** -0.048* 
1999-2001 (ref:1981-1984) 0.222*** 0,233*** -0.039 
2008-2010 (ref:1981-1984) 0.249*** 0.347*** -0.104*** 
        
Random Part       
Cons var 0.844*** 1.008*** 2.291*** 
Cohort var 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.120*** 
Cohort^2 var 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 
        
Units: Countries 32 32 32 
Units: Individuals 134,997 134,997 134,997 
Units: Responses 363,839 363,839 363,839 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The common story behind this is a general decrease but with some substantial 
differences. Self-Definition starts higher if compared to the other two, which 
start almost at the same point. Religious practice decrease almost at the same 
rate between every cohort, meaning a basic linear decrease and the same for 
Self-definition. Quite different is the trend for religious belief which, having a 
quite strong quadratic component, can also become positive in the youngest 
cohorts.  
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These results can be better seen plotting the predicted probabilities. This 
basically means to compute the probability to be believer, church-goer and to 
define themselves as religious associated to each cohort, setting the other 
variables to their mean. The results are graphically shown in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19: Predicted probabilities by cohort 
 
 
RQ3: Dividing Christian confessions 
 
In order to answer the third research question, we supplemented model 1 with 
fixed effects for Christian doctrines (Protestants as reference category in contrast 
coding) and with interaction effects between doctrines and cohorts. As before, 
we start looking at the coefficients then going to the graphical representation of 
the predicted probabilities. The first three coefficients (constant, cohort and 
cohort^2) partially confirm what we found in model 1. There is a general 
decrease in the three outcomes but with different starting points, higher for self-
definition and lower for belief and practice. Moreover, the overall quadratic term 
is significant for belief and practice while non-significant for self-definition. The 
inspection of the fixed effects coefficients for Christian traditions reveals similar 
starting point for self-definition among the four, common - and significantly 
different from Protestants and Mixed countries - starting points for Roman 
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Catholics and Eastern Orthodox if we look at belief and different starting points 
among all the different traditions if we look at practice (although the coefficients 
for mixed and Orthodox are quite similar). 
Table 10: Model 2 estimation. Coefficients in log-odds scale 
  
Self-
Definition 
Belief   Practice 
Fixed Part      
Constant 0.970***  -1.320***  -2.516*** 
Cohort -0.340***  -0.289***  -0.361*** 
Cohort^2 0.004  0.024***  0.029*** 
Roman Catholics (ref: Protestants) 0.741*  1.424*  2.682*** 
Mixed (ref: Protestants) -0.025  0.082  1.449** 
Eastern Orthodox (ref: Protestants) 0.370  1.359*  1.236** 
Roman Catholics*cohort -0.055  -0.198***  -0.084 
Mixed*cohort -0.149*  -0.129  -0.350*** 
Eastern Orthodox*cohort -0.161*  -0.171**  -0.011 
Roman Catholics*cohort^2 0.011**  0.018***  -0.015 
Mixed*cohort^2 0.028***  0.019**  0.025* 
Eastern Orthodox*cohort^2 0.041***  0.030***  -0.011 
Female (ref: male) 0.725***  0.460***  0.575*** 
1990-1993 (ref:1981-1984) -0.030  -0.181***  -0.053* 
1999-2001 (ref:1981-1984) 0.233***  0.236***  -0.047 
2008-2010 (ref:1981-1984) 0.259***  0.349***  -0.112*** 
      
Random Part      
Cons var 0.684***  0.699***  1.043*** 
Cohort var -0.031**   -0.025**   -0.050** 
Cohort^2 var 0.001***  0.000  0.001*** 
      
Units: Countries 32  32  32 
Units: Individuals 134,997  134,997  134,997 
Units: Responses 363,839  363,839  363,839 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
 
The coefficients for the interaction terms (revealing somehow the differences in 
slope and shape with the general coefficient) show instead the most interesting 
results, especially if we look at the quadratic component. They are almost not 
significant for practice, meaning weak differences in the shape of the trends 
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between the different traditions. They are instead significant if we look at self-
definition and belief, meaning marked differences for these latter. 
 
As before, the situation can be better described by looking at the plots for the 
predicted probabilities. We set the coefficients for wave and gender to their 
means and computed the probabilities for each cohort and each doctrine. 
 
Figure 20: Predicted probabilities for Self-Definition by cohorts and denominations 
 
 
Starting from self-definition (Figure 20) it is possible to see that the four 
traditions almost share the same very high starting point (somewhere between 
0.7 and 0.85) and start to decrease at the same rate. Starting from the ’50s 
cohorts, something changed for mixed countries and especially for Orthodox 
countries. The slope of the trend starts to decrease and the trend itself becomes 
slightly positive for Orthodox from the ’60s cohorts. 
 
Regarding belief (Figure 21), Roman Catholics and Orthodox share an almost 
common starting point (around 0.5) whereas Protestant and Mixed country show 
basically the same, almost flat and very low, trend. 
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Figure 21: Predicted probabilities for Belief by cohorts and denominations 
 
 
Also in this case something changed from the ’50s cohorts. The slope starts to 
decrease for Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox until it becomes positive for 
Orthodox and almost flat for Roman Catholics.   
 
Figure 22: Predicted probabilities for Practice by cohorts and denominations 
 
 
Practice (Figure 22) is the output showing the clearest trend for each tradition. 
Starting from different points (around 0.5 for Roman Catholics, 0.25 for Orthodox 
and mixed countries and 0.1 for Protestants), each tradition shows a clear 
decrease toward a quite common point around 0.1 (0.2 for Roman Catholics).   
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The same story can be told looking at the plots reporting the trends for the three 
outcomes grouped by Christian doctrines. Roman Catholics show an almost 
parallel decrease for Self-Definition and Practice and a kind of slightly U-shaped 
trend for Belief. Also mixed countries show a kind of parallel decrease for Self-
Denomination and Practice whereas the trend for belief is almost flat. Trends for 
Orthodox countries show quite singular patterns. Whereas Practice shows an 
almost linear decrease, the other two outcomes (Self-Definition and Belief) 
started to increase (at different rates) from the ’50 and ’60 cohorts. Trends for 
Protestant countries differ a lot. Self-Definition shows a steep decreasing trend 
whereas the other two outcomes are almost flat, probably suffering from a kind 
of “pavement effect”. 
 
Figure 23: Predicted probabilities for Denominations by cohorts and indicators 
 
 
5.5.5 Discussion 
This part of research is basically descriptive but some insight, some theoretical 
implications and some notes of caution can still be given. 
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Starting from the first research question, what we found are different 
associations between the three outcomes if evaluated at different levels. The 
correlation between each couple of them is quite strong at country level, 
meaning that, ecologically speaking, they could someway measure the same 
concept of religiosity. What indeed needs caution is assuming, on the other 
hand, that the three indicators are coherent within individuals. What we found 
are positive coefficients but very weak. This could mean that the three indicators 
are really measuring somewhat different dimensions of religiosity and 
considering religiosity as a single approximation (i.e. building a scale) or focusing 
only on one dimension could be misleading. 
  
What I did in answering the second research question is to compute time-trends 
for the three items. As said, cohorts were chosen to consider time. Briefly 
summing up the main theoretical approaches about religious studies, 
secularization theory speaks about a general decrease in each dimension of 
religiosity whereas individualization theory speaks about a decrease in religious 
practice and self-definition but a stability or even an increase of individual 
beliefs. What we found with model 1 is a substantial and constant decline in 
Practice and Self-Definition but something different for belief. It shows the same 
declining pattern for the older cohorts (up to the ’50 cohort) whereas the slope 
decreases and become flat – or slightly positive – in the younger ones. 
Theoretically speaking, secularization theory still seems to be the appropriate 
framework, but our data show that, at least in the youngest cohorts, the share of 
people holding religious belief breaks the descending trend. Decomposing these 
trends between the different Christian traditions can surely help in scrutinizing 
them thoroughly.    
 
Research questions three precisely aims to do this. It is deserved to remember 
that the grouping of European countries according to their dominant doctrine 
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can also reflect something more. For example, the Orthodox countries are 
almost the former Communist countries whereas the Protestant countries are 
basically the North-European countries. Looking from the side of the three 
outcomes, the patterns for Self-Definition show a common decrease starting 
from a very high rate. For Orthodox countries, something changed from the ’50 
cohort, when the trend starts to flatten (or slightly increase). The trends for 
belief confirm what we found in model 1. Starting from the ’60 cohorts 
something changed; the trends for Mixed and Protestant countries starts flatten 
(it could be interpreted as a sort of “pavement” or “bottom” effect) whereas the 
trends for Roman Catholics and Orthodox starts to flatten (Catholics) or to 
increase (Orthodox). This basically confirm the idea of a stability or even a 
reawakening of individual religious belief, at least for Orthodox countries. From 
the side of Practice, our results confirm the theoretical expectation of 
secularization theorists. For each Christian denomination, we observe a general 
decline of religious practice. The only trend appearing almost flat is the one for 
Protestants, but is clearly due to the very low level (below 0,1) of religious 
practice for these countries. 
 
Looking at the results from the side of denominations, we can also find some of 
the insight described before. Roman Catholics show, despite the general 
decrease, high levels of Self-Definition, Practice and Belief, which is very 
coherent with their social, institutionalized and dogmatic characterization. 
Eastern Orthodox countries share with Roman Catholic ones the high levels of 
Self-Definition and Belief, but it is possible to find some cues about the different 
meaning of Church attendance in the lower probability to practice (which lies 
between the probability for Catholics and the probability for Protestants). What 
is interesting to see for Orthodox is a kind of religious revival in the younger 
cohorts, both for Self-Definition and Belief. The situation for Protestant is the 
clearest one; Practice and Belief suffer from a kind of “bottom” effect resulting in 
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almost flat trends whereas the Self-Denomination starts to decrease from a very 
high probability (almost the same with the other Denominations).  
 
Before concluding, some notes of caution should be given. Firstly, the 
operationalization of the three items is only one of those possible. Although well 
thought-out and well tested, this choice is only one option among many but 
represent an appropriate way to embed this work in the debate concerning 
European religiosity. Secondly, the use of Christian doctrines as a country 
variable may reflect something more than the real theological pillars. For 
example, the Orthodox countries are almost the former Communist countries, 
whereas the Protestant countries are basically the North-European ones. When 
using these high-level variables, especially if they “cluster” the countries, it is not 
easy to disentangle the real mechanisms behind. In addition, when we focus on 
the differences between clusters of countries, it becomes impossible to explain 
the heterogeneity and the peculiarities within the clusters, losing inevitably 
important details.   
 
Having these notes said, what results from this research can be briefly 
summarized in three points: 
 The three outcomes we analysed need to be evaluated separately in the analyses 
based on individual data. Considering only one of them or summarizing in some 
kind of indexes or scale could be no longer adequate to grasp the real meaning 
of religious change in Europe. 
 Results for Protestant and Catholic countries confirm the expectations of 
secularization theorists with an overall decrease of religiosity on the three 
dimensions.  
 We can observe a kind of stability (or even a reawakening) of the strong Christian 
belief in the younger cohorts if we look at Orthodox countries (I will devote the 
entire next chapter to this issue).   
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5.6 Analysing the Typology 
In the previous paragraph I modelled cohort trends for three different indicators 
of religiosity. The results show how different these trends could be and confirm 
the need of a multidimensional approach while studying religiosity. Next step 
toward an integrate comprehension of the phenomena is to look at a typology 
made up starting from the three dimension. We already looked at it from a static 
point of view in paragraph 5.4  and it is now time to move to a longitudinal 
analysis of this typology. I have already spoken about the variables involved in 
this analysis and their operationalization at the beginning of this chapter.  
5.6.1 Religious typology over time: a descriptive approach 
Looking at the trends for the different categories of a religious typology between 
cohorts permits to collect more clues about the evolution of European religiosity. 
The main approaches – secularization and individualization theory – are based on 
the reciprocal connection between different dimensions of religiosity; 
secularization theory speaks about a general decrease for all the religious 
dimensions whereas individualization theory – and especially the BWB thesis in 
its strong meaning (Voas and Crockett 2005) – refers to a decrease of the 
institutional dimension of religiosity – i.e. Church attendance – but to a stability 
or even an increase of religious belief. It is precisely for this reason that – despite 
the great benefit of studying different indicators at the same time – also a careful 
study of their reciprocal connections is needed. Table 11 shows the evolution of 
the different categories between cohorts referring to the whole sample of 
European Christian countries. Two indications emerge loudly: the share of fully 
religious individuals is declining inasmuch as the share of fully atheist is 
increasing. This is of course a clear sign of secularization. But, what about the 
other – less conventional – categories of religiosity?        
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Table 11: Religious typology by cohort (entire sample), row percentages 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully 
atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
Other/ 
missing 
Total 
<1930 18.30 14.03 11.17 9.52 30.56 16.41 100.00 
'30s 16.41 16.91 11.22 8.04 30.99 16.44 100.00 
'40s 11.86 21.99 10.52 5.94 32.93 16.75 100.00 
'50s 9.06 26.41 11.19 4.66 30.86 17.81 100.00 
'60s 7.85 27.85 12.37 4.41 28.97 18.55 100.00 
'70s 7.42 27.98 16.12 3.32 27.45 17.72 100.00 
>'80s 6.85 32.59 19.2 2.1 24.32 14.94 100.00 
Total 11.04 23.81 12.51 5.52 29.91 17.21 100.00 
  
    
 
  
        
The Identitarian religious are very slowly losing ground; moving from the oldest 
to the youngest cohort only 6 percentage points were missed. Also the share of 
individuals who belong without believing almost reaches 0 for the youngest 
cohort, meaning that they are basically disappearing. Those who are gaining 
ground are the believers without belonging: their share moves from 11% in the 
older cohort to 19% in the youngest. From this preliminary analysis what 
emerges clearly is that secularization theory is still the leading paradigm but 
there are also unmistakable signs that something like an emergence of 
individualized religiosity is happening. In searching more clues for this statement 
it is right and proper to divide the analysis for the different Christian confessions. 
We have already seen how they matter in shaping the way of being – or not 
being – religious. Here I will present a summary table of the trends divided by 
Christian doctrine while reporting the whole tables in Appendix 7.     
 
Table 12: Categories of typology by cohort (summary) 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
TOTAL SAMPLE ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
Catholics ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ = 
Mixed  ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
Protestants =* ↑ = ↓* ↓ 
Orthodox ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓* ↓ 
*: Very low percentages and differences 
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Looking at trends divided by doctrines partially confirm what emerged before 
but also some peculiar differences arise. The general picture replies the general 
one: a clear decrease in full religiousness and a clear increase of atheism 
counterbalanced by an increase of believing without belonging. Some differences 
arise for Roman Catholics and Protestant. For Roman Catholicism, the share of 
the Identitarian religious is fairly stable so the loss of fully religious individuals is 
balanced by the increase of atheist and believers without belonging. The picture 
for Protestantism differs a lot from the general one; the share of fully religious is 
quite stable but very low (from 5% to 3%) meaning a clear pavement effect. Also 
the share of believers without belonging remains stable. The counterpart of the 
increase of fully atheist is a decrease of the Identitarian religious. This gives value 
to the idea of vicarious religions (Davie 2012) and its suitability to interpret 
religiosity in Protestant countries, even if is strongly declining in the younger 
cohorts.       
5.6.2 Religious typology over time: The model 
To go deeply in the abovementioned data and to figure them in a clearest way, I 
built a categorical multilevel model (two levels: individual and countries). The 
general idea behind replicates the one from the previous paragraph but with a 
single – categorical – dependent variable instead of three different dichotomous 
variables. Like the previous, I follow a step-by-step procedure: the first model is 
used to obtain the general trends for the three categories whereas the second to 
distinguish these trends between different confessions. Model 1 include a 
constant term (to account for random coefficients), a polynomial (2nd order) 
term for cohorts (random slopes to account for different slopes and shape 
between trends) and gender and survey wave as control variable. Model 2 is 
basically model 1 supplemented with fixed effects for Christian denominations 
and interaction effects between cohort and denominations (to account for 
different shapes between denomination trends). To simplified the result’s 
description, only the graphs for predicted probabilities will be reported. They 
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basically show the different probabilities for each response category for each 
cohort (model 1) and also for each denomination (model 2), setting the control 
variables at their mean. 
   
Figure 24 shows the predicted probabilities for the different cohort on the whole 
sample and the results confirm what we found in the descriptive analysis. Fully 
religiousness is clearly declining and approaching the “pavement” whereas fully 
atheism is constantly increasing. Also the trends for Identitarian religious and 
believers without belonging are in some way complementary: the proportion of 
believers without belong is increasing and the proportion of Identitarian religious 
is declining. The steep of these trends is growing in the youngest cohorts and this 
open interesting scenario for the future. Also the trend for belonging without 
believing is slightly declining but, given the fact that is approaching the 
pavement, it deserves less attention.              
 
Figure 24: Predicted probabilities for different categories by cohorts 
 
 
 
After having commented the general trends, we can move to the discussion of 
the differences between denominations. As before, it is possible to look at them 
both from the point of view of the categories and the denominations. 
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Figure 25 shows the trends for different denominations grouped by the category 
of the typology.  
 
Figure 25: Predicted probabilities by cohorts (divided for different categories) 
 
 
 
Fully religiousness is clearly declining and reaching its minimum for each 
Christian Denominations; as expected the higher started point is for Roman 
Catholics. The share of fully atheist increased constantly for each denomination 
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except for Orthodox for which the proportion of fully atheist reaches the top for 
the ’50 cohorts and then started to decline. Also the trends for Identitarian 
religious are clearly declining moving from the older to the youngest cohort and 
the – expected – higher starting point is the one of Protestants. Looking at the 
trend for believing without belonging the situation is quite disorienting because 
all the trends appears quite close to the minimum. The trend for Protestants is 
slightly declining – or its almost flat – whereas the other three are increasing, 
very slightly for Roman Catholics and Mixed countries and quite consistently for 
Orthodox countries. Trends for belonging without believing clearly suffers from a 
pavement effect, since they are all almost close to 0.      
 
Staring from the same data it is possible to tell the story from the point of view 
of the different Christian doctrines (Figure 26). Looking at Roman Catholics it is 
evident the decreasing trend for fully religious and the increasing trend for fully 
atheist. Trend for Identitarian religious reaches the top for the ’50 cohorts and 
then starts to decrease. The trend for believers without belonging is slightly 
increasing starting from the ’50 cohorts while the trend for belonging without 
believers is declining.  Mixed countries show an increase of fully atheist which 
counterbalances the decrease of Identitarian religious. The trends for fully 
religious and belonging without believing are almost flat and close to 0 whereas 
the trend for believing without belonging is slightly increasing. Protestant 
countries show almost the same situation of mixed countries but taken to 
extremes: trends for fully religious, believers without belonging and belonging 
without believe are flat or slightly declining and proximal to the bottom. The real 
trade-off is between Identitarian religious – which start very high and decline 
steeply – and fully atheist which counterbalance this loss.  Eastern Orthodox 
countries are the ones showing more peculiarities: the proportion of fully 
religious is constantly declining whereas the one of fully atheist increases until 
the ’60 cohorts and then starts to flatten or decrease. 
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Figure 26: Predicted probabilities by cohorts (divided for different Christian denominations) 
 
 
 
 
 
The trend for Identitarian religious is flat or slightly decreasing and the one for 
belong without believing is almost flat and close to 0. In this case the trade-off 
seems to appear between fully atheist and believers without belong. Their trends 
cross two times: in the youngest cohorts the trend for BWB decreases and the 
one for fully religious increases but this situation reverses starting from the ’50 
cohorts. Final result is a higher proportion of believers without belonging if 
compared to fully atheist. 
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Chapter 6  
 
EASTERN RELIGIOSITY AFTER THE FALL OF BERLIN WALL 
The evolution of religious practice and belief in the former communist countries 
 
 
 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the sociological discourse about European 
religiosity is undoubtedly focused on secularization (Bruce 2002; Gorski and 
Altınordu 2008; Voas and Doebler 2011). The core of secularization theory links 
process of secularization to religious decline basically stating that processes of 
modernization will have a negative effect on the stability and vitality of religious 
communities, practice, and convictions (Pollack 2008a). Given this unambiguous 
agreement about the strong European secularization, it is undoubted that what 
is happening in the former Communist countries needs further investigation, as 
results from the previous chapter also confirm. Whether we speak about 
religious stability or whether we hypothesize a religious reawakening, it is clear 
that Eastern countries represent an oddity in the main discourse about European 
Secularization. Many scholars have no doubt about this point: “One can say with 
considerable confidence that religion is reviving in the former socialist countries 
(Greeley 2002:76)”, “The resurgence of Orthodoxy in Russia provides a robust 
exception to secularization trends in Western Europe” (Evans and Northmore-
Ball 2012:795), “The religious revival observed in this region and time period can 
hardly be harmonized with the hypotheses of secularization theory” (Tomka 
2010:14), just to quote a few.  
6.1 Theory and main contributions 
When speaking about Eastern European religion and religiosity, it is crystal clear 
that the period of Communist regime represented a divide between what was 
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before and what came after. Before WWII religion had been one of the 
cornerstones of the societal order and the state itself, but under the Communist 
era it was persecuted and pushed to the private sphere (Tomka 2010). The 
regime imposed a “political forced secularization” (Meulemann 2004; Müller and 
Neundord 2012) as mean to undermine religion’s tradition and transmission of 
belief in the name of “scientific materialism”. This religion suppression treated 
believers as second-class citizens, excluding them from membership in the party, 
from the officer corps, from upper-level positions in the government, from 
industrial management, organizations and media (Ramet 1987).  
 
Under these conditions of severe repression, the religious landscape thus 
consisted of two competitors: a severely repressed Church and the officially-
promoted atheistic alternative under the name of “scientific atheism” (Froese 
2004b). Churches were no longer able to play a role in public education, religious 
organizations were monitored or prohibited (Froese 2004b), the traditional 
family structures were eroded by policies of state supplied childcare and 
increased female labour participation (Myers 1996) and this results in the strong 
weakening of the main religious socialization agencies. Moreover, rebellious 
pastors were imprisoned (Gautiert 1997; Ramet 1987), Church properties were 
confiscated and some places of worship were transformed into warehouse and 
restaurants (Michel 1992; Müller and Neundord 2012; Ramet 1987; Stan 2009). 
Instead of the differentiation the rest of the Europe was experiencing, the 
Communist system intended to centralize the social life under the power of the 
party. In this situation of dramatic – imposed – change, the Churches remained 
the only institution representing the traditions and the continuity with the 
previous system, thus becoming the source of opposition (Tomka 2010).  
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What happened after the end of Communist regime? 
 
Despite any sociologist would have no problem in defining Eastern religiosity as 
an exception of European patterns of secularization, there is no total consensus 
about what happened after the fall of Berlin’s wall. What was the impact of this 
state-imposed secularization? Has its effect continued after its collapse or a 
situation similar to what was before has been recovered? The answer is not an 
easy one and the various contributions are not always coherent. 
 
If we look at religious practice (Church attendance), Gautiert (1997) reports 
higher rates among the youngest cohort (those socialized after the Communism 
ended) in each of the Eastern countries and the same do Reistma et al. (2012). 
Pollack (2003) and Greeley (1994) instead state that Church attendance has 
either remained low or declined in former communist countries and Brenner 
(2016) quite supports them. From the general to the particular, Pollack (2003) 
identifies Russia and Albania as exceptions of the declining trend, Reistma et al. 
(2012) and Greeley (2003) specify a declining attendance in Poland and Borowik 
(2002) claims that Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian religiosity is as low as in 
the most secularized Western countries. Kaariainen (1999) asserts that Russians 
go to church less that the other Europeans but Burkimsher (2014) also reports 
increasing rates of attendance in this latter, and to lesser extent in Romania and 
Bulgaria. It is not easy to draw a unique picture of Eastern Church attendance 
trends but it seems that most of them resemble the Western European ones (low 
and stable or declining). Others, such Poland, have rates similar to the high-
attendance European countries while showing the same negative trends. Only in 
three countries, Romania, Russia and Bulgaria, we can observe some evidence of 
increasing attendance (Brenner 2016).  
 
Moving to the side of religious belief, Gautiert (1997) reports a vitality among the 
youngest cohort and the same do Kaariainen (1999) while reporting important 
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changes at the beginning of the 1990 when the number of believers increased 
significantly. Fox and Tabory (2008) similarly claim that religious monopolies 
have reduced participation but not belief and Greeley (1994) recounts for 
something between one-half and three-quarters of Russians believing in God, 
being also supported by Pollack (2003). Speaking more generally, Tomka (2010) 
claims for a changing opinion regarding religion and a growing interest. 
 
Roughly speaking, all the cues go in the direction of two different mechanisms at 
work after the fall of Communism. A reawakening of religious belief seems to 
counterbalance a stability or even a decrease of religious practice. Of course this 
is a general picture and we can pinpoint the main possible exceptions 
mentioning Russia, Romania and Bulgaria (Brenner 2016; Burkimsher 2014). This 
idea of diverging trends can be glimpsed in the literature, especially when Tomka 
(2010) mentions an interpretation of religion which deviate from tradition to 
become more diverse and individualistic. Also Kaariainen (1999) reports that, 
since 1991, the number of Churches and clergy has notably increased but none 
of these seems to have had any influence on the attendance at services. This 
new religiosity, Borowik (2002) says, could be characterised by the avoidance of 
any duties towards religious institutions.  
 
This hypothesized different trends for regular practice and individual belief need 
different explanations. Concerning practice and formal religiosity, it is impossible 
to forgot about the severe impact the Communist regime had on institutional 
Churches. As a matter of fact, in pre-communist times the personnel of 
denominational institutions consisted mainly of priests, religious and deacons. 
The party completely banned these positions and in post-communist era the 
remaining clergy was not enough even for normal Church activities. As time 
passes, the personnel of ecclesiastic institutions increasingly consists by well-
trained laic Christians (Tomka 2010) and the eventual reawakening of Church 
attendance we can observe in some Eastern countries concerns precisely the 
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ability of institutional Churches to re-organize themselves after the Communist 
tabula-rasa.       
 
If institutional religiosity was something strongly undermined by the Communist 
regimes, the eradication of personal belief was something harder as it seems 
that “systems of belief require more than simply the power of promotion and 
coercion to become accepted” (Froese 2004b:35). Stating that practice was 
strongly undermined by Communist regime while belief was not, is however too 
simplistic. We can summarize at least three different explanations for an 
eventual revival of religious belief. i) This revival can be a real revival of Christian 
belief similar to what Voas and Crockett (2005) define when speaking about the 
strong version of  “believing without belonging”. Greeley (2002:77) agrees with 
this idea by stating that “those born after 1970 found themselves more likely 
than their immediate predecessor to believe in God. Far from being a 
phenomenon of “New Age” religion, it would appear to be a rebirth of age-old 
religion”. Also Pollack (2003) reports the new form of religiousness outside the 
Church that are emerging in Eastern and Central Europe. ii) The second possible 
explanation concert exactly what Greeley mentioned as “New Age” religion. This 
interpretation is similar to the weak version of “believing without belonging” 
(Voas and Crockett 2005) which considers God also in a non-Christian manner, 
not as a personal God, but as some kind of spirit or life forces (Kaariainen 1999). 
So intended, it is that in post-communist countries beliefs can “accumulate”. 
People declaring to believe in God also believe in other phenomena like 
reincarnation, astrology, magic, occultism and elements of eastern religions 
(Borowik 2002; Kaariainen 1999; Tomka 2010). iii) The third interpretation 
concerns the use of religion as a mean to reconstruct a national identity and to 
“burn the bridges” with the communist past (Borowik 2002; Mitrokhin 1994). As 
matter of fact, until 1981 it was necessary to belong to the Communist party to 
make a career or to be well-accepted, so at the present time “being a Christian” 
basically means being an honourable person. Having been the only force of 
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opposition, religion has practically become synonymous of anti-communism in 
the new democratic view of political life (Borowik 2002). Politicians know this 
and have increasingly used religion as a way to legitimize political power 
(Meulemann 2004). It seems therefore that this supposed revival is above all a 
return to tradition, a test to reconstruct the memory and a way to reconnect to 
what was there before the regime (Borowik 2002). 
 
At the time when Communist regime set up, religion was strongly rooted in the 
Eastern European society. So, is not surprisingly that the most receptive to the 
imposed atheism were young people (Borowik 2002) and that these individuals 
should be less religious also later in life because of the socialization process 
during socialism. On the contrary, the older generation already developed their 
system of belief before the beginning of regime and they were less prone to 
change (Müller and Neundord 2012). If the idea of religious reawakening is 
correct, signs of this revival should thus be seen in the generation who came to 
maturity after the communism ended (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). All 
signals should be supporting the idea of a U-shaped curve of religiosity with the 
highest levels for the old generations born before the regime and the youngest 
ones grown after its fall. Previous research seems to support this view. Greeley 
(2002) reports the highest score on a belief scale for the younger cohorts (born 
in the seventies and eighties) and the older ones. Zrinscak (2004) observes 
different generational responses to communism and Pollack (2003) also looks at 
birth cohorts when reporting evidence for declining attendance, as younger 
cohorts are less likely to attend. Despite the analysis of religious practice partially 
confound, it really seems that children share with the grandparental generation 
in their religiosity, which the parental generation seem to have rejected (Greeley 
1994, 2002).    
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The Catholic/Orthodox cleavage  
 
Until now we treated the Former-Communist European countries as religious 
homogeneous countries and we did not focus on possible differences between 
their religious traditions. As a matter of fact, Eastern countries’ Christian religion 
comprises two different doctrines, namely Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. 
Need and Evans (2001) clearly underline the importance of considering this 
religious denomination to better understand the patterns of religiosity in the 
Former-Communist countries. Halman and Petterson (2003) go further stating 
that European religiosity is mainly related to religious tradition (rather than to 
the East/West dichotomy) with the more secular protestants and orthodox 
countries and the more religious catholic ones. This catholic/orthodox cleavage 
can be clearly seen in many empirical works. Bruce (2000) and Need and Evans 
(2001) report that predominantly catholic eastern countries have higher rates of 
attendance than traditionally orthodox and pluralistic ones. In addition, Pollack 
(2003) found that predominantly catholic eastern countries show – high – 
attendance rates which are comparable to the western European catholic peers. 
This high rates of mass attendance where found also by Titarenko (2008) in 
catholic countries rather than in predominantly orthodox countries and she 
interpreted this as the ability and the willingness of catholic churches to educate 
adherent’s belief system. Everything together, it seems that Catholic church 
resisted more strongly to the political and ideological pressure made by the 
regime (Pollack 2003). As mean of a brief summary, it is likely to think that 
catholic countries remained on a relatively high level, but did not observe any 
increase in religiosity. Conversely, Orthodox countries suffer from a strong 
religious decline during the regime but they observed an important revival in its 
aftermath (Müller and Neundord 2012). 
 
As far as these contributions show, there are many issues to face when speaking 
about a possible reawakening of religiosity in Easter European countries after the 
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fall of Communism. Firstly, it seems necessary to distinguish between a possible 
increase of regular churchgoing and a possible increase of a more individualized 
and intimate belief. Secondly, it is not clear whether we can observe a possible 
religious reawakening across all the eastern countries or whether there are some 
peculiarities. Thirdly, it seems likely that the prevailing religious denomination 
represents an important feature for distinguishing the possible religious 
trajectories among these countries. All these three issues are really central to 
draw a comprehensive picture of Eastern religiosity after the fall of communism 
and this article will tackle them.       
6.2 Research questions  
As we have seen in the theoretical paragraph, to better describe the trends for 
eastern religiosity it is necessary to focus on two different aspects of religiosity. 
These aspects, religious practice and belief, can be seen as different dimensions 
underlining the broad and complex concept of religiosity. These dimensions are 
part of the well-known typology made by Glock (1962, 1964) and Glock and Stark 
(1965) under the names of ritualistic dimension (practice) and ideological 
dimension (belief). Religious practice is the dimension most investigate in 
sociology because its social and collective nature and its widespread availability. 
Given that it measures the ritualistic dimension of religiosity, it is suitable to 
detect strong form of religiosity because requires a commitment of time 
(McAndrew and Voas 2011). The dimension of religious belief regards instead to 
the supernatural aspects of religion and  concerns a mix of dogma which must be 
accepted and recognized  to comply with a transcendent value (Pace 2007).  
 
In the theoretical paragraph we observed how the religious change in Eastern 
countries is likely to be interpreted as generational change. Starting from a 
generation socialized before the settlement of communist regime, moving to a 
generation socialized by the communist imposed-atheism and finishing with a 
generation which reached maturity when the Communism was ended. This 
peculiar situation reinforces the idea of using cohorts to account for time when 
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studying religious trends. This way of doing has clear theoretical foundations and 
cohort replacement should now be considered as the main mechanism behind 
religious change (Voas 2009; Voas and Chaves 2016; Voas and Doebler 2011) 
because of the socialization effect by the religious environment of the 
upbringing. Putting together the multidimensional approach and the need to use 
cohort replacement to account for time, the first research question can be thus 
exposed: 
 
RQ1: Are the trends for practice and belief coherent (both declining or increasing) 
or diverging? 
 
With the first research question we aim to draw the general trends for the two 
abovementioned dimensions. These trends can however subtend some 
peculiarities and some particular cases. Many contributions speak, for example, 
about a revival of religious practice only for Russia, Romania and Bulgaria 
whereas other pinpoint Poland as a country where religiosity was strengthened 
by the attempt to impose atheism. All considered,  
 
RQ2: Are there some country peculiarities in the trends for practice and belief? 
 
Besides particular country situations, it is likely that the religious tradition can 
shape the religious evolution in Eastern countries. Many contributions speak 
about a high resilience of Catholic countries to forced-atheism pressures and 
about a decrease of religiosity during the regime and a resulting reawakening 
after its end for Orthodox countries. Religious tradition is thus something to take 
seriously into account when trying to draw a clear picture of Eastern religiosity; 
 
RQ3: Are the trends for practice and belief different or the same according to the 
prevailing Christian denomination? 
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6.3 Data, variables and methods 
This research is based on EVS (European Value Study) data, a large-scale, cross-
national, and longitudinal survey research programme on basic human values 
(EVS 2011). From this dataset, I chose a subsample of 12 Eastern Former 
Communist countries (Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Ukraine) that 
participated in at least two waves of the survey. The resulting sample therefore 
comprised 43,862 individuals (see Appendix 8). 
 
Dependent variables 
 
As previously told, in this analysis we are focusing on two different dimensions of 
religiosity, namely religious practice and belief. The way to measure religious 
practice is almost standardized and basically refers to Church Attendance 
(Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2013, 2014; te Grotenhuis et al. 2015; Immerzeel 
and van Tubergen 2011; van Ingen and Moor 2015; Norris and Inglehart 2011; 
Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Voas and Doebler 2011). I decided to measure 
the religious practice as the monthly Church attendance and I started from the 
item “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days?” to build a dummy variable recoding “more 
than once a week”, “once a week” and “once a month” into “Monthly Church 
attendance” and coding it as 1. The other response categories were coded as 0. 
The measure of religious belief is less standardized and more complex also 
because it is needed to disentangle the real core of Christian belief from a more 
general and syncretic spirituality “I know there is something out there”. In trying 
to do this, I rely on a set of items asking ‘Which, if any, of the following do you 
believe in?’ and I coded as 1 a person answering ‘Yes’ to all the items concerning 
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‘God’, ‘Heaven’ and ‘Hell’, the essential convictions of the Christian theological 
system, 0 otherwise5. 
 
Independent variables 
 
For this analysis I rely on two main different independent variables: cohorts and 
religious tradition. The operationalization of cohorts is straightforward: I rely on 
the year of birth divided into decades, starting from those born before 1930. Due 
to the small numerosity of the last available cohort (born after 1990) I 
aggregated them with those born after 1980. The distribution of this variable is 
shown in Appendix 9. 
 
To answer RQ3, we need to distinguish the trends for practice and belief 
according to the prevailing Christian doctrine in a country. This variable refers to 
the Christian tradition and is defined for each country; it is built by summarizing 
the individual information gathered with the question “Which religious 
denomination?”.  Countries with an unclear situation (sharing high percentages – 
25% or more – on two different denominations) were coded as ‘mixed’ (see 
Table 13). 
 
Control variables 
 
In addition to the main independent variables, I use Survey wave (“1990-1993”, 
“1999-2001”, “2008-2010”, categorical) and age (numerical) as control variables. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Over and above the theoretical reasons, the choice of these three items has also 
methodological reasons. Relying on the work of van Schuur (2003), it is possible to see 
them as ordered and suitable for measuring a latent trait, i.e. religious belief, because  
‘Belief in God’ and ‘belief in Hell’ represent the higher and lower bounds of a scale while 
‘belief in Heaven’ is located in the middle of rank. Using them makes it possible to focus 
on Christian belief in the strictest sense and avoid generic spirituality. 
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Table 13: Individual religious denomination and country religious tradition (row percentages). 
  Religious denomination   
  
Roman 
Catholic 
Protestant Orthodox 
Other not 
Christian 
Total 
 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Roman 
Catholics 
     Czech Republic 86.21 9.35 0.54 3.89 100.00 
Hungary 72.19 24.08 0.15 3.57 100.00 
Lithuania 93.04 0.81 4.44 1.70 100.00 
Poland 98.03 0.24 0.38 1.35 100.00 
Slovak Republic 84.90 11.93 1.85 1.32 100.00 
      Orthodox 
     Bulgaria 0.33 0.61 82.40 16.66 100.00 
Belarus 12.48 0.88 85.76 0.88 100.00 
Romania 5.16 1.92 89.77 3.15 100.00 
Russian 
Federation 0.49 0.49 91.69 7.33 100.00 
Ukraine 8.24 3.19 70.14 18.43 100.00 
      Mixed 
     Estonia 3.17 45.01 45.92 5.90 100.00 
Latvia 33.04 30.89 30.94 5.13 100.00 
      Total 53.89 6.97 34.22 4.92 100.00 
 
 
Modelling strategy 
 
In answer the three research questions I rely on a set of three different logistic 
regression models. Each of these models is repeated two times for the two 
different dependent variables. To answer RQ1 (“Do the trends for practice and 
belief are coherent (both declining or increasing) or diverge?”) we computed a 
logistic regression model with the 2nd order polynomial term for cohort as main 
independent variable and age and survey wave as control variables (Model 1). 
Despite the use of multilevel modelling is the best way to analyse data and 
variables defined at different levels, for this work we had to avoid them due to 
the small number of higher level units (countries). Instead, to consider the 
potential observations’ (and their standard errors) correlation within countries, I 
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use the clustering option6 for estimating Model 1 and Model 3. To answer RQ2 
(“Are there some country peculiarities in the trends for practice and belief?”) we 
needed to explicitly model the trend differences between the various countries. I 
did so by mean of country dummy variables and their interactions with the two 
polynomial term for cohorts; as before, age and survey wave were used as 
control variables (Model 2). In order to answer RQ3 (“Are the trends for practice 
and belief different or the same according to the prevailing Christian 
denomination?”) we used dummy variables for religious tradition and their 
interactions with the two polynomial term for cohorts; also in this case I use the 
clustering option and age and survey wave as control variables.  
6.4 Results 
For the presentation of the results I will follow a two-steps procedure. Firstly, I 
will present the tables for the model estimations for both religious practice and 
belief. After that, I will discuss the results more in detail by mean of graphs 
reporting the predicted probabilities. This basically means to calculate the 
dependent variables’ probabilities for any combination of the independent 
variables setting the control variables to their mean. 
 
From Table 14 we can see that monthly church attendance in the Former-
communist countries show basically a linear decrease, with only small signals of a 
reversing trend. From model 1 we can in fact notice that the only significant 
coefficient is the one related to the 1st grade of the polynomial term for cohorts. 
From model 2 we see that this coefficient is no longer significative because its 
effect is absorbed into the country dummies and their interaction (not shown in 
Table 14 for clarity reasons7). This means relevant country-differences in the 
slope and shape of the trends. In Model 3, the coefficient related to the 1st grade 
of the polynomial term for cohorts is again significative whereas the dummy 
variables for religious tradition and their interaction terms are not (except for 
                                                          
6 See http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtvce_options.pdf for details 
7 This material is available on request to the author 
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mixed countries). This basically means small differences in the slope and shape 
on the trends among the three religious traditions.   
Table 14: Models estimation for religious practice. Coefficients in log-odds scale 
 
 
Table 15 shows instead the results for the three models for religious belief. The 
coefficients for the two grade of the polynomial term for cohorts are significative 
for all of them and this means a general U-shaped curve. Also in this case, many 
of the dummy variables for countries and their interactions with cohorts are 
significative, meaning some country peculiarities. Like for practice, also the 
coefficients for the dummy variables for religious tradition and their interactions 
are almost not significative (except for mixed countries) meaning small 
differences in the slope and shape of the trends between Orthodox and Catholic 
countries. 
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Table 15: Models estimation for religious belief. Coefficients in log-odds scale 
 
 
As said, all these results can be better viewed looking at the graphs for the 
predicted probabilities. From Figure 27 we can see that the monthly church 
attendance decreases almost linearly moving from the older to the youngest 
cohort; only for the last cohorts the trend starts to flatten. Religious belief shows 
instead a pronounced U-shaped trend with the younger cohorts (those born 
after the sixties) that are more religious even than the older ones. 
 
In answering the second research question we computed the cohort trends 
divided for all the countries. 
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Figure 27: Predicted probabilities for religious practice and belief by cohorts 
 
 
Figure 28 shows the trends for religious practice. Looking at it we can see a group 
of countries (Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia) 
which trends are very low and almost flat. Trends for Ukraine and Bulgaria show 
instead a clear increase starting from a very low level and trends for Romania 
and Slovak Republic are almost flat (or slightly U-shaped), starting from a level 
around 0.5. Poland shows the most singular trend, which starts at a very high 
level (around 0.8) and is reversely U-shaped, with the cohorts socialized during 
Communist era to be more regularly church-goers. The only strongly decreasing 
trends are the ones for Lithuania and Hungary which dramatically fall as cohorts 
go by.   
Figure 28: Predicted probabilities for religious practice by countries and cohorts 
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The graph for the country trends for religious belief (Figure 29) is somehow 
harder to read. Generally speaking, for each of them we can see a kind of U-
shaped curve. There are 4 countries (Czech Republic, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia) 
whose bending is not pronounced such as to be considered almost flat. Other 
countries (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine) show instead an 
increasing trend which can be considered almost linear, meaning that the 
younger cohorts are far more religious than the older ones. Religious belief in 
Lithuania and Slovak Republic is indeed dramatically decreased and only in the 
last available cohort it is possible to see some small signals of a reawakening. 
Russian Federation shows the most pronounced U-shaped trend, with a huge 
difference between those socialized under the regime and those socialized 
before and after (with the youngest generation being more religious than the 
oldest).  
 
Figure 29: Predicted probabilities for religious belief by countries and cohorts 
 
 
With Table 16 I will try to summarize all the results coming from model 2. We can 
see that, among Former Communist countries, there is a group of countries 
(Czech Republic, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia) whose religiosity is basically low and 
stable among all the cohorts. Hungary shows instead a decreasing religious 
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practice but an increasing belief and Poland, Romania and Russian Federation 
show an almost stable practice but an increasing religious belief.  
 
 
Table 16: Model 2 results’ summary 
 
 
The only countries where we can observe a religious increase concerning both 
practice and belief are Bulgaria and Ukraine whereas Lithuania is the only 
country showing a strong religious decrease across both dimensions. Slovak 
Republic represents somehow an anomaly in this discourse about Eastern 
European religiosity because shows a stable level of practice but a decreasing 
level of belief. 
 
As workflow, along this chapter we started from a very general assessment 
about the trends for practice and belief and then we moved to a very particular 
analysis of the single countries. The last step is to focus on an intermediate level 
of generality concerning the prevailing Christian denomination. In doing this I 
computed the cohort trends for religious practice and belief divided by the 
prevailing Christian tradition in the countries. The results are quite clear: practice 
is declining almost linearly in Catholic and Mixed countries whereas is almost 
stable in Orthodox ones. Belief, on the contrary, is reawakening for all the three 
tradition but with a more marked U-shaped trend for Orthodox countries.  
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Figure 30: Predicted probabilities for religious practice and belief by religious tradition and 
cohorts 
 
 
The common story behind suggests that the Eastern religious reawakening 
concerns basically the belief dimension and it is stronger for Orthodox countries 
(for which also the practice is stable and not declining). The new generations 
seem to believe more in the Christian dogmas both than their parents (the ones 
socialized during the Communist regime) and their grandparents (the ones 
socialized before the Communist regime) but they are not attending Church 
more often.  
6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Main result of this work is that in the Former-Communist countries we are 
observing a kind of reawakening of religiosity in progress but that this latter 
concerns only religious beliefs. Religious practice is fairly stable (for Orthodox 
countries) or declining (for Catholic and Mixed countries) whereas the trends for 
belief are markedly U-shaped and this is more evident for Orthodox countries. 
Does this mean that the Eastern European countries are the breeding ground for 
individual form or religiosity (Davie 2000; Luhmann 1982)? Even more, are we 
observing the so called “believing without belonging” (Davie 1990, 1994) 
religiosity in these latter? We are far from giving an exhaustive answer to this. 
With the available data it is impossible to disentangle between a system of belief 
based only on Christian tenets from a syncretic system where beliefs 
“accumulate”. In addition, it is impossible to exclude that this declaring is only a 
way to take the distance from the Communist past and to reaffirm a national 
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identity. At the moment, the most plausible interpretation is therefore that new 
generations are experiencing a kind of religious reawakening which is more 
individualized and less institutionalized than their grandparents. Whether this is 
truly Christian or somehow “spiritual” is not known.  
Moving from the general to the particular, many contributions speak about of 
revival of Church attendance especially for Romania, Bulgaria and Russia 
Federation (Brenner 2016; Burkimsher 2014; Pollack 2003) and many others 
(Borowik 2002; Bruce 2003; Greeley 1994; Müller and Neundord 2012) depict 
Poland as exceptional case given that Polish Catholicism played a relevant role 
during Communist regime and in its overthrow. We found only partial 
confirmations to this. Concerning Poland, we can see the importance of being 
Catholic Christian during the regime in the higher propensity to attend Church 
for the intermediate cohorts – those socialized during the regime – compared to 
the older and the younger. What we did not find is indeed the supposed strong 
revival in Church attendance for Romania – which trend is only slightly U-shaped 
– and Russian Federation – which trend continues to be very low and almost flat. 
What we found instead is a confirmation for an increasing trend in Bulgaria. 
Possible explanation is that the supposed Romanian and Russian revival concerns 
only a small and temporary period effect (Froese 2001; Pollack 2003) which is 
not grasped if we analyses religious change with the lens of cohort transmission. 
By mean of a brief summary, we found a group of countries – Czech Republic, 
Belarus, Estonia and Latvia – which low and flat trends resemble those of the 
western European secularized countries. Another group of countries – Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Russia Federation – are indeed coherent with a scenario 
made of decreasing or stable practice but increasing belief. A better understand 
of what this revival of belief means is undoubtedly the next challenge for a better 
comprehension of the Eastern religiosity. Among our sample, only two countries 
– Bulgaria and Ukraine – show a clear revival of religiosity concerning both 
religious practice and belief whereas Lithuania is the only one experiencing a 
clear decrease across all the dimensions. Slovak Republic, on the contrary, 
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represents quite an exception to the main interpretations about religious change 
having a stable practice but a decreasing belief, which is uncoherent with both 
the secularization and the individualization theory.      
Looking at these results, it stands out that all the Orthodox countries except 
Belarus are experiencing a religious revival concerning both belief and practice or 
only belief. On the other side, many Catholic countries are experiencing an 
overall decrease or religiosity (Lithuania), some kind of partial revival (Hungary 
and Poland) or a flat stability (Czech Republic). The question which directly arise 
was whether the shapes of religious changes are results of some peculiarity of 
the dominant religious tradition. To put in another way: the presumed religious 
revival we can observe in European Eastern Countries is because their 
Communist past or because their Orthodox – or Catholic – tradition? Also in this 
case it is impossible to give a clear answer. The supposed religious revival – 
which concern basically only the system of belief – is observable across the three 
denomination, but the strong pattern is undoubtedly associated to the Orthodox 
countries. These latter show a stable practice and a strong revival of religious 
belief, which correspond to a higher religiosity of the younger cohorts if 
compared both to the intermediate and the older ones. Catholic countries show 
instead a declining religious practice and a less-marked revival of religious belief, 
with the level corresponding to the younger generations only conforming that of 
the older ones. The interpretation of the trends for mixed countries is something 
in-between the previous two: practice is declining like Catholic countries (but 
starting from a lower level) whereas the trend for belief partially resemble the 
one of Orthodox countries, with the younger generations being more religious 
than the older ones.  
The picture of Eastern European religiosity we drawn is a complex one: the 
period after the fall of Communist regime seems to be characterized by a revival 
of religious belief but a stability or a decrease of religious practice. This potential 
reawakening of religiosity is stronger for Orthodox countries but all the results 
may be sullied by some noise or, at least, by some country peculiarities related 
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to their unique historical paths. Everything considered, the most plausible 
picture speaks about the “grandparent’s generation” characterized by a strong 
institutional religiosity focused mostly on religious practice, the “parents’ 
generation” socialized during the Communism and characterized by low overall 
religiosity (or by the avoidance of declaring it) and the “children’s generation” 
which is experiencing a revival of religion based mainly on individual belief and 
less and less on institutional membership.  
The prediction of what could happen in the future is, at this stage, only a guess. 
What seems plausible is however that Communist regime, with its functional 
centralization, has forced a “fake secularization” which simply postponed the 
real mechanisms behind based on functional differentiation, which the rest of 
Europe is experiencing. Maybe is only a matter of time before the “noise” 
introduced by the regime will end and the Eastern European trends resemble the 
rest of Europe.   
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Chapter 7  
 
INSECURITY AND RELIGIOSITY IN THE CHRISTIAN EUROPE 
A multilevel and multidimensional analysis based on European Values Study 
data 
 
 
 
 
In paragraph 2.2 and in Chapter 3 I presented the main theoretical bases of 
insecurity theory. In particular, I have highlighted that sociology has given little 
attention to the theoretical development and analytical test of this theory. In 
fact, we also needed to draw from psychological literature to shed light on – 
some – possible mechanisms behind. 
 
Starting from these weaknesses, this chapter represents a first step to test the 
insecurity theory. This test could integrate and expand on the seminal work by 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) as well as on the following by Ruiter and van 
Tubergen (2009) and Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2011). Relying on the main 
points analysed in the previous chapters, the aim is to focus on three relevant 
issues behind the theory. Relying on the work of Norris and Inglehart, I will test 
whether some country features are linked to individual religiosity. In addition, I 
will also test the impact of some individual situations on religiosity and I will test 
the notion gained from psychological literature that religion is more likely to be 
used as coping strategy when an individual grew in a very religious environment. 
The hypotheses I will present here follow this way of reasoning and are based on 
the same multidimensional framework as in the previous analytical chapters.     
7.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
Aim of this work is to study the relation between individual and country 
insecurity and religiosity for European Christian countries. Both sides of this 
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relation represent very demanding methodological challenges. We already dealt 
with the ways to interpret and measure religiosity in the previous chapters (see 
4.1 and 5.3) and we here follow the same strategy. Religiosity will be thus 
considered as a multidimensional concept (Glock 1964) in which at least five 
dimensions are interrelated. Along all this work we are considering three of them 
– religious practice, religious belief and self-definition – because they represent 
the main theoretical battlegrounds to explain European processes of religious 
change.  
 
When looking instead at the side of insecurity, I decided to follow the path by 
Norris and Inglehart – who rely mainly on contextual features – but I also 
supplement it with individual insecurities linked to life-threatening episodes. In 
addition, I will also test how the religious background shape the individual 
recourse to religion as coping strategy. 
 
To better explain the analytical design, I rely on a scheme reported by Ruiter and 
van Tubergen (2009) and clearly inspired by the famous Coleman Boat (1986). I 
extensively presented it in paragraph 4.2 so no need to report it here again. 
When speaking about the impact of individual insecurities we are basically 
referring to “micro to micro relations” whereas we refer to “macro to micro 
relations” when looking at contextual insecurities. The idea that the religious 
environment of the upbringing can shape the use of religion when individuals 
feel insecure is indeed caught by “cross-level interaction effects”. The 
presentation of the hypotheses will follow this structure; for clarity reasons we 
consider all the hypotheses as referred to all the three – practice, belief and self-
definition – involved dimensions of religiosity; if not I will explicitly report.        
7.1.1 Individual insecurities – Micro to micro relations 
The classic interpretation of the insecurity theory refers to the economic 
conditions individuals are facing. This situation is best caught by the employment 
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condition because unemployed individuals are undoubtedly in worse economic 
conditions than employed ones. This considered, 
 
Hp1: The worse one’s employment status, the higher one’s religiosity  
 
Moving from the economic insecurities to the existential ones, it is firstly 
necessary to look at the individuals’ health status. When an individual is sick or – 
more general – in a situation of bad health, he could be confronted with anxiety 
or fear of death, thus being a situation of stress or concern; 
 
Hp2: The worse one’s health situation, the higher one’s religiosity 
 
Given this general situation, it is however true that a bad health can also 
negatively influence the ability to reach the worship’s places like Churches; given 
this, it is deserved to specify that 
 
Hp2a: The worse one’s health situation, the lower one’s religious practice  
  
The feeling of existential insecurity can also arise when individuals are 
confronted with episodes of death, like the loss of a loved one or – even worse – 
of the partner (McIntosh, Silver, and Wortman 1993). The loss of the partner can 
lead to a situation of desperation and insecurity individuals can cope with using 
religion:  
 
Hp3: People who lost their partner are more religious than people who never did 
 
It is likely to think that this individual episodes of insecurity are linked together 
and potentially overlapped. Situations like widowhood and bad health can be 
strictly linked to old age as well as a situation of bad health can be due to 
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unemployment, and vice versa. This suggests us to consider also the combination 
of these situations: 
 
Hp4: The worse one’s insecurity condition (two or more of the previous), the 
higher one’s religiosity.  
7.1.2 Contextual Insecurities – Macro to micro relations 
In the classical version of the insecurity theory, the individual’s religious 
behaviour is linked to some contextual features which can shape the feeling of 
insecurity. This approach directly comes from the Norris and Inglehart’s seminal 
work (2004) and suggests to test also the country features that condition the 
individuals’ feeling of insecurity.  
 
As previously seen, the employment status is the most investigated source of 
economic insecurity. Over and above the individual situation of unemployment, 
also the widespread unemployment can effect individual religiosity (Chen 2010). 
During recession periods or in countries where job market is poor, a lot of people 
can lose their job or fail to find one. This can lead to insecurity feelings also 
among employed people. We can thus hypothesize that: 
 
Hp5: The higher the country unemployment rate, the higher individual religiosity 
 
Economic insecurity in a given country can also refers to socio-economic 
inequalities. The link between inequalities and religiosity can be discussed 
starting from two different approaches. According to Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
and Ruiter and van Tubergen (2009) the link between inequality and religiosity is 
simply due to the higher number of poor persons in the more unequal societies. 
Solt, Habel and Grant (2011) conversely suggest that religiosity is higher in more 
unequal societies because it works to maintain the élite’s privileges, which are 
bigger in more unequal societies (Fairbrother 2013). Whatever the possible 
explanation:         
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Hp6: The higher the country economic inequality, the higher individual religiosity 
 
The threatening effects of unemployment and inequalities could be – partially – 
neutralized by an efficient welfare state system. In situation of high 
unemployment or economic diseases, individuals can feel less insecure if helped 
by state intervention to cope with such situations (Ruiter and van Tubergen 
2009). This increase the feeling of security also within employed people or 
people in a good economic situation. Having this considered: 
 
Hp7: The higher the country welfare spending, the lower individual religiosity 
7.1.3 Religious background hypothesis  
Relying on the psychological literature presented in a previous chapter 
(paragraph 3.3) it comes that the likely to use religion as coping strategy depends 
on the religious education one received (Pargament 2002). It is almost 
universally recognized in the sociological literature (Kelley and De Graaf 1997; 
Voas and Chaves 2016) that the main religious socialization’s agency is the family 
and that the availability of religious’ resources largely depends on the religious 
education received about (Storm and Voas 2012). Given this, all the individual 
hypotheses presented in paragraph 7.1.1 are now evaluated also considering the 
individual religious background: 
Hp8: The effect of employment status, health status and widowhood (or of their 
combination) on religiosity is higher for individuals grew up in religious families  
7.2 Data and Methods 
Data 
 
This chapter is built up on the cumulated dataset of European Value Study (EVS 
2011), a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on 
basic human values. From this huge dataset I choose a subset of countries which 
permit us to pursue three different objectives: theological consistency, 
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availability of all the contextual variables and sufficient numerosity for any given 
country. Theological consistency was pursued by focusing only on Christian 
majority countries and this is methodologically and theoretically needed because 
the three dependent variables are explicitly calibrated to the main Christian 
tenets and dogmas. This considered, the dataset refers to the last two waves 
(1999-2001 and 2008-2010) and comprises 27 Christian countries:  Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden. The resulting sample was therefore made by 70,837 
individuals. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Concerning dependent variables, I follow the same strategy used in Chapter 5. 
The choice is to use three different dependent variables to grasp the relations 
between the independent variables and various dimensions of the broad concept 
of religiosity. 
 
Religious practice: The way to measure religious practice is fairly standardized 
and it basically refers to church attendance (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2013, 
2014; Fairbrother 2013; te Grotenhuis et al. 2015; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2011; van Ingen and Moor 2015; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Ruiter and van 
Tubergen 2009; Voas and Doebler 2011). Starting from the item “Apart from 
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days?” I built up a dummy variable recoding “more than once a 
week” and “once a week” into “Weekly Church attendance” and coding it as 1. 
The other response categories were coded as 0.  
 
Self-definition: The idea of “self-definition” represents in some way the individual 
perceived sense of belonging. Especially in modern context it could be instructive 
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to test how individuals perceive themselves beyond practice. The starting point 
was the item “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say 
you are ...”. I recoded the answer “a religious person” as 1 and the other two 
possible answers (“not a religious person”, “a convinced atheist”) as 0. 
 
Religious Belief: The notion of belief is the hardest to conceptualize and 
operationalize. It could refer to a godly power, supernatural energies or any kind 
of superior force. In this research, I want to test the impact of insecurity on the 
real core of Christian belief. In doing so, I have relied on a set of items asking 
“Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?”. I coded as 1 a person 
answering “Yes” to all the item concerning “God”, “Heaven” and “Hell”, 0 
otherwise.  
 
Individual independent variables 
 
Concerning independent variables, we can distinguish between two different 
sets. We have some variables (Marital Status, Health Status, Job Status) which 
contain the categories corresponding to the situations of insecurity; I will 
explicitly state which they are after the description. In addition, we have some 
variables we use as control (Wave, Gender, Age, Education) and a variable 
(Church attendance when respondent was 12 years old) which I interact with the 
others. 
 
Marital Status: I built this variable starting from the question “Current legal 
marital status respondent” and I recode it in 4 categories: “Married” 
(Married/Living together as Married), “Divorced” (Divorced/Separated), 
Widowed and Single. For the scopes of this work, the category “Widowed” is the 
most interesting. I treated this variable as categorical.       
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Health Status: I built this variables starting from the question “All in all, how 
would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is ...” and I 
recoded it in 3 categories: “Good” (Very Good/Good), “Fair” and “Poor” 
(Poor/Very Poor). The category corresponding to a situation of insecurity is 
“Poor”. I treated this variable as categorical. 
 
Job Status: I built this variables starting from the question “Are you yourself 
gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the 
employment status that applies to you” and I recoded it in 5 categories: 
“Employed, unlimited contract”, “Employed, limited contract” (Part Time/Self-
Employed), “Unemployed”, “Student”, “Inactive” (Retired/Housewife/Other). I 
am interested in the category “Unemployed”. I treated this variable as 
categorical. 
 
Given that the individual situations of insecurity grasped by the categories 
“Widowed”, “Poor health status” and “Unemployed” can partially overlap and 
cumulate I decided to synthesize them in a typology which defines clear 
individual profiles (Table 17). Given the low numerosity of the first four 
combinations, I aggregated them in the category “High insecurity” which is 
therefore composed by individual with two or more conditions of insecurity.  
Table 17: Typology of individual insecurities 
  Original     Aggregated 
  Freq. %     Freq. % 
Complete insecurity 23 0.03 
  
/ / 
Widowed + Poor health 1,150 1.68 
  
/ / 
Widowed + Unemployed 86 0.13 
  
/ / 
Poor health + Unemployed 212 0.31 
 
High insecurity 1,471 2.15 
Widowed 5,620 8.22 
 
Widowed 5,620 8.22 
Poor health 2,377 3.48 
 
Poor health 2,377 3.48 
Unemployment 4,024 5.89 
 
Unemployment 4,024 5.89 
No insecurities 54,842 80.26   No insecurities 54,842 80.26 
Total 68,334 100.00 
  
68,334 100.00 
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In addition to these main independent variables, I use other variables as control. 
They are education level (“age completed education respondent”, recoded in ten 
categories and treated as continuous variable), Church attendance at 12 years 
old (“how often attended religious services at 12 years old” recoded as dummy 
variable “weekly”), Survey Wave (“1999-2001 and “2008-2010”, categorical), 
gender (categorical) and age (continuous). 
 
Table 18: Summary of Individual Independent Variables 
  N mean sd min max 
Gender (female) 70,820 0.45 0.49 0 1 
Age 70,570 47.12 17.62 15 108 
Education 67,937 6.88 2.81 0 10 
Weekly C. Attendance (12 y.o.) 70,837 0.43 0.49 0 1 
 
 
Country independent variables 
 
The multilevel framework permits us to supplement the individual-level dataset 
with contextual variables gathered from other sources and by other 
organizations. This is undoubtedly one of the main advantage of multilevel 
approaches and it is therefore the one I followed in this analysis. 
 
Gini index is the fairly standardized way to measure income inequalities (Norris 
and Inglehart 2004; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009). In its classic version it ranges 
from a theoretical minimum of 0 (no inequalities) to 100 (perfect inequalities). 
For this analysis I used the figures obtained from the Human Development 
Report (United Nations Development Program 2001) and computed their mean 
for the period 1998-2010. 
 
Data for Unemployment Rate measures the number of unemployed people as a 
percentage of the labour force in a country (people in a country aged between 
15 and 64 years who are able and willing to work) (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2011).  They are taken from the International Labour Organization (ILO 2009) and 
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calculated as the mean level of unemployment rates over the whole period 
1998-2010.  
 
Data for Welfare Spending as percentage of Gdp are used to evaluate goodness 
of welfare systems. Here I used the mean of Eurostat data (Eurostat 2013) for 
the period 1998-2010.   
 
Table 19: Summary of Country-level dependent Variables 
  N mean sd min max 
Gini 27 30.90 3.30 24.46 36.44 
Unemployment Rate 27 8.09 3.45 2.7 15.81 
Welfare Spending 27 24.69 5.05 17.2 32.8 
 
 
As far as the country-level variables widely differ in their range (see Table 19 and 
Table 20), I used their standardized version to make the results more 
comparable. 
 
Methods 
 
 
To test the whole set of hypotheses I rely on the same multiple responses 
multilevel model as in paragraph 5.5.3. This kind of models basically permits to 
model simultaneously more than one dependent variable and to explicitly 
consider their correlation. In addition, as every multilevel model, it permits to 
use independent variables defined at different levels – individual and country in 
this case.   
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Table 20: Country Variables Summary 
  
Welfare 
Spending 
Gini 
Unemployment 
rate 
Austria 29.8 30.5 4.23 
Belgium 29.4 28.82 7.77 
Bulgaria 17.3 33.38 12.47 
Croatia 20.8 31.40 13.01 
Czech Republic 20.1 26.36 7.37 
Denmark 32.8 28.14 4.71 
Estonia 17.6 32.78 9.24 
Finland 29.2 27.88 8.51 
France 32.7 32.35 8.47 
Germany 29.8 31.82 9.14 
Great Britain 28.8 34.92 5.18 
Greece 28.6 34.50 9.73 
Hungary 22.7 28.43 6.66 
Iceland 23.3 29.38 2.70 
Ireland 24.5 32.14 4.65 
Italy 28.8 33.86 8.44 
Latvia 18.1 35.52 10.38 
Lithuania 18.9 34.82 11.00 
Netherlands 29.7 29.64 3.66 
Norway 25.1 26.96 3.61 
Poland 19.6 33.45 15.49 
Portugal 25.8 36.44 6.13 
Romania 17.2 31.98 7.06 
Slovakia 18.3 27.18 15.81 
Slovenia 24.4 24.46 6.01 
Spain 24.7 34.52 11.14 
Sweden 28.8 26.78 5.24 
 
 
To properly test all the hypotheses, I used two different models. I used Model 1 
to test the Micro-Micro hypotheses (Hp. 1, 2, 3 and 4) and the Macro-Micro ones 
(Hp. 5, 6 and 7). This model comprises the individual insecurities typology, the 
set of country variables and the control variables (Weekly Church attendance at 
12 years old included). In model 2, instead, the religious background is 
incorporated in the individual typology which is thus made by 10 categories 
leaving the other variables the same as Model 2. 
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7.3 Results 
Given the complex structure of this work, with different sets of hypotheses and 
different models, the presentation of the results will follow a two-steps 
procedure. First of all, I will present the results from Model 1 concerning the 
hypotheses Micro-Micro and Macro-Micro. Besides the estimated coefficients I 
will also report the predicted probabilities for the different categories of the 
individual independent variable and for the country variables. After that, I will 
present Model 2 and the results for the interaction hypothesis; also in this case I 
will present both the coefficients and the predicted probabilities.  
 
In Table 21 I reported the coefficients and the confidence intervals obtained 
from Model 1. Starting from the results concerning self-definition, what clearly 
emerges is the total absence of effects (high insecurity excluded) for both 
individual and country insecurities. In fact, we cannot see statistically significant 
results neither for individual insecurities (if compared to their absence) nor for 
the increase or decrease of 1 SD in country variables. If we look instead at 
religious belief, we can see how conditions of high insecurity and widowhood 
correspond to higher religiosity if compared to their absence. Also the country 
variables coefficients show statistically significant effects: an increase of 1 SD of 
Gini index correspond to an increase of religious belief, and the same for 1 SD 
decrease of Welfare spending. Concerning religious practice, results basically 
follow the ones for self-definition: the only – small – differences we have is for 
the situation of poor health, which results linked to lower practice, and for 
widowhood which results in higher practice. Given the coefficient for poor 
health, it comes hard to interpret the coefficient for the situation of high 
insecurity. In fact, it is likely that the effects of widowhood and poor health – 
which have opposite signs – almost cancel each other out.  
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Table 21: Model 1 results. Log-odds coefficients and confidence intervals 
  Practice Belief Self-Definition 
       B      [95% C. I.]      B      [95% C. I.]      B      [95% C. I.] 
                    
Constant -4,207 -4,474 -3,940 -1,231 -1,474 -0,989 -0,392 -0,702 -0,081 
  
         Individual insecurity 
Ref: NO insecurity 
         High insecuritya -0,116 -0,265 0,033 0,437 0,300 0,575 0,199 0,039 0,358 
Widowed 0,128 0,047 0,209 0,193 0,114 0,271 0,048 -0,037 0,132 
Poor health -0,170 -0,298 -0,042 0,002 -0,111 0,114 0,013 -0,097 0,124 
Unemployed -0,035 -0,141 0,070 0,004 -0,082 0,090 -0,190 -0,270 -0,11 
  
         Gini (Z) 0,243 -0,201 0,686 0,569 0,150 0,988 0,277 -0,290 0,844 
Unemp. rate (Z) 0,159 -0,094 0,412 0,114 -0,125 0,353 0,050 -0,274 0,374 
Welfare Spending (Z) -0,188 -0,451 0,075 -0,392 -0,641 -0,144 -0,274 -0,609 0,061 
  
         Age 0,022 0,020 0,023 -0,003 -0,004 -0,001 0,013 0,012 0,014 
Female - Ref: male 0,407 0,359 0,455 0,333 0,291 0,374 0,657 0,618 0,697 
Education -0,002 -0,011 0,008 -0,060 -0,068 -0,051 -0,060 -0,068 -0,052 
Wave - Ref: 1999-2001 -0,212 -0,260 -0,163 0,113 0,070 0,156 -0,115 -0,155 -0,074 
Weekly att. (12 y.o.)  
Ref: less/never 1,996 1,930 2,062 1,097 1,047 1,147 1,643 1,592 1,694 
  
         Var (country) 0,352 
  
0,317 
  
0,582 
    
         n Countries 27 
        n Individuals 65.240 
        n Responses 179.882 
        a two or more individual insecurities 
 
Despite the inspection of model coefficient gives rough indications about the 
relations between insecurity and religiosity, it is less useful to investigate the size 
of those effects. It is for this reason that we will move to the analysis of the 
predicted probabilities for a deeper interpretation of the results. Computing the 
predicted probabilities basically means to compute the probabilities for the three 
outcomes for each levels – or category – of the independent variables, letting the 
control variables to their means. 
 
The situation shown by  
 
Figure 31 does not differ from what just said. Concerning self-definition, we 
cannot see relevant difference between the various category of the insecurity 
typology and the absence of insecurity. If we look at belief instead, we can see a 
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higher probability to be religious for widowed individuals and for individuals in 
situation of high insecurity, but this difference is rather small (Phigh insecurity – PNO 
insecurity = 0.09). Also for practice, we can see a higher probability for widowed 
people (P widowed – P NO insecurity = 0,012) but this difference is as small as to be 
almost negligible.             
 
 
Figure 31: Predicted probabilities for model 1 – individual insecurities 
 
 
In summarizing these results for Model 1, it is legit to say that the impact of 
individual insecurity on religiosity is almost null; the only effect we found 
concern basically widowhood and its impact on belief and practice, but these 
effecst have absolutely low magnitude. 
 
Moving from individual conditions to country variables we can observe how the 
various indicators of insecurity impact differently on the different religious 
dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 32: Predicted probabilities for model 1 - Country level insecurities 
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What Figure 32 clearly shows is that an increase of Gini index of economic 
inequalities is linked to an increase of all the three dimensions of religiosity but, 
at the same time, the only relevant increase concerns religious belief. The 
unemployment rate also seems to have a positive relation with the three 
dimensions of religiosity but the differences are so risible as to be almost 
insignificant. Concerning welfare spending, the picture is basically reflecting the 
one for Gini index: there is in fact an increase of religiosity on the three 
dimensions corresponding to a decrease of welfare spending, but this relation is 
relevant only regarding religious belief. Everything considered, it is possible to 
summarize this by saying that a relation between some country feature and the 
individual religiosity is present, but only the dimension of religious belief is 
associated to insecurity whereas practice and self-definition are more resilient to 
external factors. I will discuss this thoroughly in the next paragraph. 
 
Moving now to the second step on this results’ presentation, we will consider the 
effect of religious socialization on the use of religion as coping strategy. To test 
this hypothesis, I have built model 2 by interacting the individual insecurities’ 
typology with the variable measuring weekly Church attendance at 12 years old, 
here used as proxy for religious socialization. The idea behind is to evaluate 
whether there is also an interaction effect which sums to the additive effects of 
insecurity and religious socialization; results are shown in Table 22. Being the 
typology referred to the category less associated to religiosity (No insecurity and 
no religious background as reference category) the resulting coefficients are de 
facto positive and statistically significant. This is obviously expected, but nothing 
says about the hypothesis behind, namely whether there is a higher likely to 
choose religion as coping strategy for individual grew in a religious environment. 
The positive coefficients only confirm the additive effect between insecurity and 
background. Like in the previous step, the best way to look at the results for the 
interaction hypothesis is to report the predicted probabilities.   
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Table 22: Model 2 results. Log-odds coefficients and confidence intervals 
  Practice Belief Self-definition 
       B      [95% C. I.]      B      [95% C. I.]      B      [95% C. I.] 
                    
Constant -4,271 -4,539 -4,002 -1,240 -1,483 -0,997 -0,393 -0,703 -0,08 
                    
Individual insecurity 
Ref: NO insecurity No 
Rel.Back.                   
Rel.Back.  – High 
insecurity 1,807 1,630 1,984 1,525 1,339 1,710 1,991 1,684 2,298 
Rel.Back.  – Widow 2,162 2,054 2,271 1,303 1,202 1,405 1,799 1,667 1,932 
Rel.Back.  – Poor health 1,827 1,672 1,982 1,072 0,923 1,222 1,570 1,387 1,753 
Rel.Back.  – Unemployed 1,997 1,862 2,132 1,097 0,971 1,222 1,442 1,299 1,584 
Rel.Back.  – No insecurity 2,080 2,006 2,155 1,112 1,058 1,167 1,636 1,581 1,690 
NO R.B.  – High insecurity 0,478 0,205 0,751 0,537 0,338 0,736 0,195 0,006 0,383 
NO R.B.  – Widow 0,368 0,201 0,535 0,229 0,102 0,356 -0,010 -0,116 0,097 
NO R.B.  – Poor health 0,136 -0,127 0,398 0,072 -0,098 0,243 0,073 -0,063 0,208 
NO R.B.  – Unemployed 0,138 -0,077 0,353 0,036 -0,086 0,158 -0,179 -0,276 -0,08 
          
Gini (Z) 0,233 -0,211 0,677 0,567 0,148 0,987 0,278 -0,289 0,844 
Unemp. rate (Z) 0,159 -0,095 0,412 0,114 -0,126 0,353 0,050 -0,274 0,373 
Welfare Spending (Z) -0,186 -0,450 0,077 -0,392 -0,641 -0,144 -0,274 -0,608 0,061 
          
Age 0,022 0,020 0,023 -0,003 -0,004 -0,001 0,013 0,012 0,014 
Female - Ref: male 0,408 0,359 0,456 0,333 0,291 0,374 0,656 0,617 0,696 
Education -0,002 -0,011 0,007 -0,060 -0,068 -0,051 -0,060 -0,068 -0,050 
Wave - Ref: 1999-2001 -0,209 -0,258 -0,160 0,114 0,071 0,157 -0,114 -0,155 -0,070 
                    
Var (country) 0,353     0,317     0,581     
                    
n Countries 27                 
n Individuals 65.240                 
n Responses 179.882               
 
 
Figure 33 reports the differences between the predicted probabilities for the 
various categories of insecurity (Pr(xi)) and the probability associated to 
individual with no insecurity (Pr(x5)), everything divided between those with 
religious background and those without. If the interaction hypothesis is 
confirmed, the differences will be expected to be higher – and positive – for 
individuals with religious background.   
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Figure 33: Difference between predicted probabilities for the various categories of insecurity and 
the category "NO insecurity” divided for religious background 
 
 
Results shown in Figure 33 are incontroversial: there are no differences in the 
use of religion as coping strategy between individual religiously socialized and 
individuals without a strong religious background. The effects for insecurity and 
religious socialization are thus only additive. The religiosity for individuals who 
attended mass weekly at 12 years old is higher, but this not affect the use of 
religion in situation of insecurity.      
7.4 Conclusions and Discussion 
Aim of this work was to empirically test the Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) 
insecurity theory to understand whether it could be used to interpret religious 
differences in Europe. Conversely to their approach, which used a worldwide 
framework characterized by extreme heterogeneity, I decided to look at a more 
homogeneous context like the European one. The multidimensional approach I 
used permits to build hypotheses upon different dimensions also considering 
their potential overlapping. This approach is justified a priori if we observe the 
different ways by which religion can work as coping strategy: these ways range 
from networks and support groups’ creation (mainly linked to religious practice 
and self-definition) to mechanisms of individual support – mainly linked to the 
belief dimension. This multidimensional approach is also justified ex-post given 
the different results we found for the different dimensions. In the light of these 
results, we can discuss them using two different focuses: firstly, we will debate 
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the different results obtained for the different dimensions of religiosity and 
secondly we will discuss the results we obtained for the different kinds of 
insecurities. In this second step we will explicitly focus on the differences 
between individual and contextual insecurities and we will try to expand the 
discussion within the debate about European secularization.         
 
If we look at the results we obtained for the different dimensions of religiosity, 
what comes out immediately is that insecurity has no impact on religious self-
definition. The resilience of this dimension to external factors does not surprise. 
In fact, being it strictly linked to a kind of group identification, it can partially 
overlap with nationality or national identity (Bellah 1967). In addition to the 
Bellah’s idea of civil religion, we can find this link between religion and 
nationality also in the concept of vicarious religions proposed by Davie (2000, 
2001). The main idea behind is a shift from a religious culture made by 
obligations, practice and strong dogmas to a religious culture based on 
consumption. Individuals, Davie says, continue to perceive themselves as 
members of a religious institutions also without practice or belief because they 
“use” it only for rituals and special occasions. Given this, the resilience of self-
definition to external factors like insecurity is clearly expected.  
 
The interpretation of the results concerning practice is something in-between 
self-definition and belief. In fact, despite it results resilient to the effects of the 
macro variables, we found a small significant effect for widowhood on practice. 
Given these results we can say that, in addition to the more intimate and 
individual belief, also the attendance to the Church can work as coping strategy. 
Fundamentals are the mechanisms of social support related to practice which 
can be used by individuals to cope with very threatening events like the loss of 
the partner.  
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Among the three dimensions considered, religious belief is the one showing the 
stronger association with insecurity. In effect, there is a significant effect both of 
individual insecurities – in the form of widowhood and high insecurity – and 
contextual insecurities – in the form of economic inequalities and welfare 
spending. The individual religiosity is in fact higher in more unequal countries 
and lower in countries with higher welfare spending. A comprehensive 
explanation of these mechanism is impossible if we rely only on the results of 
this analysis: what clearly emerge is however how the system of supernatural 
belief is likely to be considered as a stress-coping mechanism which individuals 
tend to use.  
 
Moving the focus from the different dimensions to the different kind of 
insecurities, some clear and interesting conclusions emerge. Concerning 
individual insecurities, only widowhood is associated to higher religiosity, both in 
terms of higher practice and especially belief. This condition, being strictly liked 
to a unique traumatic episode, is the emblematic situation to cope with using 
religion. For what concerns the contextual insecurity, what we can say without 
fear of contradiction is that unemployment rate has no impact on religiosity, 
whatever the dimension considered. On the contrary, economic inequality and 
welfare spending results respectively positively and negatively associated to 
religiosity, with the bigger impact on belief. This result is coherent with both the 
general insecurity theory and the theories underlining the single mechanisms. In 
fact, higher inequalities are linked to religiosity because of the higher poverty in 
high unequal societies (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009) 
or because religion is functioning to protect élite’s privileges, which are higher in 
high unequal societies (Solt et al. 2011). At the same time, a higher welfare 
spending can protect individuals from the negative effects of poverty (Ruiter and 
van Tubergen 2009) and this can impact religiosity in two different ways. On the 
first hand, it will diminish the economic insecurity and, on the other hand, it will 
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de-legitimise religious institutions as agencies of economic and social support 
(Scheve and Stasavage 2006).  
 
Everything considered, it is possible to refer to insecurity as to the main 
mechanism linking modernization and secularization? Is it a relevant component 
of secularization debate? The answer is not easy. If we focus on the individual 
level, despite in this work we found an association between widowhood and 
religiosity, this result is not useful to argue that an increase or a decrease of 
individual insecurities can have relevant impact on the national trends of 
religiosity. On the contrary, if we look at the contextual level, it is fundamental to 
say that country insecurities, despite being associated to various dimensions of 
religiosity, are also strongly linked to other processes of modernization in its 
broad sense. We can thus argue that these macro features are useful to place 
the different countries on a hypothetical path to modernization which lead to 
secularization. The study of these country characteristics such inequalities or 
welfare spending cannot however be disentangled from other characteristics like 
socio-economic wealth, education and the mechanisms of religious transmission 
which together define the country’s “levels of modernization”.            
 
Despite it seems useful, especially in a global perspective, to interpret religious 
differences among countries (Norris and Inglehart 2004), the insecurity theory 
applied to the European context shows a scarcer theoretical relevance. The 
theory applied to Europe appear thus insufficient – if used in isolation – to 
interpret the religious differences we observe in Europe.  
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Chapter 8  
 
DOES INSECURITY FOSTER RELIGIOSITY? 
A longitudinal panel study for Germany and Great Britain 
 
 
 
 
As stated in chapters 2, 3 and 7, there are basically two different ways to deal 
with the insecurity theory. On the one hand, the relation can be viewed looking 
at contexts or high-level units: religiosity is lower in more secure societies and 
higher in poorer or more insecure societies. On the other hand, the relation 
between feeling of insecurity and religiosity can refer to the individual 
behaviours; in this interpretation, individuals can use religion as coping strategy 
even in very affluent societies when threatened by particular life events. This 
chapter explores explicitly this second interpretation.  
 
In the sociological literature about the use of religion as stress coping strategy, 
only the work by Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2011) represents a systematic 
attempt to study this mechanism focusing also on the individual behaviour. In 
fact, they tested a lot of variables concerning economic and existential 
insecurities, past and present insecurities and individual and contextual 
insecurities. Despite the high relevance of their work, the results, by the authors’ 
own admission, need to be refined and scrutinized maybe with the use of 
longitudinal data. At present, the insecurity theory is in need of development, 
both theoretically and empirically (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2011) and a 
clear assessment of the individual mechanisms behind goes undoubtedly in this 
direction. If it is possible to demonstrate that a worsening of individual 
conditions can foster an increase of religiosity, this could represent a strong leap 
forward in the relevance of the insecurity theory.  
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Of course when dealing with these individual-level relations, psychology can help 
a lot to shed light on the mechanisms at work. As I told in the devoted chapter, 
the absence of sociological analysis on this topic is puzzling also because the 
psychological literature has extensively dealt with this idea. Psychologists dealing 
with these arguments place religion within the framework of stress coping 
strategies. What they intend for stress is the human mental and physical 
response and adaptation to some real or perceived changes and challenges. It is 
noteworthy to say that stress can take different forms: It can be either short-
lived, a single event with a sharp and defined time span and that acts as a shock 
or it can be long-term, meaning when some circumstances continue to have 
impact throughout the whole – or part of it – life course. Using the distinction 
from Chapter 3 between economic and existential insecurities, we can say that 
events like the death of a loved one or a physical accidents fall in the category of 
event stressors whereas the economic insecurity is one of the best example of 
chronic stressor. In both case, when trying to test the relation between the 
emergence of some life-threatening stressful events and the use of religion to 
cope with them, it is plausible to hypothesize a time-lag between the stressor 
and the – eventual – change in the religious behaviour.  
 
In chapter 3 we have also seen how religious coping strategies can work in 
different ways. They can provide positive beliefs (Krok 2015), appraisal of 
stressors through religious attributions (Beagan et al. 2012), coping behaviour 
like prayer or meditation and social support networks via religious communities 
(Beagan et al. 2012; Gall et al. 2005). Given this variety of – possible – 
mechanisms at work, religion and religiosity need thus to be considered in the 
more comprehensive way possible. Focusing only on practice or looking instead 
on how individuals perceive themselves is not enough to investigate all the 
possible mechanisms behind.   
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This multidimensionality of religiosity and the idea of time-lags between causes – 
the stressors – and effect – the increase of personal religiosity – will be deeply 
scrutinize along this entire chapter. For the inherent nature of this kind of 
analysis, which focuses on events’ timing, a particular kind of data are needed. 
These dataset – panel data – are powerful tools in the social scientists’ toolbox 
but they are quite scarce and do not permit a wide comparison like the cross-
sectional data I used in the previous chapters. This imposes some choices in the 
units of analysis. For this work I decided to test the insecurity theory in two of 
the biggest and most influent European countries: Germany and Great Britain. In 
addition to their political, economic and cultural relevance, these two countries 
have two desirable features. On the first hand, they both fall in the cluster of the 
Northern European countries (which comprises also the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France) in the typology made by Halsey (1985). This cluster is somehow 
opposed both to the Scandinavian countries and to Latin Europe ones for which, 
for opposite reasons, a relevant change in individual’s religious behaviour along 
the life course is not likely to occur. On the second hand, these two countries are 
relatively denominationally heterogeneous and this absence of a monopolistic 
religious tradition can open the field to more individualized patterns which 
partially distance themselves from a strong cultural influence.        
 
In going deeply into the heterogeneous religious landscape of these two 
countries, a good way is to briefly underline their commonalities as well as their 
differences with the majority of Europeans. Concerning Great Britain, Halsey 
(1985:12) clearly asserts that “British are to be seen and see themselves as a 
relatively unchurched, nationalistic, optimistic, satisfied, conservative, and 
moralistic people”. Given this co presence of a high morality (whose boundaries 
with religiosity are blurred) and a low propensity to attend Churches, it is not 
surprisingly that Great Britain is one of the main battlefield of the debate 
concerning “believing without belonging” (Davie 1994; Voas and Crockett 2005). 
The main question Davie has about this is easy to pose but hard to answer: why 
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the majority of British people persist in believing but see no need to participate 
regularly in their religious institutions? And why only few people have opted out 
of religion altogether? Atheists are rare. Having this in mind, it seems that Britain 
– as well as most of Western Europe – has to be defined as unchurched rather 
than simply secular (Davie 1994) This phenomena is transversal to every 
denominational allegiance and to every regional variance in the puzzling British 
religious landscape (Davie 1994). To put this in context, it is needed to spend 
some words about the denominations present in Britain, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. In fact, it is crystal clear that individual countries that 
composed the United Kingdom are far from homogeneous, “both with regard to 
their religious histories and to the manner in which their religious sentiments are 
expressed” (Davie 1994:14). Northern Ireland, for example, seems resembling 
the Irish patterns more than the mainland ones – and this results in high level of 
religious practice, almost comparable to the other – southern – European 
countries. Scotland and Wales also differ in their denominational distribution, 
and these different denominations strongly carry cultural identities. Scotland is 
the glaring example: with the strong presence of the Calvinist Church, its position 
is somehow problematic for the national Church in England, being more close to 
some European countries (Davie 1994). In addition to the regional differences 
themselves, this denominational heterogeneity has a strong consequence 
impacting the United Kingdom as a whole. Contrary to other European countries 
like France – which historical path basically forced a sharp cleavage between 
religious and non-religious, between the Catholic and the Jacobin tradition – 
England is characterized by a high degree of religious pluralism. This abundance 
of religious options excludes the obligation – common in many other countries – 
to accept Catholicism or nothing at all. We can see the signs of this in the low 
presence of atheist and of course in the combination of indicators concerning 
practice, belief and self-definition. This pluralist situation where at least five 
main denominations – Anglicanism, Quakerism, Congregationalism, 
Presbyterianism and Methodism – interact is the frame in which we need to 
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interpret the results of this work and everything which concerns British 
religiosity.    
 
Somehow similarly to Great Britain, also German religiosity can be described 
starting from a two-axes cleavage. On the one side there are the differences 
between the two main Christian confessions – Roman Catholics and Protestants 
– and on the other side there are regional differences. These latter regard both 
territorial difference such Bavaria and Germany’s far western region which are 
predominantly Catholic and the north, central and southeast regions which are 
mostly Protestant and the strong historical and political cleavage which divide 
Eastern and Western Germany. In this regard, Pollack and Pickel (2007) clearly 
focus on this territorial and historical cleavage when speaking about the possible 
processes of religious individualization Europe is experiencing. West Germany is 
a clear example of modern society where individualization is likely to occur 
whereas East Germany, being divided from West Germany for 40 years, is still in 
the process of catching up to the western German modernization level. Generally 
speaking, German religious landscape is almost equally divided among Roman 
Catholics, Protestants Evangelical and atheist. The Protestant Evangelic Church 
(EKD) comprises in turn a set of United Protestant, Lutheran and Reformed 
Churches. Everything consider, we can describe the German religious landscape 
as made by three different areas: The Catholic south-western regions, the 
protestant north-central regions and the east regions where, after the 
Communist domination, most of the population tend to refuse religion. Two key 
points are relevant when trying to draw a sociologically useful picture of German 
religion. Firstly, it is deserved to remember that Germany was the heartbeat of 
the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century; this results in centuries where 
German succeeded to build a pacific and respectful cohabitation. Secondly, when 
investigating patterns of religious membership, is important to know that the 
avoidance of religion can also be a financial decision. In fact, the German 
government collects a church tax, the so-called Kirchensteuer, that supports the 
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Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as some Jewish communities.  This tax 
is so high (about 8% of a person’s total income) that many Germans avoid to pay 
it by legally declaring to the state that they are not a member of any church.   
8.1 Hypotheses 
In the previous chapters I presented and tested the theory and the – possible – 
mechanisms behind the link between insecurity and religiosity. This relation can 
be viewed focusing both on the contextual insecurities and on the individual 
ones. I tested both of them cross-sectionally in chapter 7 and the results show 
some effects of contextual insecurities but only very small effects of individual 
situations mainly in the form of widowhood. Within this chapter the attempt is 
to refine the investigation of the relation between insecurity and religiosity at 
the individual level, trying to understand whether a worsening of personal 
situations will increase individual’s religiosity. We do so using the same 
multidimensional approach as before and thus testing the relation between the 
worsening of personal situations and the increase of religious practice and values 
and the switch in the religious denomination (see paragraph 4.1 for the related 
explanation). Concerning the working hypotheses, the attempt is to replicate 
those from the previous chapter, so testing the employment status, the marital 
status, the health status and the perceived financial situation. Also in this case, 
all the hypotheses are referred to all the three dimensions of religiosity here 
considered.   
Hp1: A worsening of individual’s job status (unemployment) will increase 
individual’s religiosity. 
Hp2: A worsening of individual’s health status will increase individual’s religiosity 
Hp3: The loss of the partner will increase individual’s religiosity 
Hp4: The worsening of financial situation will increase individual’s religiosity 
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8.2 Data, variables and methods 
8.2.1 Data 
Given the purposes of this work, which aims to assess the impact of some change 
in insecurity to religious change for two different countries, I have relied on two 
different panel dataset. 
SOEP dataset for Germany 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a longitudinal survey of 
approximately 11,000 private households and about 30,000 individuals in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. As early as June 1990—even before the Economic, 
Social and Monetary Union—SOEP dataset was expanded to include the states of 
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), thus seizing the rare opportunity 
to observe the transformation of an entire society. An immigrant sample was 
also added as well to account for the changes that took place in Germany society 
in 1994/95. Further new samples were added to include special sub-populations 
or to stabilize sample size. The database is produced by the Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) and includes variables concerning household 
composition, employment, occupations, earnings, health and satisfaction 
indicators. 
BHPS and Understanding Society dataset for Great Britain 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) was carried out by the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex from 1991 to 2009 
(Waves 1-18). The main objective of the survey was the further understanding of 
social and economic change at the individual and household level in Great 
Britain. From Wave 19, the BHPS became part of a new longitudinal study called 
Understanding Society, or the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study 
(UKHLS), conducted by ISER. The BHPS sample is part of Understanding Society 
from Wave 2 onwards and BHPS sample members have an identifier within the 
Understanding Society datasets, allowing users to match BHPS Wave 1-18 data to 
Understanding Society Wave 2 data and onwards. The wave 1 of BHPS panel 
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consists of some 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals drawn from 250 areas 
of Great Britain. Additional samples of 1,500 households in each of Scotland and 
Wales were added to the main sample in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 
households was added in Northern Ireland, making the panel suitable for UK-
wide research.  
 
Starting from the entire sample, I performed some cleaning in order to have a 
more reliable sample. I drop all the individuals with missing values on id, all the 
individuals who were not in the original sample, all the individuals with some 
wave gaps and all the individuals who participate in less than three waves (see 
Appendix 10). 
8.2.2 Variables 
When dealing with two different datasets and when trying to make the same 
analysis between them, keeping the coherence of the different variables is not 
an easy task. Despite I tried to operationalize the same dimensions of religion, 
some differences between the two countries are present. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Concerning Germany, I operationalize the dimension of religious practice starting 
from the question “Attend Church or other religious events”. The different 
categories were coded as the “average propensity of weekly Church attendance” 
(Weekly=0.99, Monthly=0.23, Only in special occasions=0.03, Never=0) (Pisati 
2000). The possible interpretation of this variables is twofold: it can be 
interpreted as the “average propensity of weekly Church attendance” or as the 
“individual propensity to attend Church in any given week” (Hout and Greeley 
1998). It is evident that the two interpretation are essentially complementary: if 
we recode the various categories of a certain question regarding Church 
attendance as the probability of weekly Church attendance, what results are 
comparable and linear measures. This way of standardize works fine especially 
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when dealing with different datasets with different answer formats and I thus 
decide to follow the same approach also regarding Great Britain. For this latter, I 
started from the question asking about the “attendance at religious services” and 
I recode it in this way: Once a week or more=0.99, at least once a month=0.23, at 
least once a year=0.03, only at weddings, funerals etc.=0.03, never=0. Coded in 
this way, the religious practice variables were treated as linear in both the 
analyses.           
 
Concerning religious denomination in Germany, I started from the item “which 
religious denomination” and I coded as “1” an individual declaring the 
membership to one of the various proposed denominations (grouped by catholic 
denominations, protestant denominations, other Christian denominations, Other 
Not-Christian denominations), “0” elsewhere. The resulting variable is thus a 
dummy one. Concerning Great Britain, the procedure was almost the same, with 
the only difference that the question does not divide among the main Christian 
doctrines.  
 
In both datasets there is not the possibility to measure religious belief as I did in 
the cross-sectional chapters (see chapters Chapter 5,Chapter 6 and 7). In its 
stead, I opted to focus on something more concerned to religious values. 
Regarding Germany, I relied on the question asking about the “importance of 
religious in your life” and ranging from “very unimportant” to “very important”. 
Regarding Great Britain, I similarly relied on the question asking if “religion 
makes difference to life” and ranging from “no difference” to “a great 
difference”. Both these variables where treated as scalar.     
 
Independent variables 
 
The independent variables I used for this work basically regard economic and 
existential insecurity. For what concerns Germany I used marital status 
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(“Married/living together”, “Divorced/separated”, “Single”, “Widowed”, 
categorical), employment status (“Full-time employed”, “part-time employed”, 
“Unemployed”, “Other”, categorical), health satisfaction (10 points scale, scalar) 
and income satisfaction (10 points scale, scalar). Regarding the first two we are 
mainly interested in the categories “Widowed” and “Unemployed”. For what 
concerns Great Britain, I used instead marital status (“Married/living together”, 
“Divorced/separated”, “Never married”, “Widowed”, categorical), health status 
(5 categories from “Very good” to “very poor”, categorical), employment status 
(“Employed”, “Retired”, “Maternity leave/family care”, “Student”, “Other”, 
categorical), partner unemployment (dichotomous), financial stress (5 categories 
from “Living comfortably” to “Finding it very difficult”, categorical). For the 
reasons I will mention in the next paragraph – in fixed effects models subjects 
serve “as their own control” – we do not need time-invariant control variables. 
 
Not all the variables of interest were asked in each wave. In order to increase the 
number of observations I approximated all the missing values with the last 
available measure on that variable. To put in another way, I assumed that the 
score on a variable did not change until a new valid score is found.     
8.2.3 Methods 
When dealing with panel data and when trying to estimate the effects of some 
time-varying variables (the “insecurity variables”) on other time-varying variables 
(the “religiosity variables”) there are two main kind of models to use: fixed-effect 
model and random-effects model. The main difference between the two is that 
fixed-effects models control somehow for the unobserved heterogeneity 
between individuals whereas random-effects models do not. If there are omitted 
variables, and these variables are correlated with the variables in the model, 
then fixed effects models provide a means for controlling for them: basically, in a 
fixed-effects model, subjects serve as their own controls. The main shortcoming 
for this is that we do not estimate the effects of these time-invariant variables. 
Random-effects models are somehow the opposite: they permit to estimate also 
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the effects of time-invariant variables but the model estimates may be biased 
because we are not controlling for some of them. Over and above the theoretical 
reasons, there is also a statistical test to investigate whether a random-effect 
model is preferred compared to a fixed-effect model. In the Hausman test 
(1978), the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs the 
alternative fixed effects. It basically tests whether the unique errors are 
correlated with the regressors; the null hypothesis is that they are not. This test 
was performed for all the dependent variables we use and it resulted significant, 
and thus I opted for fixed-effects models. The general form of this model is 
reported in the equation below. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖?̅?  
 
In the equation, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the score on the dependent variables 𝑦 of respondent i at 
time t and ?̅?𝑖 is the respondent’s average score on the dependent variable over 
time. It follows that the first part of the equation indicates the deviance from the 
individual’s mean for the dependent variable. The same holds for the 
independent variables and the error terms. It results that the deviance from the 
individual’s mean on the dependent variable is a function (𝑏𝑖) of the deviance 
from the individual’s mean on the independent variable (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) plus the 
deviance from the individual’s mean error (𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖?̅?). Given the different nature 
of our dependent variables, I used both linear fixed-effect models (for “religious 
practice”, “religious make difference” and “importance of religion”) and logistic 
ones (for “religious belonging”).  
 
For all the three dependent variables and for both countries I performed three 
different kind of models in order to take into account some peculiarities of the 
longitudinal analysis. Model a corresponds to the classic fixed-effects model. 
Model b instead is Model a supplemented with time fixed effects dummy 
variables to control for time-flow. Model c is basically Model b with all the 
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independent time-varying variables considered at t-1 to take into account a 
supposed time-latency between cause and effect. 
8.3 Results 
In presenting the results I here follow a two-steps reasoning. For each of the two 
countries, I firstly present the tables concerning the changes in the various 
dependent variables and then I move the presentation of the results coming 
from the models’ estimation.  
8.3.1 Great Britain 
Concerning Great Britain, the focus is on three different dependent variables, 
namely religious practice, religious belonging or “self-definition” and “religion 
makes difference”. Before moving to the analysis of the impact of changes in 
insecurity, it is needed to see whether we observe some changes in the 
dependent variables or not. This is a necessary step because, if there is no 
change in the dependent variables, there could be no effect for a change in the 
independent. As Table 23, Table 24 and Table 25 show, there is only a small 
change in the answers along the waves..  
 
For what regards this analysis, the item performing better is the one related to 
religious practice. In fact, we can observe an 80% stability and 20% change (a 
change occurs when the answer at time t is different from the one at time t-1) 
among the observations. In addition, we can see also a nice linear pattern for 
change which marks out a little probability of big changes between two 
consecutive observations. The item concerning religious self-definition is instead 
the most problematic one because there is only a little change (4%). This almost 
complete stability has some relevant implications, both from the theoretical and 
the methodological point of view. 
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Table 23: Great Britain - Change in religious participation over all the waves 
Wave t  once a 
week or 
more 
at least 
once a 
month 
at least 
once a 
year 
never 
only at 
weddings, 
funerals 
Total 
Wave t-1  
once a week or more 11,461 616 214 117 121 12,529 
at least once a month 475 5,474 881 205 266 7,301 
at least once a year 191 751 14,399 1,395 2,898 19,634 
never 107 166 1,020 20,079 5,678 27,050 
only at weddings, funerals  124 230 1,734 3,829 33,754 39,671 
Total 12,358 7,237 18,248 25,625 42,717 106,185 
 
 
I will discuss the theoretical considerations in the last paragraph. Concerning 
methodology, what goes with it is the impossibility to run the models for all the 
individuals with no changes occurring in the dependent variable; this can of 
course lead to a loss of sample size and to some biased results.  
 
Table 24: Great Britain - Change in religious belonging over all the waves 
Wave t  
0 1 Total Wave t-1 
 
0 38,466 2,086 40,552 
1 1,846 64,464 66,310 
Total 40,312 66,550 106,862 
 
Also looking at the item asking whether “religion makes difference” we can see 
an almost 90% of stability and 10% change among the observations. Also in this 
case there is a nice pattern marking out a little probability of big changes 
between two consecutive observations. 
 
Table 25: Great Britain - Change in "religion makes difference" over all the waves 
Wave t  no 
difference 
a little 
difference 
some 
difference 
a great 
difference 
Total 
Wave t-1  
no difference 42,668 1,606 694 351 45,319 
a little difference 1,831 19,938 1,162 409 23,340 
some difference 759 1,100 18,179 693 20,731 
a great difference 204 493 711 16,009 17,417 
Total 45,462 23,137 20,746 17,462 106,807 
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Moving from the evaluation of the dependent variables’ variability to the 
models’ estimation I want to recap that we are interested in the changes for 
those variables measuring to some changes in the independent variables. 
Concerning these latter, we are particularly interested in the category 
“Widowed” of marital status, “Poor health” and “Very poor health” of health 
status, “Unemployed” of employment status, “Partner unemployed” and 
“Finding it quite difficult” and “Finding it very difficult” of the variable about 
financial stress. 
 
The results coming from the models’ estimation (Table 26) are quite clear. The 
only variable showing some impact on the change in religiosity is the one 
concerning widowhood. Given the results we can confidently say that losing the 
partner increase religious practice and sense of belonging but not the feeling 
that religion can make some difference in life. The other variables or categories 
we are interested in do not show statistically significant relations with religiosity.  
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Table 26: Fixed-effect models results for Great Britain 
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8.3.2 Germany 
In presenting the results for Germany I will follow the same structure as Great 
Britain. I will firstly present the patterns of change of the dependent variables 
moving then to the models’ estimation results. As for Great Britain, Table 27, 
Table 28 and Table 29 point out only small volatility in the dependent variables. 
Also for Germany, the item performing better is the one for religious practice for 
which we can observe a 20% change and 80% stability. Also in this case we see 
the linear pattern which suggests only little probability of big changes between 
two consecutive observations. 
 
Table 27: Germany - change in religious participation over all the waves 
Wave t  
Weekly Monthly 
Only special 
occasions 
Never Total 
Wave t-1  
Weekly 5,214 495 210 140 6,059 
Monthly 540 3,360 951 228 5,079 
Only special occasions 233 991 11,373 2,172 14,769 
Never 113 222 2,184 13,588 16,107 
Total 6,100 5,068 14,718 16,128 42,014 
 
 
The indicator for religious belonging present the same problems as for Great 
Britain; in fact, we can observe only a minimal share – 1% – of answers changing 
between two contiguous observations.    
 
Table 28: Germany - change in religious belonging over all the waves 
Wave t  
0 1 Total Wave t-1 
 
0 5,667 245 5,912 
1 235 35,883 36,118 
Total 5,902 36,128 42,030 
 
 
For the variable concerning the importance of religion we found higher variability 
that religious belonging but still very low – 5%. 
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Table 29: Germany - change in "importance of religion" over all the waves 
Wave t  Very 
unimportant 
Less 
Important 
Important 
Very 
important 
Total 
Wave t-1  
Very unimportant 4,231 235 34 4 4,504 
Less Important 207 11,679 348 28 12,262 
Important 39 398 10,705 193 11,335 
Very important 6 27 174 4,362 4,569 
Total 4,483 12,339 11,261 4,587 32,670 
 
 
Moving from the inspection of the dependent variables to the reading of the 
results coming from the models and reported in table 30, we see some result 
coherent with what we found for Great Britain. In fact, widowhood has a 
statistically significant impact on religiosity also in Germany. The only difference 
is that this impact regard religious practice and the variable asking whether 
“religion makes difference” and not religious belonging as for Great Britain. In 
addition, we found also a statistically significant effect for unemployment on 
religious practice and belonging but its size is so small as to be almost irrelevant.  
8.4 Conclusions and discussion 
Main aim of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that a worsening of individual’s 
conditions can foster their religiosity. The idea behind is that when people suffer 
from some life-threatening episodes they likely turn religious as a way to cope 
with these situations. Following the main typology suggest by the – scarce – 
sociological literature, I tested episodes concerning both economic and 
existential insecurities. I did so by focusing on three different dependent 
variables aiming to measure the effects on various dimensions of the broad 
concept of religiosity. This is coherent also with the idea that religion can work as 
coping strategy in many different ways ranging from the social support by 
religious communities to the values individuals internalize.  
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                Table 30: Fixed-effect models results for Germany 
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To perform this empirical test, I worked on two different countries, Germany and 
Great Britain, which panel datasets present the longest observation windows 
across European countries.  
 
While inspecting the volatility of the dependent variables across individuals 
across time we found the first problematic issue. In fact, the variables measuring 
the three dimension we want to investigate are not likely to change between 
waves. To put it in another way: individuals are not likely to change their 
religiosity. The only dimension showing some kind of volatility is the one 
measuring Church Attendance, for which almost 20% of the answers at time t are 
different from those at time t-1. The same percentage for the variables 
measuring religious values is 5% whereas it is only 1% for religious self-definition. 
This last 1% is quite expected if we rely on the idea of religious belonging as the 
cultural identity mentioned before and, concerning Germany, it is even more 
expected if we think at the taxation issue connected to religious belonging. 
Undoubtedly these results represent the first clue about the inconsistency of 
insecurity theory if evaluated at the individual level.  
 
This interpretation is confirmed by the results of the models, which represent 
the core of this work. Despite we control both for the time-flow itself and for a 
possible time-lag between the appearance of life-threatening episodes and the 
change in religiosity, the results are quite clear: individuals in Germany and Great 
Britain are not likely to turn more religious when some episodes causing 
insecurity occur. The only exceptions are represented by the loss of the partner, 
which increase practice and values in Germany and practice and belonging in 
Great Britain and the unemployment status, which increase practice and 
belonging in Germany. The results concerning widowhood are quite coherent 
with want we found in the previous chapter and this make us quite confident 
about the strength of these findings. In any case, the effect sizes for both 
unemployment and widowhood are very small and this basically means that the 
insecurity theory evaluated at individual level is almost useless as theory aiming 
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to explain religious differences across European countries. Of course the results 
have to be circumscribed to the two countries we analyzed, but at the same time 
they make us not optimistic about the relevance of insecurity theory for the 
debate about European religiosity. 
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Chapter 9  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
The present work represented a long path across many issues related to the 
study of European religiosity. These issues regard theoretical, methodological 
and empirical aspects. I started with the state of the art for what concern the 
various theories behind the study of worldwide religiosity. This group of theories 
includes the basic secularization theory, the individualization theory and the 
economic market theory. According to the first, the world is experiencing a 
decrease of religiosity due to processes of modernization. Scholars from 
individualization theory hypothesize instead that religion is changing and not 
declining due to such processes of modernization: religion in modern time is 
becoming more and more individualized and intimate thus losing its institutional 
traits. The approach by adherents of the economic market theory is rather 
different: they interpret the religious field as a classic market, in which the levels 
of religiosity depend on the competition between the various religious agencies 
in attracting more followers. If so, religiosity should be higher when there is an 
open and pluralistic religious market.  
      
Regarding Europe, scholars from the field almost agree that the main dispute is 
between secularization and individualization theory. For what concern this work, 
it is noteworthy to say that these two approaches focus on different dimensions 
of religiosity: for adherent of the secularization theory, religiosity is declining 
across all the dimensions whereas for followers of the individualization theory 
only the practice and the institutional belonging are declining while personal 
beliefs are quite stable or increasing. Given this multi-dimensional feature of 
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religiosity, I gave a detailed overview of the various dimensions behind the broad 
concept of religiosity. In the same chapter I dealt with other relevant issues for 
the study of religiosity with quantitative methods; I gave a lot of attention to the 
age-period-cohort issue and I come out with the idea that the best way to study 
religious change is by looking at cohort replacement. 
 
After these preliminary considerations, I estimated the trends for three 
dimensions of religiosity – practice, belief and self-definition – dividing them 
among the different European Christian confessions (Catholic, Protestants and 
Orthodox). What results is that practice is declining cohort after cohort across all 
the denominations; religious belief and – partially – self-definition shows instead 
a kind of reawakening in the youngest cohort for orthodox countries. At a first 
glance, these findings seem to support the individualization theory’s claim for 
those countries. To better investigate this point and to clarify whether these 
results have to be interpreted in the light of their Communist past, I devoted an 
entire chapter to the inspection of the trends for the Former-Communist 
countries. This analysis showed that this resurgence of belief is mainly a matter 
of Orthodoxy (and its political use to burn the bridges with the Communist past), 
given that the U-shaped trend for religious belief is stronger for Orthodox 
Former-Communist countries and less pronounced for Catholic ones.  
 
In the theoretical chapter, I described secularization theory as a broad-spectrum 
theory comprising many mechanisms that link processes of modernization with 
the decline of religiosity. Among these, we are particularly interested in the so 
called “insecurity theory” which states that modernization leads to secularization 
because of the augmented security individuals feel in modern and wealthy 
countries. Despite its interest, this theory is scarcely investigated in sociology and 
its empirical test is limited to the works by Norris and Inglehart (2004) and 
Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2011). Also theoretically, the insecurity theory is in 
need of development. One of the most problematic aspects mainly regards the 
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level of analysis: does the relation between insecurity and religiosity works only 
when looking at country differences or does it hold also for individuals? To put in 
another way: is insecurity linked to religiosity also in wealthy countries and 
societies? Does individual situations of insecurity foster religiosity over and 
above country effects? The core of this work tackles explicitly this issue.       
 
In doing this, I firstly presented the main contributions by sociology; in addition 
to the Norris and Inglehart’s one, all the theoretical works are basically based on 
the idea of Sacred Canopy by Peter Berger (1967). According to him, religion 
works as a shield to protect humankind against chaos and insecurity. The scarce 
theoretical development of a sociological theory of insecurity is quite surprising 
given that psychology has instead dealt consistently with the use of religion as 
stress copying mechanism. Scholars from the field assume that religion can 
furnish a plenty of mechanisms to cope with situations of insecurity: these 
mechanisms range from the social support given by religious communities and 
reinforced by regular practice to the individual and intimate prayer and beliefs. 
 
After this attempt to put together elements from both sociology and psychology 
to build a coherent theoretical framework, I devoted two analytical chapters to 
test the main hypotheses of the theory. In the first one, I used a comparative 
cross-sectional approach to test the effects of both individual and contextual 
situations of insecurity on the three dimensions of religiosity. Results show that 
the main effects regard country features whereas only widowhood seems to 
have a – very small – effect on religiosity among individual level variables. All 
these effects are more noticeable on religious belief whereas religious practice 
and self-definition seem to be more resilient to external variables. To go deeper 
into the analysis of the individual link between episodes of insecurity and 
religiosity, in the second analytical chapter I used instead panel-data to test the 
relation for Germany and Great Britain. Also in this case we found no significant 
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effects except for widowhood (but also in this case the effect is rather 
negligible). 
 
Given this summary, it is evident that many questions arose. These questions 
regard both methodological issues (is a multidimensional framework needed to 
study patterns of religiosity? Does multilevel approach permit a proper study of 
the relations between macro variables and micro outcomes? Do longitudinal 
panel-studies represent a better test for individual-level relations?) and 
theoretical ones. Concerning these latter, the main question behind is whether 
insecurity theory represents a relevant contribution to explain the causes of the 
religious differences Europe is experiencing. Given the saliency of both aspects, I 
will devote two different paragraphs to their investigation. After these two 
paragraphs, I will try to conclude opening the field to some further steps that are 
needed to expand more the theoretical comprehension of this theory. 
9.1 Theoretical conclusions 
What we have discovered so far is that some country-features related to 
insecurity (welfare spending and inequalities) show some effects on religiosity – 
especially on belief – whereas only widowhood shows some impact among 
individual situations of insecurity.  
 
From both the theoretical and methodological chapters, it should be clear that 
the link between insecurity and religiosity needs two requisites to work. On the 
one side, a quite high level of insecurity is expected. On the other side, religion is 
likely to be used as coping strategy only when it represents a common choice 
within the living context. To put in another way, a quite big amount of “religious 
capital” is needed for making religion the first available strategy to cope with 
adverse situations. 
 
These two requisites are strongly interrelated because they are both linked to 
modernization processes. Regarding the first, we should bear in mind that along 
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this work we explicitly focused on Europe and that even the most insecure 
European country shows quite high levels of security if compared to many 
worldwide countries. This consideration has clear theoretical relevance because 
means that, regarding insecurity, almost every European country has reached 
high levels of modernization. Regarding the second instead, it is noteworthy to 
say that the “religious capital” is getting weaker and weaker as secularization 
processes unfold. The main result for this is that individuals are not likely to use 
religion as coping strategy anymore.   
 
In light of these considerations, the research agenda on the field should be 
reappraised: instead of wondering if the insecurity theory is a relevant part of 
the secularization theory, it might be better to investigate when and where the 
insecurity theory applies. 
 
Starting from the period around the sixties, the dichotomy “religious versus not 
religious” seemed not to be the appropriate way to look at religious phenomena 
in Europe. The deep societal changes we observed in the ’60 completely re-
framed religions and their position within society. Religion was the central and 
collective source of identity and Christianity was undoubtedly the main feature 
that unified European society. After the sixties, this scenario changed 
dramatically: religion started to be only an option among many and Christianity 
itself became an option among many other religions. (Stolz and Könemann 
2016).  
 
This of course causes a weakening of religious transmission and religion itself. 
When raising their children, parents place individual autonomy above conformity 
to tradition. This causes a “snow ball” trend toward the collapse of the “sacred 
canopy”. Religion is no longer perceived as the defense mechanism against chaos 
(Berger 1967) and thus a weakening of its role as coping strategy is likely to be 
expected. The general idea behind is that as far as modernization proceed, its 
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impact on religion unfolds (weakening religion) and thus even the mechanisms 
behind lose strength having already “done their job”.   
 
When Norris and Inglehart (2004) wrote their book, they explicitly test the 
theory by comparing worldwide countries. In the light of what said before, these 
countries widely differ regarding their placing on the path toward modernization. 
When comparing modern and secularized countries with pre-modern and less 
secularized ones, results are likely to be found. In countries where the 
modernization process has not fully unfolded yet, religion is still strong and the 
same its coping function. On the contrary, in the secularized European countries 
religious relevance is weaker and the same its role as coping strategy.  
 
Given this, it is appropriate to describe the path toward European religious 
modernity as follows. In past times religion’s social relevance was stronger, it 
was the “sacred canopy” which protect men against chaos and insecurity. At the 
same time, the insecurity itself was higher and thus a strong link between the 
two was expected. This mechanism is however exhausted in modern time 
because while insecurity was decreasing, religiosity was doing the same. Being 
weaker its social relevance, religion in modern time is less and less considered as 
the preferred way to cope with threatening situations. Many other ways of 
threating insecurities (biomedicine, insurance, psychology etc.) have 
progressively replaced religion for almost all members of the European society, 
regardless their individual insecurity: the sacred canopy has collapsed. 
 
From this derives that insecurity theory has a higher explanatory power when 
comparing some third-world countries and western wealthy societies, but within 
Europe its theoretical power is weaker. The differences we have in present time 
between European countries and less modern ones can be similar with those we 
have between modern-day Europe and past Europe. When modernization 
225 
 
processes were at their first steps, both religiosity and insecurity were higher and 
therefore a stronger relation between the two was plausible.                       
9.2 Methodological conclusions 
Over and above the theoretical relevance of the topic, this work explicitly dealt 
with many methodological issues. The attempt is to find the best techniques and 
designs to consider many relevant aspects suggested by the literature. A good 
assessment of the link between theory and analysis represent an undeniable 
added value for every empirical work. In particular, I used innovative strategies 
to deal with the multidimensionality of the broad concept of religiosity and with 
the best possible assessment of the causality between micro variables. 
 
The idea of considering religiosity as a strongly multidimensional concept 
represents one of the main analytical cornerstones of this work. In linking this 
theoretical consideration to an analytical strategy there are a plenty of suitable 
techniques. I decided to use a special kind of multilevel models called 
“multivariate multilevel models” which have a very desirable feature. In fact, 
they can estimate more than one dependent variable within a single model: in 
doing so, it is possible to consider simultaneously their potential overlap as well 
as their differences. With a three-level model like the one we used in Chapters 5 
and 7, it is also possible to estimate the correlation coefficients between the 
different outcomes at different levels. In this regard, results show that the 
correlation between dimensions is quite high if evaluated at country-level but 
much lower between individuals. This confirm the idea that, when testing 
theories involving more than one dimension, this approach is more suitable that 
the unidimensional one (or the use of some scales) because it clearly reveals the 
difference between the effects on the various dependent variables. 
 
The core of this work was the assessment of the relation between individual and 
country insecurity and religiosity. In doing so we particularly focused on the 
individual link because we wanted to explicitly test the idea that individuals are 
226 
 
likely to use religion when facing life threatening-situations. I started with a 
cross-sectional model based on European data, which estimated only small 
effects for widowhood on religiosity. It is obvious that a cross-sectional model is 
suitable to test only associations between variables and that, in models of such 
complexity, it is not easy to speak about causality. To reinforce our findings, I 
used panel data to test similar hypotheses in a longitudinal way. The available 
data suggested us to focus only on two countries (but the approach can be 
extended to all the countries with suitable datasets) but the results we had were 
completely coherent with the cross sectional ones. This gave more strength to 
our findings and casted many doubts about the appropriateness of insecurity 
theory at individual level. 
9.3 Further developments and final remarks 
When we drew the theoretical conclusions of this work, we said that future 
research would be better pursued by investigating when and where the 
insecurity applies, rather than wondering if it is a component of the 
secularization theory. This because in the secularized Europe, religion is no 
longer considered as the sacred canopy which protect humankind against chaos 
and insecurity. Religion is likely to be used as coping strategy when religious 
capital is strong in the societal context but, as the literature about secularization 
as well as our results show, this is not the case for modern Europe.  
 
Institutional religiosity in Europe is disappearing but scholars from 
individualization theory affirm that it is being replaced with more individualized 
forms of religiosity. These individualized forms can take the shape of an 
individual Christian religiosity but also of “alternative” religiosity. What if the 
“institutional” religious capital is getting weaker year after year whereas some 
forms of “alternative” religious capital are getting stronger? It is likely that 
individuals should start to use this alternative religiosity as coping strategy? This 
idea is certainly a leap of faith but probably needs some consideration. 
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In their recent book, Stolz et al. (2016) define four different profiles of religiosity. 
Their typology comprises the three classic types (the “institutional”, the “secular” 
and the “distanced”) which have been explicitly or implicitly considered in this 
work. In addition, they propose a fourth one: the “alternative”. The alternative 
type comprises individuals who speak more of "spirituality" than of "religion"; 
they believe in Karma, angels, spirits, energies, crystals, stones, spiritual, healing, 
breathing and movement techniques and rituals. Their spirituality is holistic 
(everything is connected), syncretic (it mixes elements from different cultural 
backgrounds) and strongly focuses on nature as vital and sacred. This type is 
increasing both in number and in symbolic relevance (Stolz et al. 2016b). This 
“alternative spirituality” is, in modern time, tumultuous, kaleidoscopic, various 
and somehow more accepted than institutional religiosity (especially among the 
youngest). Considering also its emphasis on physical and mental health and well-
being, it should be the perfect “coping strategy” for a modern and individualized 
world.   
To sum up the entire path we ran, it is deserved to say that we found a decline 
cohort after cohort of the institutional religiosity in the form of religious practice 
and self-definition. Concerning belief, some cautions are instead needed because 
Orthodox countries are experiencing a kind of revival in the aftermath of 
Communist regimes. Whether this revival concerns exactly Christian belief or 
whether it regards the alternative forms or religiosity is hard to say. What is 
plausible indeed is that the new democratic political forces are using religion to 
“burn the bridges” with the Communist past. Maybe it is only a matter of time 
before the Former-Communist countries’ religious trends resemble those of the 
rest of Europe.   
This weakening of institutional religiosity in Europe is going hand by hand with 
the weakening of its functioning as coping strategy. In a situation characterized 
by low insecurity and low social relevance of religion, the “sacred canopy” has 
almost collapsed and its protective function is almost exhausted. Whereas this is 
the plausible scenario for modern countries, situations in which modernization 
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processes are at their first stages could show different relations. In addition, a 
possible substitute for institutional religiosity as coping strategy could be the use 
of alternative religiosity or spirituality in its place. This last approach is 
potentially interesting but now represents only an educated guess.            
 
Before concluding, I want to briefly present a summary of the possible 
developments of the insecurity theory for what concerns Europe:  
- The relation between macro-variables and individual religiosity has to be 
clarified. In situation like this, when many processes contribute to the 
same phenomena – modernization – it is not easy to disentangle the 
contribution given by each of them. 
- Concerning the individual-level relationship, it should be tested 
longitudinally in many other countries, focusing explicitly on the different 
levels of average religiosity. If the cues from psychological literature are 
confirmed, religion should be a possible coping strategy only in very 
religious countries. 
- The same individual relation should also be tested looking backward. The 
idea is the same as before: in a period when European insecurity was 
higher and when religious capital was stronger, maybe the relation 
between them was also stronger.  
- It should be interested to test the individual relation between insecurity 
and religiosity for small and cohesive (and thus with a strong religious 
capital) religious minorities.  
- The first four points of this list are based on an “institutional” definition 
of religion. As we discussed in this paragraph, an interesting and 
innovative development should be to consider also alternative forms of 
religiosity and spirituality. Does insecurity can foster the recourse to such 
alternative practice and belief? The question sounds interesting. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix 1: individuals surveyed by Wave 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 Total 
Austria X 1.460 1.522 1.510 4.492 
Belgium 1.145 2.792 1.912 1.509 7.358 
Bulgaria X 1.034 1.000 1.500 3.534 
Belarus X X 1.000 1.500 2.500 
Croatia X X 1.003 1.525 2.528 
Czech Republic X 2.109 1.908 1.821 5.838 
Denmark 1.182 1.030 1.023 1.507 4.742 
Estonia X 1.008 1.005 1.518 3.531 
Finland X 588 1.038 1.134 2.760 
France 1.200 1.002 1.615 1.501 5.318 
Germany 1.305 3.437 2.036 2.075 8.853 
Great Britain 1.167 1.484 1.000 1.561 5.212 
Greece X X 1.142 1.500 2.642 
Hungary X 999 1.000 1.513 3.512 
Iceland 927 702 968 808 3.405 
Ireland 1.217 1.000 1.012 1.013 4.242 
Italy 1.348 2.018 2.000 1.519 6.885 
Latvia X 903 1.013 1.506 3.422 
Lithuania X 1.000 1.018 1.500 3.518 
*Luxembourg X X 1.211 1.610 2.821 
Malta 467 393 1.002 1.500 3.362 
Netherlands 1.221 1.017 1.003 1.554 4.795 
Norway 1.051 1.239 X 1.090 3.380 
Poland X 982 1.095 1.510 3.587 
Portugal X 1.185 1.000 1.553 3.738 
Romania X 1.103 1.146 1.489 3.738 
Russian Fed. X X 2.500 1.504 4.004 
Slovak Republic X 1.136 1.331 1.509 3.976 
Slovenia X 1.035 1.006 1.366 3.407 
Spain 2.303 2.637 1.200 1.500 7.640 
Sweden 954 1.047 1.015 1.187 4.203 
Ukraine X X 1.195 1.507 2.702 
Total 15.487 34.340 38.919 46.899 135.645 
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Appendix 2: Individual Religious denomination by Country (row percentages). Country 
denomination (in bold). 
  
Roman 
Catholics 
Protestants 
Eastern 
Orthodox 
Other not 
Christian 
Total 
Austria 90,33 6,65 0,74 2,28 100 
Belgium 92,33 1,48 0,29 5,91 100 
Bulgaria 0,33 0,61 82,4 16,66 100 
Belarus 12,48 0,88 85,76 0,88 100 
Croatia 96,82 0,09 0,05 3,04 100 
Czech Republic 86,21 9,35 0,54 3,89 100 
Denmark 0,91 97,18 0,00 1,91 100 
Estonia a 3,17 45,01 45,92 5,90 100 
Finland 0,18 74,08 1,23 24,52 100 
France 92,14 2,06 0,76 5,04 100 
Germany a 44,5 52,16 0,33 3,02 100 
Great Britain 16,01 68,55 0,06 15,38 100 
Greece 1,06 0,00 97,56 1,38 100 
Hungary 72,19 24,08 0,15 3,57 100 
Iceland 0,92 94,48 0,00 4,60 100 
Ireland 95,78 2,39 0,1 1,73 100 
Italy 98,95 0,38 0,05 0,62 100 
Latvia a 33,04 30,89 30,94 5,13 100 
Lithuania 93,04 0,81 4,44 1,70 100 
Luxembourg 90,56 2,21 0,82 6,41 100 
Malta 98,79 0,79 0,03 0,39 100 
Netherlands a 52,41 25,63 0,00 21,97 100 
Norway 1,28 93,12 0,23 5,37 100 
Poland 98,03 0,24 0,38 1,35 100 
Portugal 96,58 0,85 0,00 2,56 100 
Romania 5,16 1,92 89,77 3,15 100 
Russian Fed. 0,49 0,49 91,69 7,33 100 
Slovak Republic 84,9 11,93 1,85 1,32 100 
Slovenia 94,06 0,37 1,69 3,88 100 
Spain 94,76 0,40 0,29 4,55 100 
Sweden 1,60 93,22 0,52 4,66 100 
Ukraine 8,24 3,19 70,14 18,43 100 
Total 57,05 24,05 13,70 5,20 100 
a: countries coded as "mixed" 
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Appendix 3: Cohorts by Wave 
Wave  <1930 '30s '40s '50s '60s '70s >'80s Missing Total 
1981-1984 4.555 2.235 2.662 3.730 2.266 0 0 39 15.487 
1990-1993 6.337 5.196 6.077 7.027 7.216 2.386 0 101 34.340 
1999-2001 4.008 5.336 5.821 7.411 7.610 7.186 1.420 127 38.919 
2008-2010 2.095 5.106 6.998 8.230 8.443 7.502 8.334 191 46.899 
Total 16.995 17.873 21.558 26.398 25.535 17.074 9.754 458 135.645 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Model 0 (null model) 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑗𝑘  𝜋1𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠2𝑗𝑘  𝜋2𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠3𝑗𝑘  𝜋3𝑗𝑘) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽0𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
𝛽0𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣0𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋2𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽1𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  
𝛽1𝑘 = 𝛽1 + 𝑣1𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋3𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽2𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 
𝛽2𝑘 = 𝛽2 + 𝑣2𝑘 
 
[
𝑣0𝑘
𝑣1𝑘
𝑣2𝑘
] ~𝑁(0, Ω𝑣) ∶ Ω = [
𝜎𝑣0
2
𝜎𝑣0 1 𝜎𝑣1
2
𝜎𝑣0 2 𝜎𝑣1 2 𝜎𝑣2
2
] 
cov[
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘|𝜋1𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘|𝜋2𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘|𝜋3𝑗𝑘
] = [
𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝜌[𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)
] 
𝑔(𝜋) = 𝜋(1 − 𝜋)/𝑛 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
Appendix 5: Model 1 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑗𝑘  𝜋1𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠2𝑗𝑘  𝜋2𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠3𝑗𝑘  𝜋3𝑗𝑘) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽0𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽4𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽9𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽12𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽13𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽14𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 
𝛽0𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣0𝑘 
𝛽3𝑘 = 𝛽3 + 𝑣3𝑘 
𝛽4𝑘 = 𝛽4 + 𝑣4𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋2𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽1𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽6𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽10𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽15𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽16𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽17𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  
𝛽1𝑘 = 𝛽1 + 𝑣1𝑘 
𝛽5𝑘 = 𝛽5 + 𝑣5𝑘 
𝛽6𝑘 = 𝛽6 + 𝑣6𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋3𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽2𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽8𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽11𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽18𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽19𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽20𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 
𝛽2𝑘 = 𝛽2 + 𝑣2𝑘 
𝛽7𝑘 = 𝛽7 + 𝑣7𝑘 
𝛽8𝑘 = 𝛽8 + 𝑣8𝑘 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑣0𝑘
𝑣1𝑘
𝑣2𝑘
𝑣3𝑘
𝑣4𝑘
𝑣5𝑘
𝑣6𝑘
𝑣7𝑘
𝑣8𝑘]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ~𝑁(0, Ω𝑣) ∶ Ω = 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑣0
2
𝜎𝑣0 1 𝜎𝑣1
2
𝜎𝑣0 2 𝜎𝑣1 2 𝜎𝑣2
2
𝜎𝑣0 3 𝜎𝑣1 3 𝜎𝑣2 3 𝜎𝑣3
2
𝜎𝑣0 4 𝜎𝑣1 4 𝜎𝑣2 4 𝜎𝑣3 4 𝜎𝑣4
2
𝜎𝑣0 5 𝜎𝑣1 5 𝜎𝑣2 5 𝜎𝑣3 5 𝜎𝑣4 5 𝜎𝑣5
2
𝜎𝑣0 6 𝜎𝑣1 6 𝜎𝑣2 6 𝜎𝑣3 6 𝜎𝑣4 6 𝜎𝑣5 6 𝜎𝑣6
2
𝜎𝑣0 7 𝜎𝑣1 7 𝜎𝑣2 7 𝜎𝑣3 7 𝜎𝑣4 7 𝜎𝑣5 7 𝜎𝑣6 7 𝜎𝑣7
2
𝜎𝑣0 8 𝜎𝑣1 8 𝜎𝑣2 8 𝜎𝑣3 8 𝜎𝑣4 8 𝜎𝑣5 8 𝜎𝑣6 8 𝜎𝑣7 8 𝜎𝑣8
2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cov[
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘|𝜋1𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘|𝜋2𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘|𝜋3𝑗𝑘
] = [
𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝜌[𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)
] 
𝑔(𝜋) = 𝜋(1 − 𝜋)/𝑛 
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Appendix 6: Model 2 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑗𝑘  𝜋1𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠2𝑗𝑘  𝜋2𝑗𝑘) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠3𝑗𝑘  𝜋3𝑗𝑘) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋1𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽0𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽4𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽9𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽12𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽13𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽14𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽21𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝐷𝑘
+ 𝛽22𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽23𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽30𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽31𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽32𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 
+ 𝛽33𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽34𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽35𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  
𝛽0𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣0𝑘 
𝛽3𝑘 = 𝛽3 + 𝑣3𝑘 
𝛽4𝑘 = 𝛽4 + 𝑣4𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋2𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽1𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽6𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽10𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽15𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽16𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽17𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽24𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝐵𝑘
+ 𝛽25𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝐵𝑘 + 𝛽26𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝐵𝑘 + 𝛽36𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
+ 𝛽37𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝛽38𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 
+ 𝛽39𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝛽40𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  
+  𝛽41𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  
𝛽1𝑘 = 𝛽1 + 𝑣1𝑘 
𝛽5𝑘 = 𝛽5 + 𝑣5𝑘 
𝛽6𝑘 = 𝛽6 + 𝑣6𝑘 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋3𝑗𝑘) =  𝛽2𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽8𝑘𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽11𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  
+  𝛽18𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽19𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒3. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽20𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒4. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝛽27𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑃𝑘
+ 𝛽28𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑃𝑘 + 𝛽29𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑃𝑘 + 𝛽42𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
+ 𝛽43𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝛽44𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^1. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 
+ 𝛽45𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝛽46𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  
+  𝛽47𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥. 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡^2. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  
𝛽2𝑘 = 𝛽2 + 𝑣2𝑘 
𝛽7𝑘 = 𝛽7 + 𝑣7𝑘 
𝛽8𝑘 = 𝛽8 + 𝑣8𝑘 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑣0𝑘
𝑣1𝑘
𝑣2𝑘
𝑣3𝑘
𝑣4𝑘
𝑣5𝑘
𝑣6𝑘
𝑣7𝑘
𝑣8𝑘]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ~𝑁(0, Ω𝑣) ∶ Ω = 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑣0
2
𝜎𝑣0 1 𝜎𝑣1
2
𝜎𝑣0 2 𝜎𝑣1 2 𝜎𝑣2
2
𝜎𝑣0 3 𝜎𝑣1 3 𝜎𝑣2 3 𝜎𝑣3
2
𝜎𝑣0 4 𝜎𝑣1 4 𝜎𝑣2 4 𝜎𝑣3 4 𝜎𝑣4
2
𝜎𝑣0 5 𝜎𝑣1 5 𝜎𝑣2 5 𝜎𝑣3 5 𝜎𝑣4 5 𝜎𝑣5
2
𝜎𝑣0 6 𝜎𝑣1 6 𝜎𝑣2 6 𝜎𝑣3 6 𝜎𝑣4 6 𝜎𝑣5 6 𝜎𝑣6
2
𝜎𝑣0 7 𝜎𝑣1 7 𝜎𝑣2 7 𝜎𝑣3 7 𝜎𝑣4 7 𝜎𝑣5 7 𝜎𝑣6 7 𝜎𝑣7
2
𝜎𝑣0 8 𝜎𝑣1 8 𝜎𝑣2 8 𝜎𝑣3 8 𝜎𝑣4 8 𝜎𝑣5 8 𝜎𝑣6 8 𝜎𝑣7 8 𝜎𝑣8
2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cov[
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝1𝑗𝑘|𝜋1𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝2𝑗𝑘|𝜋2𝑗𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝3𝑗𝑘|𝜋3𝑗𝑘
] = [
𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)
𝜌[𝑔(𝜋1𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝜌[𝑔(𝜋2𝑗𝑘)𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)]
0.5 𝑔(𝜋3𝑗𝑘)
] 
𝑔(𝜋) = 𝜋(1 − 𝜋)/𝑛 
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Appendix 7: Typology categories by cohort (divided by Christian doctrines) 
Roman Catholics 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully 
atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
Other/missing Total 
<1930 26.40 11.32 9.74 12.43 23.82 16.29 100.00 
'30s 23.47 12.92 9.50 11.14 26.89 16.08 100.00 
'40s 17.69 18.62 9.58 9.10 29.19 15.80 100.00 
'50s 13.17 23.63 10.19 7.23 29.12 16.67 100.00 
'60s 11.55 24.74 11.20 6.93 28.22 17.35 100.00 
'70s 10.49 26.51 14.34 4.98 26.69 16.99 100.00 
>'80s 9.39 32.04 17.12 3.19 24.16 14.09 100.00 
Total 16.05 21.01 11.18 8.08 27.30 16.38 100.00 
                
Mixed 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully 
atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
Other/missing Total 
<1930 10.39 18.12 6.60 10.39 33.32 21.17 100.00 
'30s 6.88 23.10 7.32 7.26 32.72 22.72 100.00 
'40s 4.54 28.23 6.57 3.99 34.42 22.24 100.00 
'50s 3.35 33.86 6.68 2.72 28.26 25.12 100.00 
'60s 3.27 35.88 7.23 2.54 25.93 25.16 100.00 
'70s 2.95 37.99 10.16 1.59 25.48 21.83 100.00 
>'80s 2.75 43.49 13.12 0.55 25.32 14.77 100.00 
Total 4.94 30.53 7.55 4.38 29.73 22.86 100.00 
                
Protestants 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully 
atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
Other/missing Total 
<1930 5.44 18.00 12.70 3.69 46.06 14.11 100.00 
'30s 4.21 23.89 11.85 1.99 43.87 14.18 100.00 
'40s 3.38 27.50 9.71 1.57 42.30 15.55 100.00 
'50s 3.34 32.00 9.93 1.30 37.15 16.28 100.00 
'60s 2.79 35.92 10.67 1.06 33.04 16.51 100.00 
'70s 2.85 37.00 12.28 0.96 29.49 17.42 100.00 
>'80s 3.00 44.29 11.04 0.83 22.52 18.32 100.00 
Total 3.57 30.24 10.97 1.66 37.68 15.88 100.00 
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Eastern Orthodox 
Cohort 
Fully 
religious 
Fully 
atheist 
Believe 
without 
belonging 
Belong 
without 
believing 
Identitarian 
religious 
Other/missing Total 
<1930 12.82 14.01 25.17 3.19 31.47 13.35 100.00 
'30s 12.96 17.82 22.14 3.17 31.03 12.88 100.00 
'40s 9.96 19.81 20.54 2.01 32.11 15.58 100.00 
'50s 7.53 21.24 21.59 1.68 31.88 16.09 100.00 
'60s 5.64 19.91 24.93 1.34 29.91 18.26 100.00 
'70s 5.03 18.47 28.31 1.48 29.34 17.37 100.00 
>'80s 4.88 20.40 33.43 0.90 25.37 15.02 100.00 
Total 7.94 19.23 24.77 1.86 30.30 15.89 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8: Individuals surveyed by countries and waves 
 
EVS-wave 
   1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 Total 
 
(n) (n) (n) (n) 
Bulgaria 1,034 1,000 1,500 3,534 
Belarus 0 1,000 1,500 2,500 
Czech Republic 2,109 1,908 1,821 5,838 
Estonia 1,008 1,005 1,518 3,531 
Hungary 999 1,000 1,513 3,512 
Latvia 903 1,013 1,506 3,422 
Lithuania 1,000 1,018 1,500 3,518 
Poland 982 1,095 1,510 3,587 
Romania 1,103 1,146 1,489 3,738 
Russian Federation 0 2,500 1,504 4,004 
Slovak Republic 1,136 1,331 1,509 3,976 
Ukraine 0 1,195 1,507 2,702 
Total 10,274 15,211 18,377 43,862 
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Appendix 9: Individuals surveyed by countries and cohorts 
 
Cohort 
  <1930 '30s '40s '50s '60s '70s '80s Total 
 
(n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) 
Bulgaria 377 554 618 699 633 405 247 3,533 
Belarus 116 211 315 428 483 468 479 2,500 
Czech Republic 706 831 1,065 1,115 959 745 382 5,803 
Estonia 306 504 582 641 685 509 303 3,530 
Hungary 408 427 517 683 601 509 365 3,510 
Latvia 242 475 571 657 656 465 356 3,422 
Lithuania 279 483 503 652 689 548 363 3,517 
Poland 336 493 500 776 632 439 378 3,554 
Romania 353 532 583 743 676 536 315 3,738 
Russian Federation 367 530 492 837 726 644 394 3,990 
Slovak Republic 406 545 642 905 781 493 193 3,965 
Ukraine 187 338 406 531 491 432 317 2,702 
Total 4,083 5,923 6,794 8,667 8,012 6,193 4,092 43,764 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10: Sample selection procedure BHPS-Understanding Society panel dataset 
  id observations 
Original sample 33,540 293,104 
…after dropping missing values on id 33,540 290,927 
…after dropping non-original sample 14,578 181,400 
…after dropping individuals with some gaps 7,387 116,286 
…after dropping individuals with less than three 
waves 6,947 115,679 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
